Q&A: Konstantin Sonin on Ukraine, Putin, and the Future of the War

More than four years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war has evolved into a grinding conflict with enormous human costs, rapid technological change, and profound geopolitical consequences.

Konstantin Sonin, the John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy and an expert on political economy and authoritarianism, recently returned from Kyiv, where he observed how Ukrainians are adapting to wartime life while continuing to innovate politically, economically, and militarily.

In this conversation, Sonin, who in May 2024 was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison (in absentia) by Russian authorities for posting information about the atrocities committed by Russian occupying forces in the town of Bucha in Ukraine, discusses Vladimir Putin’s leadership, the changing role of the United States, how Ukraine has become a hub for military innovation, and why he believes the war is slowly moving toward an eventual end.

You recently returned from Kyiv. What was it like to be there during the war?

One thing that is difficult to explain is how normal and even happy life can appear in Kyiv despite the war. It is a college town filled with young people. There are concerts, museums, theaters, cafés — life continues.

Yet, at night, there are raid alerts. Missiles and drones strike apartment buildings. People die. Those are two parts of the same reality. Night and day, sometimes literally.

Students under 25 are generally not drafted, so universities are still full of young people. Many students come from territories that were occupied or directly affected by fighting. Yet there is still energy and optimism in the city. That contrast is one of the most striking things about Ukraine today.

You’ve said Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government increasingly revolves around his personal security. What do you mean by that?

I do not think Putin is scared in the ordinary sense. What I see instead is that normal state functions are no longer operating normally, because the imperative is to protect him personally. People responsible for Putin’s personal security effectively dominate decision-making.

When social media is shut down or internet access is restricted in major cities, there is nobody in the system able to say, “We cannot afford this economically or socially.” The personal security of one person overrides every other consideration.

Historically, many wartime leaders were willing to place themselves in danger. Think about Winston Churchill or Abraham Lincoln. Putin is very different. Despite his fixation on military grandeur, he is cowardly and extremely cautious about going anywhere near the battlefield. 

Russia continues to suffer staggering casualties. What does that tell us about the state of the war?

For months now, Russia has reportedly been losing around 1,000 soldiers a day while front lines move very little. It is hard to fathom, but it is reminiscent of World War I with its enormous casualty numbers but little or no territorial change. We are witnessing something similar now, in real time. This may be the largest conflict since World War II in terms of battlefield deaths, yet the world has gradually become accustomed to it. That normalization is itself striking.  And sadly, it is also completely preventable.

How are ordinary Russians responding to the war at this stage?

The quality of life in Russia has deteriorated steadily since the war began, though it has not resulted in total economic collapse or open revolt. Restaurants still operate. There is employment. People are surviving.

But people clearly live worse than they did before the war, and increasingly there is a sense that there is no end in sight. I think the frustration comes less from immediate desperation than from the realization that this situation could continue indefinitely.

You’ve studied authoritarian systems for years. Do you see your research reflected in what is happening now?

One thing that stands out in Ukraine is how a democracy under pressure still promotes competence and competition – and an autocracy does the opposite.

Ukraine has made real progress fighting corruption during wartime. This may sound counterintuitive, but in a dire situation, corruption becomes even more dangerous and unaffordable.

You also see a new generation of leadership emerging. Many military commanders and government officials are very young and have risen because they demonstrated ability under extremely difficult conditions. The prime minister is under 40. The defense minister is in his 30s.

In Russia, by contrast, Putin remains surrounded by the same aging leadership and military commanders, even after enormous failures and losses. That reflects the difference between a competitive democratic system and a stagnant authoritarian one.

Ukraine has also become a center of rapid military innovation, especially with drone technology. What stands out to you there?

One thing you notice immediately in Kyiv is the number of foreign military and industry experts visiting the city. For many people working in defense technology, this is where history is happening.

The pace of technological change is extraordinary. Systems that existed four years ago are already obsolete. Entirely new companies and weapons platforms emerge constantly.

Military organizations around the world are studying what Ukraine has done. European militaries are learning from it, and the United States is as well. Ukraine has effectively become a real-time laboratory for modern warfare and defense innovation.

How has the Trump administration changed the situation for Ukraine?

Until 2025, Ukraine relied heavily on support from the United States. What changed under President Trump was the realization that Ukraine could no longer assume that support would remain constant or guaranteed. As a result, Ukraine has shifted toward greater reliance on Europe and on its own domestic capabilities.

At the same time, the relationship between Ukraine and the United States has become more transactional. The United States benefits from access to battlefield innovation and technological knowledge coming out of Ukraine, especially now that it is at war with Iran.

How do you see the war eventually ending?

We are gradually moving toward a point where Russian advances stop entirely and the front lines effectively freeze. It seems to be headed in this direction, even if it does still take a few years.

That does not necessarily mean there will be a formal negotiated settlement immediately. Many wars end without a comprehensive political agreement. It is possible the fighting simply stops before diplomacy catches up.

The more difficult question is what happens politically inside Russia afterward. My instinct is that the end of the war and the end of Putin’s regime are closely connected. One may trigger the other. Putin made an enormous mistake with this war, but he does not know how to back down. That is part of the tragedy.