

Authoritarian Politics
Winter 2022
PPHA 38765, PBPL 28765
updated 2/22/2023

Instructor: Professor Alexei Zakharov

Class Time and Location: Monday/Wednesday 10:30am-11:50am, Keller 0010

Office Hours: Thursday, Friday 10:00am-12:00pm

Certificate Program: Global Conflict Studies

Course Description

The goal of this course is to provide an understanding of undemocratic regimes — something that more than one half of the world’s population is forced to content with. We will start by looking at how authoritarian regimes differ from democracy and also from each other, proceeding to examine the threats that autocrats face, and the measures they take to maintain their rule, such as building or dismantling institutions, distributing patronage, hiring the right subordinates, manipulating public opinion, rigging elections, and suppressing dissent. Other actors, including opposition, face their own problems when contending with, or challenging, autocratic rule. We proceed to look at the ways in and out of the autocracies — how democratic rule becomes subverted, and how it is reestablished. We examine the impact of authoritarianism on economy and foreign policy, as well as on values, cooperation, and the fabric of the society, and whether and how these effects persist and reinforce authoritarian rule. Finally, we will look at the effect of technological change on the evolution of autocracies, as it can both empower citizens of autocracies, and strengthen autocratic control over them.

Grading

The final grade will be based on the following formula:

10% Course attendance and participation in class discussion

25% Individual paper assignment

25% Group paper assignment and presentation

40% Final exam

The goal of the individual paper assignment is to write an essay (4-5 double-spaced pages or longer) on a topic related to the material covered in this course. The essay should be centered around a research paper. One way to structure it would be to present the conventional wisdom at the time when the results appeared, summarize and appraise the results of the research, and reflect on the contribution to our knowledge of the subject. A good idea is to look at the legacy of this research - search for the most important academic papers published in its aftermath, and check whether the results were eventually generalized, or if contradictory results were obtained. You can also try to formulate your own research problem — think of the following question: “If I had an unlimited research budget, what would I do, and why?”, describe policy implications of the results, and/or provide a case study that you think illustrates the results. Unless by my approval, the paper has to be an original research paper (not a book or lit review) published since 2010 in top 3 political science journals

(APSR, JOP, AJPS), or in top 5 economics journals (QRE, AER, Econometrica, JPE, RES); it cannot be one of the required/recommended papers on the class reading list.

The group assignments will be done in groups of 2 (for masters students) or 3-4 (for undergraduate students); you'll have to write an essay (7-8 double-spaced pages or more) covering 2-3 research papers centered around a single theme (the papers and theme are subject to my approval). You also will have to make a 10-15 minute presentation. Think of it as a continuation of the lectures; there are many interesting topics that you can present on which could not be covered because of time constraints.

The final exam will consist of problems and essay questions and must be taken on the scheduled date.

Important deadlines

- April 16. Individual paper assignments are due.
- April 24. Groups and themes for group paper assignment and presentations should be selected.
- May 14. Group paper assignments are due.

All assignments are due at 23:59pm of the due date. Late assignments can be turned in with a 30% penalty before 23:59pm of the following date. Students are also encouraged to send slides in advance of group presentations; I will provide feedback on the slides if they are sent at least 3 days in advance.

Prerequisites

For BA students, one quarter of statistics (Stats 220 or equivalent) and concurrent or prior training in game theory (PBPL 222, Social Science Inquiry core, or equivalent) is recommended

Academic integrity

University of Chicago takes great pride in upholding the highest scholarly standards; as students, you are required to comply. Plagiarism will not be tolerated. Instances of plagiarism will be reported to the Dean of Students; the instructor reserves the right to impose a zero grade on the assignment on question.

Student conduct, diversity, and inclusion

Learning is fun but requires an atmosphere of tolerance and mutual respect, recognizing and celebrating the diversity of our students along a broad range of factors. Please consult the University's statement on [civil behavior](#) and the Harris School's statement on diversity and inclusion [here](#).

