

# Ruochen Yi

Ph.D. Candidate, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago

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## References

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Prof. Steven Durlauf	University of Chicago	608-577-8186	<a href="mailto:sdurlauf@uchicago.edu">sdurlauf@uchicago.edu</a>
Prof. Roger Myerson	University of Chicago	773-834-9071	<a href="mailto:rmyerson@uchicago.edu">rmyerson@uchicago.edu</a>
Prof. James Robinson	University of Chicago	773-702-6364	<a href="mailto:jamesrobinson@uchicago.edu">jamesrobinson@uchicago.edu</a>

## Placement Director

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Prof. Steven Durlauf	University of Chicago	608-577-8186	<a href="mailto:sdurlauf@uchicago.edu">sdurlauf@uchicago.edu</a>
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## Education

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<b>University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy</b>	Chicago, the United States
Program: <b>Ph.D.</b> in Public Policy	Aug.2018-
Committee member: Prof. Durlauf (Co-chair), Prof. Myerson (Co-chair), Prof. Robinson.	
Program: <b>Master of Arts with Certificate in Research Method (MACRM)</b>	Aug.2017-Aug.2018
<b>University of Miami, College of Art and Science</b>	Miami, the United States
Program: <b>Master of Public Administration</b>	Aug.2014-Dec.2015
<b>Nanjing University, School of Architecture</b>	Nanjing, China
Major: <b>Architecture, Bachelor of Engineering</b>	Sept. 2009-Jul. 2013
Minor: <b>History</b>	

## Field of Specialization

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**Primary:** Political Economy, Development

**Secondary:** Game Theory, Labor

## Job marketing Paper

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*Structure of Government and Balance of Power, Evidence from Mid-level officials' promotion in China*

In this paper, I have collected a comprehensive dataset and characterized how the promotion prospects of prefecture Mayors and Secretaries depend on their ages. I developed a game theory model, relying on the unique dual-head system in China, to generate testable predictions about the dynamic relationship between Mayors' and Secretaries' ages and their decisions to "stimulate" GDP growth. I find that both Secretaries and Mayors manipulate GDP growth during their final opportunity for promotion to primary vice-provincial positions with real authority. Aware of these manipulations, the higher authority is found to have set higher promotion standards for these Secretaries. Secretaries at their critical age must achieve, on average, a 1.45% higher nominal GDP growth rate than Secretaries at other ages to secure promotion. Additionally, I have discovered that Secretaries at their critical ages manipulate less when paired with Mayors who are qualified to succeed them as Secretaries. Short-term policy measures used by Secretaries to "stimulate" economic development may hinder Mayors' future pursuit of high GDP growth, highlighting how the presence of Mayors can act as a check on Secretaries, reducing short-sighted economic policies aimed solely at promotion and ensuring long-term development.

## **Working Paper**

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*Endogenous Rebellion Benefits and Political Survival*, co-author with Zhaosong Ruan

*Ethnic Partitioning at Subnational Borders and Civil Conflicts, Evidence from Africa*, co-author with Yifan Yang

*Government Incentives in China's Land Market Auction*, co-author with Yifan Yang

## **Teaching Assistant Experience**

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Head TA, Advance Micro 2, Harris School of Public Policy	2021, 2022, 2023 Winter
TA, Ph.D. Micro 1, Harris School of Public Policy	2021 Fall
TA, Principles of Micro 1, Harris School of Public Policy	2020 Fall
TA, Contentious Policy Making, Harris School of Public Policy	2020 Spring
TA, Advance Micro 2, Harris School of Public Policy	2020 Winter
TA, master level Advance Statistics, Harris School of Public Policy	2019 Winter
Head TA, master level Principles of Micro 1, Harris School of Public Policy	2018 Fall

## **Presentation**

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MPSA 2023, *Endogenous Rebellion Benefits and Political Survival*, co-author with Zhaosong Ruan, presented by co-author

Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago:

Ph.D. workshop 2023, *Promotion of Mid-level officials, Evidence from China*

Ph.D. workshop 2022, *Ethnic Partitioning at Subnational Borders and Civil Conflicts, Evidence from Africa*, co-author with Yifan Yang

Ph.D. workshop 2021, *Government Incentives in China's Land Market Auction*, co-author with Yifan Yang

Ph.D. workshop 2020, *Reform Strategies of Authoritarian Regimes*, co-author with Zhaosong Ruan

PE lunch 2019, *Reform Strategies of Authoritarian Regimes*, co-author with Zhaosong Ruan, presented by co-author

## **Working Experience**

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<b>Shandong Provincial Education Department</b>	Jinan, China
<i>Officer of Vocational and Adult Education Division</i>	07/2013-07/2014

## **University Activities**

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<b>League Committee of Nanjing University</b>	Nanjing, China
<i>Vice minister of Practice Department</i> (highest position held by student)	06/2011-06/2012

## **OTHERS**

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<b>Computer Skill:</b>	Stata, Mathematica, Latex
<b>Language:</b>	Mandarin Chinese (native), English (fluent)
<b>Awards:</b>	Highest GPA Award in MPA program of University of Miami, 2015 Outstanding Student Leader of Nanjing University (100/13680), 2011
<b>Citizenship:</b>	Chinese
<b>Date of Birth:</b>	10/10/1991
<b>Gender:</b>	Male