May 19, 2025

 

Scott Gehlbach, the Elise and Jack Lipsey Professor in the Department of Political Science, the Harris School of Public Policy, and the College at the University of Chicago

Scott Gehlbach is the Elise and Jack Lipsey Professor in the Department of Political Science, the Harris School of Public Policy, and the College at the University of Chicago. A scholar of authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes, much of Gehlbach’s research is motivated by the contemporary and historical experience of Russia and Ukraine.

Last month, we sat down with Professor Gehlbach to discuss the state of the war in Ukraine, what about the conflict has surprised him, and where it goes from here.

There’s a new president of the United States now. What would you say about the state-of-play now that the Trump administration is in office?

The Trump administration is hoping to impose a deal. My read is that the suggested deal is skewed in Russia's favor, with Russia not being asked for any significant concessions as far as I can tell. Ukraine, on the other hand, is being asked for quite a bit, including the de facto loss of the territory that Russia has seized in the war, as well as recognition by the United States of Crimea as sovereign Russian territory, which of course was sovereign Ukrainian territory seized by Russia just 10 short years ago.

If Ukraine were forced to accept an unfavorable arrangement, could this invite future Russian aggression?

Quite possibly. At some level, Ukrainians are in a much better position to deter or at least push back against future Russian aggression today than they were three years ago. One of the things that's interesting is how much military production has moved to Ukraine itself; the Europeans are investing significantly in Ukrainian production. It's not just weapons transfer from Europe and the United States to Ukraine, as it was at the war’s outset, so this model is likely to be more sustainable over the long run.

What does the U.S. provide?

The big things that the U.S. provides are difficult for Ukraine or even European countries to provide on their own. There's just not a great substitute for Patriot missiles (air defense) and American intelligence. If those capabilities were withdrawn by the U.S., that would certainly have an effect.

Has the nature of the war evolved over time? 

We've seen an incredible evolution in military technology and tactics over the past three years. At this point, it has become much more of a drone war. There are still some traditional armored units, but both sides have lost significant amounts of capacity there. The Ukrainians have gotten very good at drone production, and this shift in military tactics to the use of drones favors Ukraine in that it will enable them to establish lines that would be difficult for Russia to breach in some future offensive.

What do you think will happen over the next couple years? 

The rate of advance is so slow now, and the costs are so high that it seems likely that at some point this is going to settle into some sort of frozen conflict. The question becomes: If that's the inevitable outcome, why should Ukraine settle for less than that today? Obviously, there will be more loss of life, but there are other principles and important issues at stake. One hugely underappreciated factor is that Zelenskyy is a democratically elected leader and, as such, he must be responsive to the Ukrainian public. I don't think he or any other Ukrainian leader could agree to the surrender of Crimea.

Do you think the Ukrainian people are willing to accept a negotiated peace?

What would Americans think if some other country occupied the U.S. west to the Rockies? Would we just surrender it just for the sake of peace?

It’s important to remember that just about everybody in Ukraine knows someone who has been killed in the war – and that affects how they think about potential negotiations. In the polling data, you see real support in Ukraine for not compromising fundamental issues of sovereignty. You also see substantial support for Zelenskyy: In fact, support for Zelenskyy went up after his contentious meeting with Trump in the Oval Office on February 28. Perhaps paradoxically, Trump's actions might have even bolstered Ukrainians’ commitment to fighting.

What have been the biggest surprises for you around how the war has unfolded?

There have been lots of surprises. The nature of Russia’s initial attack was a surprise. I expected a missile attack and conflict in the East, but the major drive on Kiev shocked me. I'm not a military historian, but when I saw this big column of tanks advancing on Kiev, I thought gosh, it seems like the Russians should be vulnerable. Aren't they just sitting ducks? As it turns out, they were.

Later on, it seemed that the big Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in September 2023 would be successful. I believed that the Ukrainians would punch through the Russian lines, and they didn't. 

A third major surprise is what the war has become: a sort of hybrid conflict between Star Wars (with drone technology) and World War I (with trenches that just don't move for weeks or months at a time).

There have been plenty of surprises and lessons for all of us. To wit, China has apparently embedded personnel behind Russian lines trying to draw tactical lessons from the war. You also have U.S. generals speaking openly about everything they've learned about war in the 21st century from this conflict.

How has the Ukrainian economy changed?

There's been a reorientation of the economy towards military production. Long term, Ukraine's economic future lies with Europe, and there's overwhelming support in Ukraine for EU membership. It's interesting that the plan that has been proposed by the Trump administration does not call for Ukraine to give up on its aspirations to join the EU, only on its aspirations to join NATO. I think EU membership is probably going to happen sooner or later.  Getting all your ducks in a row for an EU membership bid means reorganizing your bureaucracy, adopting certain laws, and sending your bureaucrats to Brussels, and all of that helps to create the sort of institutions that are good for economic growth in general.

What’s life like in Kiev?

I taught there in summer of 2023. I was surprised when I went to Kiev by how normal it felt on the surface. It's a well-functioning city. Public transit works, the streets are clean, and the buildings look nice – in better shape, it might seem, than a typical American city. But then you look a little bit more closely and you understand what's different. The restaurants close at nine o'clock so that people can get home before the curfew, and there were a couple of air raids while I was there. You get up in the middle of the night, you go down to the basement -- ultimately, people carry on.

I’ll always remember being at the train station when I was departing. It was full of men back from the front lines for a week. Their families were all around, back for the week to see their husband or father while he’s on leave. Patriotic music played on the loudspeakers. Dark curtains covered the windows as an air defense measure. For me, that was a very impressionable moment.

Any final predictions? 

I expect the war to grind on. I think that the space for a negotiated agreement between Russia and Ukraine probably doesn’t exist so long as Putin is alive. After Putin, it’s possible to imagine an agreement that would be acceptable to both the Russian government and to the Ukrainian public. Those are the parties that need to buy into any agreement.

The Ukrainian front line is unlikely to collapse, even if the U.S. just walks away. The whole thing is awful and it’s due to the ego, delusions, and miscalculations of one man.