

The Political Economy of Development PPHA 42310

James Robinson

Fall 2016

This course is intended as an introduction for Ph.D. students to the research literature in the political economy of development. Its purpose is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of how social science methodological tools are used in the area. The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the field an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material with *'s in detail and also discuss the material without *'s, but in less detail. There is a “book of the day” for each reading which I will talk about briefly. Though the research papers in this course tend to be short and focused on very specific questions that one can hopefully answer in a convincing way, often inspiration, ideas and questions themselves come from very different sorts of research, qualitative, ethnographic and works which have studied a subject in a very different way than you might. I hope you'll come away from the class with some appreciation of this perspective and the rich set of ideas and questions it provides for us. There is a great deal of knowledge about the world out there even if it isn't presented in ways which attempt to establish causal hypotheses. Even more important, sometimes the thirst to establish causal hypotheses leads us to set aside things which ultimately turn out to be very important.

This is a very eclectic subject but the theme that unites it is an argument that traditional approaches to trying to understand economic development, particularly in terms of the ‘fundamentals’ of standard economic models, cannot satisfactorily account for the evidence. ‘Satisfactorily’ is a bit “in the eye of the beholder” and this course will necessarily be a bit subjective. Nevertheless, I'll try to argue using many different sources of evidence from regressions, through case studies and ethnographic material, that it is very unlikely that the tools development economists have used for the past 50 years to study why poor countries stay poor and why rich countries got rich, are sufficient for the task.

The main argument is going to be that societies are organized in very different ways with very different consequences for prosperity. We talk about these differences in organization in terms of the institutional differences in society, the differences in the rules which create very different patterns of incentives and opportunities and very different allocations of resources. Institutions will be thought of in a very broad way, from traditional economic institutions

like property rights, though political institutions, such as how collective decision are made, all the way to social institutions like kinship relationships. This is a much broader agenda than traditional ‘institutionalism’ in economics or political science but I think logically we have to anticipate that any aspect of the way a society is organized could have important consequences for the economy and I’m going to give you a lot of examples of this.

Why then the emphasis on ‘political’ as in ‘political economy of development’. That’s an empirical claim that to understand institutional differences and their consequences for prosperity you need to understand power and how it is exercised. Put simply, the institutions of a society are chosen by the society themselves through some process of collective decision making (preference aggregation). Different distributions of power in society lead to different collective choices and these have different consequences for development. If this is right then understanding comparative development is ultimately going to be about understanding comparative politics.

This is not the only way to think about institutional differences however, as we will see. Standard views in economic theory would suggest institutional differences are efficient and reflect differences in underlying circumstances (factor endowments etc.). Such theories regard the distribution of power in society as irrelevant to understanding institutions and the efficiency of resource allocation (though it may determine the distribution of surplus). If this view is correct (and I’ll present evidence that it isn’t) then institutional differences cannot be the source of comparative economic development. Other views emphasize the cultural origins of institutional differences, I’ll give examples of these and of other views which emphasize the ideological origins of institutional differences. Examples suggest that both of these approaches have explanatory power in some contexts. The main issue is how important quantitatively they are compared to other (e.g. political) approaches. I’m going to mostly emphasize the political approach, but I think you should keep an open mind about the others which have been much less researched and studied empirically.

Grading: The course grade will be based on a paper which every student has to write. The last two classes of the quarter will be given over to short presentations of the paper idea. I find this a useful deadline for people and a great way to get feedback on a project. The aim is not to have a well crafted research paper by the end of the quarter but rather to have a good question or puzzle that interests you, where you can place it in a literature and come up with a research design. This is usually empirical, but you don’t even need to have run a regression, but know what data would you use, what is the hypothesis, what model would I estimate? That being said previous incarnations of this course at Harvard were taken by Ph.D. students outside of economics and political science including in sociology and history. If you have no idea about econometrics coming into the course you may struggle to get much out of a lot of the readings but I’m still happy to discuss if it could work for you and what sort of paper you’d write for the course.

Course Information:

Professor

James Robinson: jamesrobinson@uchicago.edu

Office Harris 176.

Office Hours: Thursday 3-5pm.

Teaching Assistant

TBA.

Lecture

Tuesday, Thursday 10.30-11.50pm.

1 How Politics Matters for Development (September 27)

I start with a series of examples to motivate why we are interested in the political economy of development.

