Many Factors Come Into Play When Deciding the Cause of Degenerate Autocracy, Study Finds

Dictators often pursue policies that result in their own demise, a new study coauthored by Konstantin Sonin, John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at Harris, argues. History abounds with disasters that not only could have been avoided, but many leaders appear to opt into failures that a rational actor would have avoided. What’s more puzzling is that such leaders often operate within complex institutional frameworks where they are supported by teams of expert advisers – yet the result remains the same.

The working paper, which Sonin coauthored with Georgy Egorov, Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Science at Northwestern University, was released on July 26. The authors explain the contradiction, using game theory to propose a cycle through which the need for regime security dictates the replacement of technocrats by incompetent loyalists and ultimately leads to disastrous decisions.

“Our theory makes specific predictions about the dynamics of individual dictatorships,” the authors write. “A new leader might be surrounded by brilliant people when he comes to power. His tenure might follow either a bloody or peaceful path, depending on many circumstances, including both luck and rational decisions. The dictators that stay in power long enough to witness their power wane become fearful of losing their position.

“Because of this fear, they replace competent subordinates with loyal ones, which ultimately leads to poor advice and bad policy. As a result, the successes of a dictator’s earlier years fall victim to later years attempts (often futile) to hold on to power,” they continue.

This paper demonstrates the critical complementarity between the emphasis on loyalty and repression of opposition, which results, dynamically, in a “degenerate autocracy.”

The authors’ theory proceeds as follows:

First, leaders appoint advisers upon whose expertise they rely for policymaking. Appointment decisions are based on the competency of the advisers, and advisers’ policy advice depends on two factors: the level of vulnerability of the incumbent, and advisers’ own prospects under the new regime if the incumbent fails. Since advisers are better informed, they can misguide leaders. The wrong policy choice by a vulnerable leader will result in a change at the top.

The shift into autocracy begins with a leader’s decision to repress their opposition. By doing so, they lessen their present odds of being challenged but raise the future stakes of power struggles. Faced with the fear of overthrow, the repressive leader appoints less competent advisers who are loyal and less likely to identify their vulnerability. Less competent advisers give poorer policy advice.

Egorov and Sonin conclude that even when decisions are not ultimately detrimental for the regime, such as Mao’s Great Leap Forward in China or Pol Pot’s collectivization drive in Cambodia, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being made and implemented.

They warn that dictators who combine an emphasis on loyalty with repression of opposition may create degenerate democracy. The framework provided is useful for making sense of historical moments that previously lacked explanation, such as Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as well as for predicting future dynamics.