

Order & Violence

Spring 2017 Syllabus

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[Office hours sign-up](#)

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Part I

Course information

Teaching assistants Mariya Grinberg (mgrinberg@uchicago.edu) and Asfandiyar Mir (asfandiyar@uchicago.edu), both Ph.D students in the Department of Political Science.

Lecture time and location Mondays 3:00-5:50pm in Public Policy 142.

Section time and location To be announced

Admission Priority will be given to Harris master's students, followed by graduate students from other departments. Undergraduates should take my Political Economy of Development class (sorry, no exceptions).

Prerequisites There are no formal prerequisites for this class, but non-Harris students should have a background in economics, statistics, and basic game theory. I have designed this class to be a complement to James Robinson's *Why Nations Fail* class. Thus students can receive credit for both. Nonetheless, the themes are overlapping and so I slightly discourage people from taking both classes unless international development and conflict is your specialty.

What this course is about

Most countries in the world have been independent for about 50 years. Some are peaceful and have prospered, while some remain poor, war-torn, or both. What explains why some countries have succeeded while others remain poor, violent, and unequal?

Moreover, fifty years on, a lot of smart people are genuinely surprised that these countries' leaders have not been able to make more progress in implementing good policies. If there are good examples to follow, why haven't more countries followed these examples into peace and prosperity?

Finally, we see poverty and violence despite 50 years of outside intervention. Shouldn't foreign aid, democracy promotion, peacekeeping, and maybe even military intervention have promoted order and growth? If not why not, and what should we do about it as citizens?

This class is going to try to demystify what's going on. There are good explanations for violence and disorder. There are some good reasons leaders don't make headway, bureaucrats seem slothful, and programs get perverted. The idea is to talk about the political, economic, and natural logics that lead to function and dysfunction.

To understand the politics of weak states in the last 50 years, we are going to start with some theory and history. We need a theory of violence, and theories of how states, institutions, and societies develop to curb violence. And we want to look at the development of Western nations, and their impacts on the world, over a wide sweep of history.

We will also talk about policies, and how order and development can be fostered. I can't tell you what specific programs or reforms to focus on, or how to implement them. What I can do is help you to understand some of the big ideas about why some paths lead to success or failure, as well as why the best plans so often go awry—ideas that surprisingly few development practitioners ever acquire.

I designed this course to give students an appreciation for big ideas and theories in comparative politics, international relations, political economy, sociology, geography, and development economics. This class involves reading *a lot* of material, and building your conceptual and historical sense of development and politics.

This is a global class, but a slightly unbalanced one. A lot of the examples are going to draw on Africa and Latin America, with a good deal on historical European and U.S. development, plus some material on the Middle East and Asia—an ordering determined largely by my knowledge and ignorance.

I won't have the concrete policy answers in many cases. Actually, no one does, and one of my big aims in this class is to help you learn enough and think critically enough to know why everyone with a clear solution is wrong, and why “peace-building” and “development” are the hardest things in the world. There is no single answer. But there are some principles to finding the right answer in the right situation, and history to learn from. That's what you're signing up for in this class.

Grading

Note: The grading criteria could change depending on the final size of the class, and I will finalize the criteria by April 3, 2017.

There is a simple way to get a good grade in this course: read the readings. All of the grading is designed to incentivize you to read and understand the material. The reason I do this is that I think reading and writing are the main way we all change how we understand the world and influence others. Virtually every reading in this course is one that deeply influenced my own perspective.

Lecture attendance (10%) Your TA will circulate an attendance sheet during class. You will not be penalized for missing one or perhaps two lectures, since everyone falls sick or has other obligations.

Wikipedia assignments (20%) Twice during the semester you will update the quality of academic social science in Wikipedia, by integrating required and recommended readings into relevant Wikipedia articles. Typically, for each assignment, a few sentences or short paragraphs that integrate the insights from 2–4 articles is sufficient. We will discuss the assignment in section or regular class.

Take-home midterm due April 24 (30%) On April 3 I will distribute a list of up to 6 short essay questions that may appear on the midterm. On April 21st I will tell you which 2–3 of these essay questions compose the midterm. Original insights will be rewarded the most, and so you are encouraged to study and prepare independently. You will need to hand in an electronic copy of these questions to your TA *before class* on Monday April 24. Students, not TAs, are responsible for ensuring proper electronic delivery. The late penalty is one grade level per day, starting from the beginning of class. Sickness or other late excuses must be accompanied by a doctor’s note or similar.

