

Justin Holz

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Employment & Affiliations	Post Doctoral Scholar , University of Chicago	2021-present
	Project Leader , Joint Initiative for Latin American Experimental	2018-present
	Associate Director , Chicago Experiments	2013-2015; 2016-2019
	Research Professional , Becker Friedman Institute	2011-2013
Education	Ph.D., Public Policy , University of Chicago	2021
	M.S., Economics and Public Policy , DePaul University	2011
	B.A., Economics , Gettysburg College	2009
Fellowships & Grants	Inter-American Development Bank (with Alejandro Danon & Jared Gars; \$67,000)	2022
	Russell Sage Foundation (with David Novgorodsky & Andrew Simon; \$35,000)	2022
	BFI, Experimental Initiative Grant (PI; \$20,000 annually)	2016 - 2019
	National Opinion Research Center Fellowship (\$27,000 annually)	2016 - 2018
Academic Services	Associate Editor , Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics	2022 - present
	Referee for <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , <i>Journal of Experimental Economics</i> , <i>National Tax Journal</i> , <i>Economic Inquiry</i>	
Job Market Paper	Minimum Wages and Racial Differences in Hiring: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment (with Alec Brandon, Andrew Simon & Haruka Uchida)	
	<i>W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Early Career Research Award</i>	
	<i>Abstract:</i> When minimum wages increase, discriminating employers may try to avoid regulatory burdens by substituting away from disadvantaged workers. We test this hypothesis using a resume correspondence study with 35,000 applications around three ex-ante uncertain minimum wage changes. Before the increases, applicants with distinctively Black names were 19% less likely to receive a callback than equally qualified applicants with distinctively white names. Announcements of minimum wage hikes substantially reduce the callbacks for both types of applicants but shrink the racial callback gap by 80% for the subsequent year for which we have data. We interpret our results through a hiring model to show that the gap shrinks because white applicants are more likely to be marginal, partly due to statistical discrimination. We show how researchers or policymakers can use our framework, without policy variation, to predict how labor market policies will change racial disparities in other settings.	

Publications

Peer Effects in Police Use of Force (with Bocar Ba & Roman Rivera)*Forthcoming. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*

Abstract: We study the link between police officers' on-duty injuries and their peers' force-use using a network of officers who attended the police academy together through a random lottery. On-duty injuries increase the probability of officers using force by 7% in the subsequent week. Officers are also more likely to injure suspects and receive complaints about neglecting victims and violating constitutional rights. The effects are concentrated in a narrow time window following the event and is not associated with significantly lower injury risk to the officer. Together, these findings suggest that emotional responses drive the effects rather than social learning.

The \$100 Million Nudge: Increasing the Tax Compliance of Firms using a Natural Field Experiment (with John List, Alejandro Zentner, Joaquin Zentner, & Marvin Cardoza)*Accepted. Journal of Public Economics*

Abstract: This paper uses a natural field experiment to examine the effectiveness of deterrence messages on tax compliance in the Dominican Republic. In collaboration with the tax authority, we sent messages to 56,310 firms that collectively paid \$700 million in the year before the experiment. Our field experiment complements a tax enforcement reform in the Dominican Republic a year before our intervention. Sharing information about prison sentences or the public disclosure of evasion arising from the tax enforcement reform increases tax revenue by \$184 million (0.22% of GDP). Using a unique sample that covers the entire firm size distribution, we show that the largest firms, that pay 84% of all corporate income taxes and typically have been excluded from this type of intervention, are highly responsive to our information treatments.

Estimating the Distaste for Price Gouging with Incentivized Consumer Reports (with Rafael Jimenez Duran & Eduardo Laguna-Muggenburg)*Conditionally Accepted. American Economic Journal: Applied*

Abstract: Thirty-four states prohibit price increases during emergencies and individuals take costly actions to report violators. We measure experimentally the willingness to pay to report sellers who increase prices of personal protective equipment. Over 75% of subjects pay to report even if others are willing to buy at those prices. We argue that reports contain information about a desire to prevent or punish third-party transactions at unfair or illicit prices. Reports are partially driven by a distaste for firm profits or markups, implying that the distribution of surplus between producers and consumers matters for welfare.