- **Bates, Robert H. (1981)** *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- **Douglas, Mary (1962)** “Lele Economy compared to the Bushong,” in Paul Bohannan and George Dalton eds. *Markets in Africa*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- **Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane and Pablo Querubín (2015)** “State Capacity, Local Governance, and Economic Development in Vietnam,”

http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dell/files/150502_master.pdf?m=1444163927

- **Malinowski, Bronislaw (1921)** “The Primitive Economics of the Trobriand Islanders,” *Economic Journal*, 31, No. 121, 1-16.
- **Paige, Jeffrey (1998)** *Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- **Udry, Christopher and Goldstein, Markus (2008)** “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6), 981-1022.

2 Why Does Politics cause Poverty? (September 29)

- (*) **Wittman, Donald (1989)** “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 97(6), 1395-1424.
- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron (2003)** “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?” *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31, 620-652.
- **Acemoglu, Daron (2005)** “Modelling Inefficient Institutions,” *Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006*,
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1214
- (*) **Galiani, Galiani, Sebastian, Gustavo Torrens and Maria Lucia Yanguas (2014)** “The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental Evidence,” NBER Working Paper No. 19943.

- **Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent (1990)** “The Development of Irrigation in Provence 1700-1860: The French Revolution and Economic Growth,” *Journal of Economic History*, 50, 615-638.

Book of the Day: Kelly, Raymond C. (1993) *Constructing Inequality*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

3 Power (October 4)

Power and comparative statics. The power function, different conceptions of power, social networks, asset ownership, interlinkage, collective action.

- (*) **Dippel, Christian, Avner Greif and Daniel Trefler (2015)** “The Rents From Trade and Coercive Institutions: Removing the Sugar Coating,” NBER Working Paper No. 20958.
- (*) **Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas (2007)** “Economics of Conflict: An Overview,” in Todd Sandler and K. Hartley (eds.), *Handbook of Defense Economics*, Vol. II, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 649-709.

<http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sskaperd/GarfinkelskaperdasHB0306.pdf>

- **Padgett, John F. and Ansell, Christopher K. (1993)** “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 98 (6), 1259-1319.
- (*) **Naidu, Suresh, James A. Robinson and Lauren Young (2015)** “Social Origins of Dictatorship: Evidence from Haiti,” Unpublished.
- (*) **Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2008)** “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile,” *American Economic Review*, 98, 1737–65.
- **Basu, Kaushik (1986)** “One Kind of Power,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 38, 259-282.

Book of the Day: Dahl, Robert (1961) *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven: Yale University Press,

4 Economic Institutions (October 6)

Some basic econometric evidence on the connection between economic institutions and comparative development.

- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A. (2001)** “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review*, 91, 1369-1401.

- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Francisco A. Gallego and James A. Robinson (2014)** “Institutions, Human Capital and Development,” *Annual Reviews of Economics*, 6, 875-912.
- **Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2010)** “Property Rights and Economic Development,” in Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig eds., *Handbook of Development Economics*, Vol. 5, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 4525-4595.

<http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ghatak/handbook.pdf>

Book of the Day: de Soto, Hernando (1989) *The Other Path*, New York: Basic Books.

5 Political Institutions

5.1 The State: Origins (October 11)

Some ideas and evidence about what creates variation in the nature and effectiveness of states.

- (*) **Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2009)** “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics,” *American Economic Review*, 99(4), 1218-44.
- (*) **Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul (2014)** “On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo,” <http://raulsanchezdelasierra.com/papers/>
- (*) **Osafo-Kwaako, Philip and James A. Robinson (2013)** “Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa,” *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41 (1): 534-564.

Book of the Day: Herbst, Jeffrey I. (2000) *States and Power in Africa Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.

5.2 The State: Consequences (October 13)

- (*) **Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou (2013)** “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113–152.
- **Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno and James Robinson (2015)** “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach,” *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2364-2409.
- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Jacob Moscona and James A. Robinson (2016)** “State Capacity and American Technology,” *American Economic Review*, 106(5), 61-67.

- (*) **Heldring, Leander (2015)** “State Capacity and Violence in Rwanda,”

<https://sites.google.com/site/leanderheldring/>

- **Frederico Finan, Benjamin A. Olken, Rohini Pande (2015)** “The Personnel Economics of the State,” NBER Working Paper 21825.

Book of the Day: Evans, Peter B. (1995) *Embedded Autonomy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

5.3 The Regime #1: Dictatorship (October 18)

Models of dictatorship and their predictions about institutions and development.

- (*) **Francois, Patrick, Ilya Rainer and Francesco Trebbi (2015)** “How is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica*, 83(2), 465–503.
- (*) **Guidolin, Massimo, and Eliana La Ferrara (2007)** “Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?” *American Economic Review*, 97(5), 1978-1993.
- **Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2007)** “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 74(4): 1259-1274.

Book of the Day: Albertus, Michael (2015) *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

5.4 The Regime #2: Democracy (October 20)

The contrast with democracy..