Take-home final exam (40%) IN the 7th or 8th week of classes I will distribute a list of up to 10 short essay questions that may appear on the final. On the evening before the registrar schedules our final exam, I will send you a list of 4–6 essay questions to complete for the final. The final will be due at midnight the day of the scheduled final exam. Hence you have at least 24 hours to complete the exam, rewarding advance preparation of all the questions. Original insights will be rewarded the most, and so you are encouraged to study and prepare independently. You will need to hand in an electronic copy of these questions to your TA *before midnight* on the day of the registrar-scheduled final exam. Students, not TAs, are responsible for ensuring proper electronic delivery. The late penalty is one grade level per day, starting from the beginning of class. Sickness or other late excuses must be accompanied by a doctor’s note or similar.

Part II

Weekly schedule and readings

This is a reading-intensive course. Each week I assign about four book chapters or papers, and you should read them all before attending class. All are downloadable online through UChicago’s network or from home on UChicago’s [VPN](#). The book chapters that are not on the Internet have Dropbox links. Please let me know if any links are broken and I will fix them.

“Additional readings” are not required, but I’ll often discuss a key idea or concept in the lecture. I list them here for your reference and future reading. You are not responsible for reading these readings, but the ideas we discuss in class are testable.

1 The demand for order

- Farrell, Henry. 2015. “[Dark Leviathan: The Silk Road Might Have Started as a Libertarian Experiment, but It Was Doomed to End as a Fiefdom Run by Pirate Kings.](#)” Aeon, February.
- Amos Sawyer. 2004. “[Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River basin area.](#)” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(03).

- Olson, Mancur. 1993. “[Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.
- James Ferguson with L. Lohmann. 1994. “[The anti-politics machine: 'development' and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.](#)” *The Ecologist* 24(5).

Additional reading

- Sudoscript. 2017. “[When Pixels Collide.](#)”
- Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra Hartman, and Robert Blair. 2014. “[How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 100–120.
- Tilly, Charles (1985). “[War making and state making as organized crime,](#)” in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- [Introduction](#) and [Chapter 1](#) of Gambetta, Diego. 1996. “The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection.” Harvard University Press.
- de la Sierra, Raúl Sánchez. 2015. “[On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo.](#)” Working paper.
- Autesserre, Severine. 2008. “[The Trouble with Congo. How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Violence,](#)” *Foreign Affairs*, May-June, 87 (3), 94–110.
- Ellickson, Robert C. 2009. “[Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes.](#)” Harvard University Press.
- Skarbek, David. 2011. “[Governance and prison gangs.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 702-716. (Or [listen to the EconTalk podcast](#) from March 2015)
- Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. “[Organizing violence.](#)” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46.5 (2002): 599-628.
- Barry Weingast on the Violence Trap. [EconTalk podcast.](#) August 2013.
- Wikipedia, “[Anarchy \(international relations\)](#)”
- Milner, Helen. 1991. “[The assumption of anarchy international relations theory.](#)” 17(1): 67-85
- Bates, Robert H. 2008. “[When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa.](#)” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. .
- Sen, Amartya 1988. “[The Concept of Development,](#)” *Handbook of Development Economics*, Volume 1, Edited by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, Elsevier Science Publishers.
- Ellickson, Robert C. 2009. “[Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes.](#)” Harvard University Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. “[Leviathan](#)”

2 Why fight at all?

- Fearon, James 1995. “[Rationalist Explanations for War](#),” *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- [Chapter 1](#) of Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. “Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador.” New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, Robert. 1994. “[The Coming Anarchy](#),” *The Atlantic*, February.
- First 8 pages of Walter, Barbara. 2014. “[Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War](#).” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 58(2).

Additional reading

- Galiani, Sebastian, and Gustavo Torrens. 2016. “[Why Not Taxation and Representation? A Note on the American Revolution](#).” NBER Working Paper.
- [Chapter 6](#) of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. “Political Economy for Public Policy.” Princeton University Press.
- Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. 2008. “[Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model](#).” *Journal of Public Economics* 92(10): 1942–67.
- Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. 2015. “[The Empiricists’ Insurgency](#).” *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. “[Civil War](#).” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48.1 (2010): 3-57.
- Beber, Bernd, and Christopher Blattman. “[The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion](#).” *International Organization* 67, no. 01 (2013): 65–104.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “[Greed and grievance in civil war](#).” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.
- Blattman, Christopher, and Jeannie Annan. 2015. “[Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State](#).” *American Political Science Review* 110(1).
- Blattman, Christopher and Laura Ralston. 2015. “[Generating employment in poor and fragile states: Evidence from labor market and entrepreneurship programs](#).” Working paper.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. “[Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment](#).” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2005): 598–624.
- Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi. 2017. “[How is Power Shared in Africa?](#)” *Econometrica*.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2016. “[Does Local Ethnic Segregation Lead to Violence? Evidence from Kenya](#).” Working paper.

- Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 3 (2000): 159–81.
- Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis. 2004. “Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies.” Oxford University Press.
- Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. 2003. “The Nature of Human Altruism.” *Nature* 425(6960): 785–91.

3 Order through states

- Bräutigam, Deborah. “Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance.” *IDS Bulletin* 33, no. 3 (2002): 1–17.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. “War and the State in Africa.” *International Security* (1990): 117-139.
- Tilly, Charles (1985). “War making and state making as organized crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Chapter 1 of Dipali Mukhopadhyay. 2014. “Warlords, strongman governors, and the state in Afghanistan.” Cambridge University Press. (A Kindle version of Chapter 1 is available on Amazon for free by clicking on “Send a free sample”)

Additional reading

- Chapter 2 of Samuels, David J. 2012. “Comparative Politics.” Pearson Higher Education.
- Wikipedia on Bureaucracy, Rational-legal authority, and Environmental determinism
- Rauch, James E., and Peter B. Evans. “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries.” *Journal of Public Economics* 75, no. 1 (2000): 49–71.
- Diamond, Jared. 1998. “The Evolution of Guns and Germs.” In *Evolution: Society, Science, and the Universe*, edited by A. C. Fabian, Cambridge University Press.
- Alsan, Marcella. “The Effect of the Tsetse Fly on African Development.” *The American Economic Review* 105, no. 1 (2014): 382–410.
- Tilly, Charles. “Coercion, Capital, and European States [1990].” 2012. In *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, edited by Craig Calhoun et al., 251–67. John Wiley & Sons.
- Vu, Tuong. 2010. “Studying the state through state formation.” *World Politics* 62(1): 148-175.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 2002. “The origins, development, and possible decline of the modern state.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5(1): 127-149.
- Chapters 1-2 and 5 of Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. “States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.” Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Robinson, James A. 2002. “States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 40(2): 510-519.
- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2013. “Taxation and Development.” *Handbook of Public Economics* 5: 51.
- Barry Weingast on Law. EconTalk podcast. August 2014.
- Johnson, Noel and Mark Koyama. 2015. “States and Economic Growth” Working paper.
- Dincecco, Mark. 2015. “The Rise of Effective States in Europe.” Working paper.
- Dincecco, Mark, James E. Fenske, and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato. 2016. “Is Africa Different? Historical Conflict and State Development.” Working paper.
- Mellinger, Andrew D., Jeffrey Sachs, and John L. Gallup. 1999. “Climate, Water Navigability, and Economic Development.” Working Paper.
- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2010. “State capacity, conflict, and development.” *Econometrica* 78(1): 1-34.
- Robb, Graham. 2008. “The discovery of France.” Pan Macmillan.
- Weber, Eugen. 1976. “Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914.” Stanford University Press.
- Sahlins, Peter. 1989. “Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees.” University of California Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. “The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.” Macmillan.
- Diamond, Jared. 1997. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: WW Norton & Company.
- Weber, Max. 1946. “Bureaucracy.” From *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* 196: 232–35.

4 Order through institutions

- Monty Python and the Holy Grail, “The Annoying Peasant”
- North, Douglass C. 1992. “Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance.” San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
- Sections 5 to 10 of Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth.” *Handbook of Economic Growth* 1: 385-472.
- Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis & Barry R. Weingast. 2009. “Violence and the rise of open-access orders.” *Journal of Democracy*, 20(1): 55-68.

- Pages 1 to 6 of Mahoney, James. 2001. “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1): 111–41.
- Read introduction to Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.” *Econometrica*, 78(6): 1863-1903.