Selected Works
in Progress**Increasing the Take-up of a Tax Amnesty using a Natural Field Experiment** (with John List, Andrew Simon & Alejandro Zentner)*Data Collected; AEARCTR-0006612*

Abstract: This paper uses a natural field experiment to understand how governments can increase the take-up of tax amnesties. In collaboration with the tax authority, we randomized correspondences with 125,452 debtors who collectively owe 5.2 billion USD. Our deterrence message increases payments of known debt by 25% and unknown debt by 42%, while our other types of messages do not increase revenue. These results suggest that beliefs about low enforcement are a significant barrier to amnesty take-up.

Do Sanctions Increase Voter Turnout? (with Julio Elias, John List & Alejandro Zentner)*Data Collected; AEARCTR-0008423*

Abstract: This paper uses a natural field experiment to assess the effects of collateral sanctions for vote abstention in Argentina. We randomized messages to Argentinian citizens, reminding them of an upcoming election, pre-existing collateral sanctions for abstention, or the possibility of small symbolic fines to avoid these sanctions. We find that informing voters of the collateral sanctions increases voter turnout by three percentage points, but find no significant effects when additionally informing subjects that they can avoid sanctions by paying a large fine. These effects reduce the disparity in voter participation by primarily mobilizing low-propensity individuals to vote.

Debt Amenities and Energy Consumption (with Alejandro Danon & Jared Gars)*In Preparation.*

Abstract: Energy debt forgiveness acts as an implicit subsidy on past consumption and may lead to overuse in expectation of future forgiveness. In collaboration with a state electricity utility in Argentina, we measure the effect of debt forgiveness on subsequent bill payments and electricity consumption. We randomize firms that currently carry debts in a 2x2 field experiment that varies whether firms are eligible for contemporaneous debt forgiveness and the probability that they are eligible for future forgiveness. We will also estimate treatment effect heterogeneity and spillovers to firms that did not owe debts.

Police Militarization, Home Values & Public Opinion (with Miguel Morales & Taeho Kim)*In Preparation.*

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether providing the police with military equipment improves social welfare. We estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for police militarization using housing markets using country-year panel data on spending on military equipment from the 1033 Program, reported crime, and home values. Using a hedonic pricing regression, we calculate the marginal WTP to avoid militarization using variation in housing values. We find that police militarization reduces both crime and home values with crime displacement into neighboring areas.

Understanding Inequality in Property Taxes (with David Novgorodsky & Andrew Simon)*Data Collected; AEARCTR-0009302***A Field Experiment on Tax Avoidance** (with Ricardo Perez-Truglia & Alejandro Zentner)*Data Collected; AEARCTR-0009298***Increasing the Tax Compliance of Self-Employed Workers** (with John List, Alejandro Zentner, Joaquin Zentner, & Marvin Cardoza)*Data Collected; AEARCTR-0004064***An Economic Approach to Valuing the Harms of Hate Speech** (with Rafael Jimenez Duran)*In Preparation.***Conferences
Invited Seminars**

ESA, AFE, Discrimination & Disparities Online Seminar, IADB Pollution RCT Workshop	2022
Gettysburg College, Queens University	
MSR Research Hub, Behavioral Science Summit, MWIEDC	2021
APAAM, Behavioral Insights Global, CESifo Workshop on Political Economy	2020
AEA Meetings, AFE, APAAM, CELS, Economics of Eating Meat	2019

Teaching Experience

Guest Lecturer, University of Chicago Expanding Diversity in Economics Summer Institute	2021, 2022
Co-Instructor, University of Chicago A Course in Experimental Economics	2021
Teaching Assistant, University of Chicago	
Statistics for Data Analysis	2020
Experimental Economics	2012, 2013, 2014, 2018, 2019
Applied Behavioral Economics	2019
Principles of Microeconomics	2019
Survey Questionnaire Design	2018
Advanced Microeconomics	2017, 2018
Economics for Everyone	2017
Mathematics Pre-Core Camp	2017
Co-Instructor, Chicago Heights Elementary School District Principles of Microeconomics	2011, 2012

References

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