- (*) **Aidt, Toke S. and Raphaël Franck (2015)** “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832,” *Econometrica*, 83,(2), 505–547.
- (*) **Fujiwara, Thomas (2015)** “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil,” *Econometrica*, 2015, 83(2): 423-464.
- (*) **Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. (2005)** “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, 835-864.
- **Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria and Gerard Padró i Miquel (2015)** “The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya”, *American Economic Review*, 105 (6), 1817-51.

Book of the Day: Runciman, David (2015) *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

5.5 The Architecture of Democracy (October 25)

But there are lots of types of democracies organized in many different ways...

- **Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Rafael Santos (2012)** “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia” *Journal of European Economic Association*, 11(1), 5-44.
- (*) **Finan, Frederico and Laura Schechter (2012)** “Vote Buying and Reciprocity,” *Econometrica*, 80(2), 863–881.
- **Bruhn, Miriam, Francisco Gallego and Massimiliano Onorato (2011)** “Legislative Malapportionment and institutional persistence,”

<https://ideas.repec.org/p/ioe/doctra/381.html>

- (*) **Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo (2014)** “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (03), 575-603.
- (*) **Cruz, Cesi, Julienne Labonne and Pablo Querubin (2014)** “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes,”

http://cpd.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Family_Networks_web.pdf

- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik (2013)** “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?” *Review of Economic Studies*, 80 (3): 845-875.

Book of the Day: Gaventa, John (1982) *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence & Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*, Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

6 Social Institutions (October 27)

So far we have considered institutions in conventional ways, economic institutions (property rights), political institutions (the state, the regime), but there are many more institutions than this in society...

- **Kelly, Raymond C. (1985)** *The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- (*) **Jakeila, Pamela (2011)** “Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence,” *American Economic Review*, 101(3): 509-513.

- (*) **Jakiela, Pamela and Owen Ozier (2015)** “Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies,” *Review of Economic Studies*,
- (*) **Moscona, Jacob, Nathan Nunn and James A. Robinson (2015)** “Social Structure and Conflict,” Unpublished.
- **Dunning, Thad and Lauren Harrison (2010)** “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali,” *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 21-39.
- (*) **Gneezy, Uri, Kenneth L. Leonard and John A. List (2009)** “Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patrilineal Society,” *Econometrica*, 77(5), 1637–166.

Book of the Day: Ferguson, James (1994) *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

7 Social Equilibria: Some Examples (November 1)

Some scholars have tried to paint a broader picture of what an equilibrium with underdevelopment looked like. We already met the Lele, but now we have Chiaramonte, Tzintzuntam, Tabanan and Modjokuto..

- **Banfield, Edward C. (1958)** *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, New York: The Free Press.
 - **Foster, George P. (1967)** *Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World*, New York: Little, Brown and Company.
 - **Geertz, Clifford (1968)** *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1. **Book of the Day: Henrich, Joseph P. (2015)** *The Secret of Our Success*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

8 Deep Institutional Variation (November 3)

How do such social equilibria get established? Often they are deeply rooted in the past. Showing this empirically is a very active and exciting research agenda.

- (*) **Alsan, Marcela (2015)** “The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development,” *American Economic Review*, 105(1): 382-410.

- (*) **Nunn, Nathan (2008)** “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123 (1): 139–176.
- (*) **Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon (2011)** “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa,” *American Economic Review*, 101 (7): 3221-3252.
- **Olsson, Ola and Christopher Paik (2012)** “A Western Reversal Since the Neolithic? The Long-Run Impact of Early Agriculture,” Mimeo.
- **Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn (2013)** “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128 (2): 469-530.

Book of the Day: Putnam, Robert H. (1993) *Making Democracy Work*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

9 Path Dependence (November 8)

To connect this historic events to the present you need some sense of how they create a specific development path. I give some examples.

- (*) **Dell, Melissa (2010)** “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
- **Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi (2005)** “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” *American Economic Review*, 95, 1190-1213.
- (*) **Dippel, Christian (2014)** “Forced Coexistence and Economic Development: Evidence From Native American Reservations,” *Econometrica*, 82(6), 2131–2165.
- (*) **Patterson, Orlando (2013)** “Institutions, Colonialism and Economic Development: The Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson (AJR) Thesis in Light of the Caribbean Experience,” <http://scholar.harvard.edu/patterson/home>

Book of the Day: Kimeldorf, Howard (1988) *Reds or Rackets?: The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

10 Interactions (November 10)

So far I have been discussing economic, political and social institutions and emphasizing studies which focus on the origins or consequences of one. But these no doubt interact. How and with what consequences? I think this is another very exciting area of research.