Additional reading

- North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2006. “A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history,” National Bureau of Economic Research. 12795.
- Pages 1-24 of Besley, Timothy and Suresh Naidu. 2015. “Chapter 21: Political Economy,” Draft chapter for core-econ.org
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics.” *American Political Science Review*: 251-267.
- David, Paul A. 1985. “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” *The American Economic Review* 75(2): 332–37.
- Mahoney, James. 2001. “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1): 111–41.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty.” Basic Books.
- Sections 1 to 4 of Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth.” *Handbook of Economic Growth* 1: 385-472.
- Glaeser, Edward L., et al. 2004. “Do institutions cause growth?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 9(3): 271-303.
- Gonzalez de Lara, Yadira, Avner Greif and Saumitra Jha. 2008. “The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions.” *American Economic Review*, 98(2): 105-09.
- Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin. 2015. “State Capacity, Local Governance, and Economic Development in Vietnam.” Working paper.
- Akee, Randall, Miriam Jorgensen, and Uwe Sunde. 2015. “Critical junctures and economic development—Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations.” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 43(4): 844-861.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: the Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213.
- Wantchekon, Leonard, Natalija Novta, and Marko Klasnja. 2012. “Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Colonial Benin,” Working Paper.

- Hariri, Jacob G. “[The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 106.3 (2012).
- Pande, Rohini and Christopher Udry. 2005. “[Institutions and Development: A View from Below](#)”, in the Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, edited by R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press.

5 Order from societies

- Blog post by Tabarrok, Alex. 2015. “[The Ferguson Kleptocracy](#),” *Marginal Revolution* (blog post, March 5).
- Kunzru, Hari. 2015. “<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/18/ghettoside-investigating-homicide-epidemic-jill-leovy-review>” Book Review in *The Guardian*, 18 February.
- Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2013. “[Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game.](#)” Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan and Pennsylvania State University.
- [Chapter 1](#) of James Scott. 2009. “The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia.” Yale University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. “[Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.](#)” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3):137-158.

Additional reading

- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. “[What makes democracy work?](#)” *National Civic Review* 82(2): 101-107.
- [Preface \(p. ix-xxvi\)](#) in James C. Scott. 2012. “Two Cheers for Anarchism.”
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 1990. “[Migration, the politics of protest, and state consolidation in Africa.](#)” *African Affairs*: 183-203.
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2015. “[Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions](#)”
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. “[Social capital, civil society and development.](#)” *Third world quarterly* 22(1): 7-20.
- Paul Robinson on [Cooperation, Punishment and the Criminal Justice System](#), EconTalk Episode with Russ Robert, August 31, 2015.
- Welzel, Christian, and Ronald Inglehart. 2008. “[The role of ordinary people in democratization.](#)” *Journal of Democracy* 19(1): 126-140.
- Leeson, Peter T. 2014. “[Pirates, prisoners, and preliterate: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law.](#)” *European Journal of Law and Economics* 37(3): 365-379.
- Fearon, James D. 2011. “[Self-enforcing democracy.](#)” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(4): 1661-1708.

- De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1840. “[Democracy in America](#).”
- LeGuin, Ursula K. 2015. “[The Dispossessed](#).” Hachette UK.
- Ellickson, Robert C. 2009. “[Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes](#).” Harvard University Press.
- Leovy, Jill. 2015. [Ghettoside: A True Story of Murder in America](#). Spiegel & Grau.

6 The origins and politics of today’s weak states

- [Chapters 2 and 8](#) of Migdal, Joel S. 1988. “Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World.” Princeton University Press.
- Bates, Robert H., John H. Coatsworth, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. “[Lost Decades: Post-independence Performance in Latin America and Africa](#).” The Journal of Economic History.
- Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2004. “[Economic Reform: Patterns and Constraints](#).” Democratic Reform in Africa. The Quality of Progress: 29-63.

Additional reading

- [Chapter 11](#) of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. “Political Economy for Public Policy.” Princeton University Press.
- [Chapter 2](#) of Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism,” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- [Chapter 2](#) of Samuels, David J. 2012. “Comparative Politics.” Pearson Higher Education. (especially second half of chapter on late state development)
- Robert Klitgaard. 2013. “[Tropical Gangsters II: Adventures in Development in the World’s Poorest Places](#)” Amazon Digital Services.
- [Chapter 6](#) of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. “Political Economy for Public Policy.” Princeton University Press.
- Robinson, James A. “[Colombia: Another 100 years of solitude](#).” Current history 112.751 (2013): 43-48.
- Heldring, Leander, and James A. Robinson. 2012. “[Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa](#).” Working paper.
- Young, Crawford. 2004. “[The end of the post-colonial state in Africa? Reflections on changing African political dynamics](#).” African Affairs 103(410).
- Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. “[A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability](#).” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (2010): 190–208.

