Professor Konstantin Sonin Sheds Light on Purges During Joseph Stalin's Great Terror in New Paper

In the history of authoritarian regimes, purges have been a common tool rulers use to maintain control by removing perceived threats. One of the most notorious episodes of purges took place during Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror of 1937-38, when over half of the high-ranking military officers in the Soviet Union were arrested, and many were executed.

A recent BFI working paper coauthored by Alexei Zakharov and Konstantin Sonin, the John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the Harris School of Public Policy, entitled “The Anatomy of the Great Terror: A Quantitative Analysis of the 1937-38 Purges in the Red Army,” sheds new light on this dark chapter through data analysis and historical research, and provides the first systematic evidence that the Great Terror directly impacted the Red Army’s failures in the beginning of the German invasion in 1941.

“Very little is known about the logic behind these sweeping episodes of elite repression, despite their fame,” Sonin said. “Stalin did not leave memoirs, and most of the records remain closed to the public in modern-day Russia. This paper allows us to look inside this black box and attempt to understand what Stalin intended and how he went about executing his plan.”

The scholars’ analysis suggests that Stalin’s actions were preventive rather than reactive, aiming to neutralize possible challengers before they could gain any real power. One key finding of their study is the likelihood of repression of younger officers and those who had achieved high ranks at a young age. This challenges conventional wisdom by suggesting that Stalin’s purges were not entirely driven by loyalty or political affiliation, but rather by a desire to eliminate competent officers who might pose a potential threat to his rule.

As the authors point out, officers who reached high ranks early in their careers were often seen as highly competent and potentially ambitious. This reflects a preemptive strategy by Stalin to reduce the chances of a coup or rebellion, a move not driven by a specific conspiracy but by a more general concern about maintaining absolute control over the Soviet military—a question historians have debated for years.

In examining the patterns of repression, the study also confirms some well-known aspects of Stalin's purges, such as the higher likelihood of repression for certain ethnic minorities and officers with foreign contacts. At the same time, the authors challenge previous academic scholarship by revealing a more nuanced understanding of the Soviet military. For example, their analysis highlights an inverse relationship between military promotions and age in the early 1940s, with younger officers often being preferred for promotion. This trend, however, contrasts sharply with the purge's simultaneous focus on eliminating younger officers—often with fake justifications—and underscores the purges’ contradictory nature.

The ultimate consequence of these purges was felt when the German forces invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. The Red Army’s poor initial response to the invasion has often been attributed to the decimation of its high command during the Great Terror. By removing the most competent and talented officers, Stalin's purges significantly weakened the military leadership at a critical time. The authors’ findings reveal how the purges inadvertently contributed to one of the most disastrous periods in Soviet military history.

By analyzing a comprehensive dataset of Soviet generals, the authors demonstrate that the purges were not a reaction to immediate threats, but a preemptive strategy aimed at maintaining Stalin’s grip on power.

“Stalin did not simply target older, established military figures who could rise against him, but largely promising young officers, removing them not only from the political scene as potential rivals but from the military scene when World War II came about,” Sonin said. “This analysis contributes to a literature seeking to understand how authoritarian purges can shape both political systems and military outcomes in times of crisis—once again leading to bad outcomes.”