- **Greif, Avner (1994)** “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 102, 912-950.
- (*) **Tabellini, Guido (2010)** “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe.” *Journal of European Economic Association*, 8, 677-716.
- (*) **Tabellini, Guido (2008)** “The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, 905-950.
- (*) **Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson and Jonathan Weigel (2015)** “The Interaction of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom,” NBER Working Paper #21798.
- **Ticchi, Davide, Thierry Verdier and Andrea Vindigni (2013)** “Democracy, Dictatorship and the Cultural Transmission of Political Values,”
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=7441
- **Aghion, Philippe, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Andrei Shleifer (2010)** “Regulation and Distrust,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125 (3): 1015-1049.

Book of the Day: Henrich, Joseph et al. eds. (2004) *Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies*, New York: Oxford University Press.

11 Persistence (November 15)

Delving deeper into the topic of path dependence I examine some models of and empirical evidence about persistence of institutional equilibria.

- **Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2008)** “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,” *American Economic Review* 98(1), 267-291.
- **Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (1997)** “Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth among New World economies: a view from economic historians of the United States,” In *How Latin America Fell Behind*, ed. Stephen Haber, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 260–304.
- **Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois and Ashok Kotwal (2015)** “Clientelism in an Indian Village,” *American Economic Review*, 105(6): 1780-1816.
- **Voth, Hans-Joachim and Nico Voigtlander (2012)** “Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Antisemitic Violence in Nazi Germany,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127 (3): 1339-1392.

Book of the Day: Kelley, Jonathan and Herbert S. Klein (1981) *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality: A Theory of Inequality and Inherited Privilege Applied to the Bolivian National Revolution*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

12 Institutional and Social Change (November 17)

What causes institutions and societies to change? This was already implicit in the last lecture but here I discuss many more ideas : modernization, technological change, innovation, demographic shocks and dynamics, trade and market expansion (or contraction), socialization experiences, re-coordination of strategies, warfare...

- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008)** “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-42.
- (*) **Friedman, Willa, Michael Kremer, Edward Miguel, Rebecca Thornton (2011)** “Educational as Liberation?” <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16939>
- **Bidner, Chris and Patrick Francois (2013)** “The Emergence of Political Accountability,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128 (3): 1397-1448.
- **Dasgupta, Aditya (2015)** “Why Dominant Parties Decline,”

<http://scholar.harvard.edu/adasgupta/job-market-paper-0>

- (*) **Yanagizawa-Drott, David, Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag, and Stan Veuger (2014)** “Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(4), pp.1633-1685.
- (*) **Mackie, Gerry (1996)** “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account,” *American Sociological Review*, 61(6), 999-1017.
- **Brenner, Robert (1976)** “Agrarian Class-Structure and Economic-Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,” *Past and Present*, 70, 30-75.
- **Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson and James A Robinson (2011)** “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution,” *American Economic Review* 101(7), pp. 3286–3307.
- **Holley, Donald (2000)** “The Mechanical Cotton Picker,”

<https://eh.net/encyclopedia/mechanical-cotton-picker/>

- (*) **Jha, Saumitra (2015)** “Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130 (3): 1485-1545.
- **Bauer, Michal, Alessandra Cassar, Julie Chytilová and Joseph Henrich (2013)** “War’s Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-group Biases,” *Psychological Science*, 25(1), 47-57.
- **Matthias Doepke and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2008)** “Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 747-793.
- **Demsetz, Harold (1967)** “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” *American Economic Review*, 57, 61-70.
- **Taylor, M Scott (2011)** “Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison,” *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3162-95.

Book of the Day: White, Lynn (1966) *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, New York: Oxford University Press.

13 Changing Institutions and Societies (November 22)

How do we intervene to change bad institutional equilibria and make them more functional?

- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and James Robinson (2014)** “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2), 319-368.
- **Bidner, Chris and Patrick Francois (2012)** “Cultivating Trust Norms, Institutions and the Implications of Scale,” *Economic Journal*, 121(555), 1097-1129.
- **Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2011)** “Laws and Norms” NBER Working Paper #17579 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17579>
- (*) **Acemoglu, Daron, Leopoldo Fergusson, James A. Robinson, Dario Romero and Juan F. Vargas (2015)** “The Perils of Top-Down Statebuilding: Evidence from Colombia’s ‘False Positives’” Unpublished.
- (*) **Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster, Edward Miguel (2012)** “Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-Analysis Plan,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(4). 1755-1812.

Books of the Week: Wright, Gavin (2013) *Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mickey, Robert (2015) *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep South, 1944-1972*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

14 November 29, December 1 Student Presentations