- Francois, Patrick, Ilija Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica* 83, no. 2 (2015): 465–503.
- Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2015. “[The Logic of Political Survival](#).” Cambridge: MIT Press.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. 2011. “[The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics](#).” New York: PublicAffairs.
- Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg (1982). “[Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant](#)”. University of California Press.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. “[Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico](#).” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Radelet, Steven. 2016. “[The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World](#).” New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ake, Claude. 1996. “[Democracy and development in Africa](#).” Brookings Institution Press.
- Ake, Claude. 2000. “[The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa](#).” Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
- Fanon, Franz. 2004. “[The Wretched of the Earth](#).” Grove Press.

7 Order through armed intervention?

- Gettleman, Jeffrey. “[Quandary in South Sudan: Should It Lose Its Hard-Won Independence?](#)” *New York Times*, January 23, 2017.
- Introduction to Stewart, Rory, and Gerald Knaus. 2011. “Can Intervention Work?” W.W. Norton & Company. (The whole book is [highly](#) recommended)
- [Chapter 1 and 7](#) of Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. “Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War.” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. “[Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective](#).” Center for Global Development Working Paper 57.
- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 2004. “[Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States](#).” *International Security* 28 (4): 5–43.

Additional reading

- [Introduction and Chapter 6](#) of Driscoll, Jesse. 2015. “[Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States](#).” Cambridge University Press.
- Stewart, Rory, and Gerald Knaus. 2011. “Can Intervention Work?” W.W. Norton & Company.

- Finnemore, Martha. 2008. “Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention,” in Richard Price (ed.), *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 197-224.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269–292.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 283-301.
- Easterly, William. 2008. “Foreign Aid Goes Military!” *New York Review of Books*.
- Barry Weingast “In the Shadow of Violence: A New Perspective on Development.” Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, July 2015.
- Posen, Barry R. “Nationalism, the mass army, and military power.” *International Security* (1993): 80-124.
- Dube, Oeindrila, and Suresh Naidu (2014) “Bases, bullets and ballots: The effect of US military aid on political conflict in Colombia.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20213.
- Shringarpure, Bhakti. 2013. “In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani.” *Warscapes*, July 15.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. “Short- and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations.” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22(1): 9–32.

8 State building without war (aid, good governance, and taxes)

- Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 2006. “An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa.” Center for Global Development Working Paper 74.
- Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews. 2013. “Looking like a state: techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation.” *The Journal of Development Studies* 49(1): 1-18.
- Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. “Good Enough Governance Revisited.” *Development Policy Review* 25(5): 533–74.
- Blum, Jurgen, Fotini Christia, and Daniel Rogger. 2016. “Public Service Reform in Post-Conflict Societies.” Working paper.

Additional reading

- Chapters 5.2 and 11.3 of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. *Political Economy for Public Policy*. Princeton University Press.

- Grindle, Merilee S. 2004. “[Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries.](#)” *Governance* 17(4): 525–48.
- Mwenda, Andrew. [Africa and the Curse of Foreign Aid](#) (Video)
- Qian, Nancy. 2014. “[Making Progress on Foreign Aid.](#)” *Annual Review of Economics* 3.
- Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian. 2014. “[U.S. Food Aid and Civil Conflict.](#)” *American Economic Review*.
- Faye, Michael and Paul Niehaus. 2012. “[Political Aid Cycles](#)”, *American Economic Review* 102(7): 3516–3530.
- Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2012. “[The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 146-165.
- Podcast with Binyavanga Wainaina: “[The Ethics of Aid: One Kenyan’s Perspective](#)” (or see [transcript](#))
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. 2009. “[A Political Economy of Aid.](#)” *International Organization* 63(2): 309–40.
- Easterly, William. 2009. “[Can the West Save Africa?](#)” *Journal of Economic Literature* 47(2).
- [Chapter 5](#) of Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. “*African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999.*” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berman, Eli, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Erin Troland. 2013. “[Effective Aid in Conflict Zones.](#)” *VoxEU.org*, May 26.
- Werker, Eric and Faisal Z. Ahmed (2008). “[What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?](#)” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22(2).
- Easterly, William and Tobias Pfutze. 2008. “[Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid.](#)” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2).
- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2013. “[Taxation and Development.](#)” *Handbook of Public Economics* 5: 51.
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