Classroom attendance

Students are expected to attend the course in person. Students who cannot attend the class in person due to extraordinary reasons (quarantine requirements, sickness, COVID symptoms or childcare disruptions) must contact the instructor to arrange recording of lectures.

Special accommodations

The University of Chicago, and we personally, support the right of all enrolled students to a full and equal educational opportunity. The University's policies regarding students with disabilities are available [here](#). If you have a disability accommodation awarded by the University Student Disability Services Office, you should inform the Harris Dean of Students Office by the end of the first week of class.

Required readings and course schedule

There is no required textbook for this course. Required and recommended readings will be assigned prior to each lecture and will be available on Canvas. There are no assigned texts for this course. All readings will be available on Canvas. *This plan may be subject to change depending on how fast we progress.*

March 20: Overview

No reading

March 22: Authoritarian regimes at a glance

Required

Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E., 2014. Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. *Perspectives on politics*, 12(2), pp.313-331.

Hellmeier, S., Cole, R., Grahn, S., Kolvani, P., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S.F., Pillai, S. and Lindberg, S.I., 2021. State of the world 2020: autocratization turns viral. *Democratization*, 28(6), pp.1053-1074.

Recommended

Svolik, M.W., 2012. *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 2]

Geddes, B., Wright, J.G., Wright, J. and Frantz, E., 2018. *How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse*. Cambridge University Press.

Maerz, S.F., Lührmann, A., Hellmeier, S., Grahn, S. and Lindberg, S.I., 2020. State of the world 2019: autocratization surges—resistance grows. *Democratization*, 27(6), pp.909-927.

Meng, A., 2021. Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: Rethinking institutional strength. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(2), pp.526-540.

March 27: Power sharing

Required

Boix, C. and Svolik, M.W., 2013. The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(2), pp.300-316.

Meng, A., Paine, J. and Powell, R., 2022. Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 26.

Recommended

North, D.C. and Weingast, B.R., 1989. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. *The journal of economic history*, 49(4), pp.803-832.

Wright, J., Frantz, E. and Geddes, B., 2015. Oil and autocratic regime survival. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(2), pp.287-306.

Gehlbach, S. and Keefer, P., 2011. Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39(2), pp.123-139.

Gorlizki, Y., Khlevniuk, O. and Suny, R.G., 2006. Stalin and his circle. In *The Cambridge History of Russia: Vol. 3. The Twentieth Century* (pp. 243-267). Cambridge University Press.

Myerson, R.B., 2008. The autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), pp.125-139.

Gandhi, J. and Przeworski, A., 2007. Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative political studies*, 40(11), pp.1279-1301.

Gandhi, J. (2008) *Political institutions under dictatorship*, Ch. 3

Gailmard, S., 2017. Building a new imperial state: The strategic foundations of separation of powers in America. *American Political Science Review*, 111(4), pp.668-685.

Roessler, P. and Ohls, D., 2018. Self-enforcing power sharing in weak states. *International Organization*, 72(2), pp.423-454.

Dower, P.C., Finkel, E., Gehlbach, S. and Nafziger, S., 2018. Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia's great reforms. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1), pp.125-147.

Paine, J., 2022. Strategic Power Sharing: Commitment, Capability, and Authoritarian Survival. *The Journal of Politics*, 84(2), pp.1226-1232.

Knutsen, C.H. and Rasmussen, M., 2018. The autocratic welfare state: Old-age pensions, credible commitments, and regime survival. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(5), pp.659-695.

March 29: Franchise extensions

Required

Treisman, D., 2020. Democracy by mistake: How the errors of autocrats trigger transitions to freer government. *American Political Science Review*, 114(3), pp.792-810.

Recommended

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., 2006. *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 6]

Brückner, M. and Ciccone, A., 2011. Rain and the democratic window of opportunity. *Econometrica*, 79(3), pp.923-947.

Llavador, H. and Oxoby, R.J., 2005. Partisan competition, growth, and the franchise. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), pp.1155-1189.

Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N., 2004. Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's "Age of Reform". *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 119(2), pp.707-765.

Ticchi, D. and Vindigni, A., 2008. War and endogenous democracy.

Myerson, R.B., 2010. Capitalist investment and political liberalization. *Theoretical Economics*, 5(1), pp.73-91.

Aidt, T.S. and Franck, R., 2015. Democratization under the threat of revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica*, 83(2), pp.505-547.

Przeworski, A., 2009. Conquered or granted? A history of suffrage extensions. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(2), pp.291-321.

Campante, F.R. and Chor, D., 2012. Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2), pp.167-88.

Docquier, F., Lodigiani, E., Rapoport, H. and Schiff, M., 2016. Emigration and democracy. *Journal of Development Economics*, 120, pp.209-223.

Geddes, B., 1999. What do we know about democratization after twenty years?. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1), pp.115-144.

April 3: Elections under autocracy

Required

Schedler, A., 2002. Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. *Journal of democracy*, 13(2), pp.36-50.

Ofori, G.K., 2019. Do fairer elections increase the responsiveness of politicians? *American Political Science Review*, 113(4), pp.963-979.

Recommended

Gehlbach, S. and Simpson, A., 2015. Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1), pp.212-224.

Little, A.T., 2012. Elections, fraud, and election monitoring in the shadow of revolution. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7(3), pp.249-283.

Frye, T., Reuter, O.J. and Szakonyi, D., 2019. Hitting them with carrots: Voter intimidation and vote buying in Russia. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), pp.857-881.

Enikolopov, R., Korovkin, V., Petrova, M., Sonin, K. and Zakharov, A., 2013. Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 110(2), pp.448-452.

Luo, Z. and Rozenas, A., 2018. Strategies of election rigging: trade-offs, determinants, and consequences. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 13(1), pp.1-28.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A., 2002. Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of democracy*, 13(2), pp.51-65.

Ananyev, M. and Poyker, M., 2022. Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 71, p.102075.

Heckelman, J.C., 1995. The effect of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates. *Public Choice*, 82(1-2), pp.107-124.

Frye, T., Reuter, O.J. and Szakonyi, D., 2019. Hitting them with carrots: Voter intimidation and vote buying in Russia. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), pp.857-881.

April 5: Autocratic governance and leadership succession

Required

Scharpf, A. and Gläsel, C., 2020. Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: evidence from autocratic Argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(4), pp.791-806.

Recommended

Zakharov, A.V., 2016. The loyalty-competence trade-off in dictatorships and outside options for subordinates. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2), pp.457-466.

Egorov, G. and Sonin, K., 2011. Dictators and their viziers: Endogenizing the loyalty-competence trade-off. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(5), pp.903-930.

Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A., 2005. Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), pp.835-864.

Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A., 2009. Hit or miss? The effect of assassinations on institutions and war. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1(2), pp.55-87.

Besley, T., Montalvo, J.G. and Reynal-Querol, M., 2011. Do educated leaders matter?. *The Economic Journal*, 121(554), pp.F205-227.

Baturo, A., 2017. Democracy, development, and career trajectories of former political leaders. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(8), pp.1023-1054.

Escribà-Folch, A., 2013. Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946-2004. *Democratization*, 20(1), pp.160-185.

Krcmaric, D., Nelson, S.C. and Roberts, A., 2020. Studying leaders and elites: The personal biography approach. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23, pp.133-151.

Debs, A., 2016. Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(1), pp.73-84.

Chung-Hon Shih, V., 2008. "Nauseating" displays of loyalty: Monitoring the factional bargain through ideological campaigns in China. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(4), pp.1177-1192.

April 10: Repression

Required

Gregory, P.R., Schröder, P.J. and Sonin, K., 2011. Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin's archives. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39(1), pp.34-42.

Hill, D.W. and Jones, Z.M., 2014. An empirical evaluation of explanations for state repression. *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), pp.661-687.

Recommended

Escribà-Folch, A., 2013. Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy. *International Political Science Review*, 34(5), pp.543-560.

Lawrence, A.K., 2017. Repression and activism among the Arab Spring's first movers: Evidence from Morocco's February 20th movement. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(3), pp.699-718.

Aytaç, S.E., Schiumerini, L. and Stokes, S., 2018. Why do people join backlash protests? Lessons from Turkey. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(6), pp.1205-1228.

Finkel, E., 2015. The phoenix effect of state repression: Jewish resistance during the Holocaust. *American Political Science Review*, 109(2), pp.339-353.

Tyson, S.A., 2018. The agency problem underlying repression. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(4), pp.1297-1310.

Dragu, T. and Przeworski, A., 2019. Preventive repression: Two types of moral hazard. *American Political Science Review*, 113(1), pp.77-87.

Hsieh, C.T., Miguel, E., Ortega, D. and Rodriguez, F., 2011. The price of political opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(2), pp.196-214.

Sullivan, C.M., 2016. Political repression and the destruction of dissident organizations: Evidence from the archives of the Guatemalan national police. *World Politics*, 68(4), pp.645-676.

Frantz, E. and Kendall-Taylor, A., 2014. A dictator's toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3), pp.332-346.

Shen-Bayh, F., 2018. Strategies of repression: Judicial and extrajudicial methods of autocratic survival. *World Politics*, 70(3), pp.321-357.

Carey, P.D., Bell, C., Ritter, E.H. and Wolford, S., 2022. Oil discoveries, civil war, and preventive state repression. *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(5), pp.648-662.

Nordås, R. and Davenport, C., 2013. Fight the youth: Youth bulges and state repression. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), pp.926-940.

Esteban, J., Morelli, M. and Rohner, D., 2015. Strategic mass killings. *Journal of Political Economy*, 123(5), pp.1087-1132.

April 12: Autocracy and the military

Required

Quinlivan, J.T., 1999. Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East. *International Security*, 24(2), pp.131-165.

Powell, J., 2012. Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état. *Journal of Conflict resolution*, 56(6), pp.1017-1040.

Recommended

Escribà-Folch, A., Böhmelt, T. and Pilster, U., 2020. Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 37(5), pp.559-579.

Hoekstra, Q., 2020. How Mosul fell: the role of coup-proofing in the 2014 partial collapse of the Iraqi security forces. *International Politics*, 57(4), pp.684-703.

Narang, V. and Talmadge, C., 2018. Civil-military pathologies and defeat in war: Tests using new data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(7), pp.1379-1405.

Sudduth, J.K., 2017. Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(1), pp.3-15.

Sudduth, J.K., 2017. Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(13), pp.1768-1801.

Mattingly, D.C., 2022. How the Party Commands the Gun: The Foreign–Domestic Threat Dilemma in China. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Smith, A., 2017. Political succession: A model of coups, revolution, purges, and everyday politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(4), pp.707-743.

Albrecht, H. and Eibl, F., 2018. How to keep officers in the barracks: Causes, agents, and types of military coups. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(2), pp.315-328.

Hassan, M., 2017. The strategic shuffle: Ethnic geography, the internal security apparatus, and elections in Kenya. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2), pp.382-395.

Arbatli, C.E. and Arbatli, E., 2016. External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts?. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 33(2), pp.115-152.

Böhmelt, T., Escribà-Folch, A. and Pilster, U., 2019. Pitfalls of professionalism? Military academies and coup risk. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(5), pp.1111-1139.

Di Lonardo, L., Sun, J.S. and Tyson, S.A., 2020. Autocratic stability in the shadow of foreign threats. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4), pp.1247-1265.

April 17: Information and propaganda

Required

King, G., Pan, J. and Roberts, M.E., 2017. How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. *American political science review*, 111(3), pp.484-501.

Recommended

- Adena, M., Enikolopov, R., Petrova, M., Santarosa, V. and Zhuravskaya, E., 2015. Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4), pp.1885-1939.
- Chen, J. and Xu, Y., 2017. Why do authoritarian regimes allow citizens to voice opinions publicly?. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(3), pp.792-803.
- Egorov, G., Guriev, S. and Sonin, K., 2009. Why resource-poor dictators allow freer media: A theory and evidence from panel data. *American political science Review*, 103(4), pp.645-668.
- Frye, T., 2019. Economic sanctions and public opinion: Survey experiments from Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(7), pp.967-994.
- Gehlbach, S. and Sonin, K., 2014. Government control of the media. *Journal of public Economics*, 118, pp.163-171.
- Guriev, S. and Treisman, D., 2019. Informational autocrats. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 33(4), pp.100-127.
- Huang, H., 2018. The pathology of hard propaganda. *Journal of Politics*, 80(3)
- Kamenica, E. and Gentzkow, M., 2011. Bayesian persuasion. *American Economic Review*, 101(6), pp.2590-2615.
- Rozenas, A. and Stukal, D., 2019. How autocrats manipulate economic news: Evidence from Russia's state-controlled television. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3), pp.982-996.
- Yanagizawa-Drott, D., 2014. Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4), pp.1947-1994.
- Edmond, C., 2013. Information manipulation, coordination, and regime change. *Review of Economic studies*, 80(4), pp.1422-1458.
- Little, A.T., 2017. Propaganda and credulity. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 102, pp.224-232.
- Sirotkina, E. and Zavadskaya, M., 2020. When the party's over: Political blame attribution under an electoral authoritarian regime. *Post-soviet affairs*, 36(1), pp.37-60.

April 19: Autocracy and the economy

Required

- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P. and Robinson, J.A., 2019. Democracy does cause growth. *Journal of political economy*, 127(1), pp.47-100.

Recommended

- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P. and Robinson, J.A., 2015. Democracy, redistribution, and inequality. In *Handbook of income distribution* (Vol. 2, pp. 1885-1966). Elsevier.
- Besley, T.J. and Kudamatsu, M., 2007. Making autocracy work. *LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS48*.

Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A. and Padró i Miquel, G., 2015. The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, 105(6), pp.1817-51.

Dahlum, S. and Knutsen, C.H., 2017. Do democracies provide better education? Revisiting the democracy–human capital link. *World Development*, 94, pp.186-199.

Gao, Y., Zang, L., Roth, A. and Wang, P., 2017. Does democracy cause innovation? An empirical test of the popper hypothesis. *Research Policy*, 46(7), pp.1272-1283.

Gehlbach, S. and Keefer, P., 2012. Private investment and the institutionalization of collective action in autocracies: ruling parties and legislatures. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2), pp.621-635.

Husted, T.A. and Kenny, L.W., 1997. The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), pp.54-82.

Knutsen, C.H. and Rasmussen, M., 2018. The autocratic welfare state: Old-age pensions, credible commitments, and regime survival. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(5), pp.659-695.

Rousseau, D.L., Gelpi, C., Reiter, D. and Huth, P.K., 1996. Assessing the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, 1918–88. *American Political Science Review*, 90(3), pp.512-533.

Sanford, L., 2021. Democratization, elections, and public goods: The evidence from deforestation. *American Journal of Political Science*

April 24-26: Democratic backsliding

Required

Noury, A. and Roland, G., 2020. Identity politics and populism in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23, pp.421-439.

Graham, M.H. and Svobik, M.W., 2020. Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), pp.392-409.

Ren, Z.B., Carton, A.M., Dimant, E. and Schweitzer, M.E., 2022. Authoritarian leaders share conspiracy theories to attack opponents, galvanize followers, shift blame, and undermine democratic institutions. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, p.101388.

Recommended

Akdede, S.H., 2010. Do more ethnically and religiously diverse countries have lower democratization?. *Economics Letters*, 106(2), pp.101-104.

Alsan, M., Braghieri, L., Eichmeyer, S., Kim, M.J., Stantcheva, S. and Yang, D.Y., 2020. Civil liberties in times of crisis (No. w27972). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Amat, F., Arenas, A., Falcó-Gimeno, A. and Muñoz, J., 2020. Pandemics meet democracy. Experimental evidence from the COVID-19 crisis in Spain.

Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. and Majlesi, K., 2020. Importing political polarization? The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure. *American Economic Review*, 110(10), pp.3139-3183.

- Barrera, O., Guriev, S., Henry, E. and Zhuravskaya, E., 2020. Facts, alternative facts, and fact checking in times of post-truth politics. *Journal of public economics*, 182, p.104123.
- Boese, V.A., Edgell, A.B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S.F. and Lindberg, S.I., 2021. How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two-stage process. *Democratization*, 28(5), pp.885-907.
- Bursztyn, L., Egorov, G. and Fiorin, S., 2020. From extreme to mainstream: The erosion of social norms. *American economic review*, 110(11), pp.3522-3548.
- Colantone, I. and Stanig, P., 2018. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4), pp.936-953
- Dimant, E., 2022. Hate trumps love: The impact of political polarization on social preferences. Available at SSRN 3680871.
- Enyedi, Z., 2020. Right-wing authoritarian innovations in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European Politics*, 36(3), pp.363-377.
- Gandhi, J., 2019. The institutional roots of democratic backsliding.
- Golec de Zavala, A., Bierwiazzonek, K., Baran, T., Keenan, O. and Hase, A., 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarianism, and rejection of sexual dissenters in Poland. *Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity*, 8(2), p.250.
- Freeman, D. and Bentall, R.P., 2017. The concomitants of conspiracy concerns. *Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology*, 52, pp.595-604.
- Hangartner, D., Dinas, E., Marbach, M., Matakos, K. and Xefteris, D., 2019. Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile? *American political science review*, 113(2), pp.442-455.
- Kotschy, R. and Sunde, U., 2021. Income shocks, inequality, and democracy. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 123(1), pp.295-326.
- Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D., 2018. *How democracies die*. Broadway Books.
- Ren, Z.B., Carton, A.M., Dimant, E. and Schweitzer, M.E., 2022. Authoritarian leaders share conspiracy theories to attack opponents, galvanize followers, shift blame, and undermine democratic institutions. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, p.101388.
- Osmundsen, M., Bor, A., Vahlstrup, P.B., Bechmann, A. and Petersen, M.B., 2021. Partisan polarization is the primary psychological motivation behind political fake news sharing on Twitter. *American Political Science Review*, 115(3), pp.999-1015.
- Ross, M.L., 2015. What have we learned about the resource curse?. *Annual review of political science*, 18, pp.239-259.
- Rovny, J., 2023. Antidote to Backsliding: Ethnic Politics and Democratic Resilience. *American Political Science Review*, pp.1-19.
- Satyanath, S., Voigtländer, N. and Voth, H.J., 2017. Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party. *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2), pp.478-526.

Steinmayr, A., 2021. Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 103(2), pp.310-327.

Svolik, M., 2018. When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents. Available at SSRN 3243470.

Jackson, M.O. and Morelli, M., 2007. Political bias and war. *American Economic Review*, 97(4), pp.1353-1373.

May 1: Protests

Required

Cantoni, D., Yang, D.Y., Yuchtman, N. and Zhang, Y.J., 2019. Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2), pp.1021-1077.

Kuran, T., 1991. The East European revolution of 1989: is it surprising that we were surprised?. *The American Economic Review*, 81(2), pp.121-125.

Recommended

Acemoglu, D., Hassan, T.A. and Tahoun, A., 2018. The power of the street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 31(1), pp.1-42.

Bursztyn, L., Cantoni, D., Yang, D.Y., Yuchtman, N. and Zhang, Y.J., 2021. Persistent political engagement: Social interactions and the dynamics of protest movements. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3(2), pp.233-50.

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May 8: The political psychology of authoritarianism

Required

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May 10: Autocracy in the information age

Required

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May 15-17: Group presentations