Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections*

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Abstract

We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized on a traditional cleavage, but are also internally divided along a second issue cleavage. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter an election through an established party’s nomination process, as opposed to circumventing established parties via a third-party challenge. We further explore when this threat disciplines party elites and the conditions under which Outsider challenges are most likely to succeed. Our framework highlights how established parties will be especially vulnerable to Outsider primary entry in periods of intense ideological polarization between the parties, and that this vulnerability is especially heightened for the majority party.

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1. Introduction

In the United States, and elsewhere, recent elections have exposed the vulnerability of established parties and party systems to the entry of Outsider candidates. A defining feature of these candidates is their ability to enter politics and contest elections without the support of traditional party elites. Some Outsiders, such as Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Roy Moore, pursue their campaigns by seeking the nomination of established parties, despite strong initial opposition from party elites and insiders. Others, including Ross Perot, Imran Khan, and Beppe Grillo’s Five Star movement, bypass existing parties entirely, pursuing third-party or independent campaigns or even creating entirely new parties.

Why might voters prefer to support Outsider candidates, either in party primaries or in general elections, instead of more experienced and vetted candidates? What forces shape an Outsider’s decision to enter an election through an established political party, rather than as a third-party candidate? And given that, regardless of their ultimate success, Outsider candidacies of all forms are often highly disruptive to established parties, why might party elites fail to take the necessary steps to mitigate the Outsider threat?

We explore these questions in a theoretical model of electoral competition between two established parties. A novel ingredient that we introduce is that there are two issue dimensions of policy conflict. The first issue dimension—for example, redistribution and the size of the state—represents a traditional issue cleavage on which there is polarization between parties. The second issue dimension represents a cleavage on which there is polarization and disagreement within parties. Our running interpretation of this issue dimension is “globalism” versus “anti-globalism”. More broadly, however, the model describes any context in which there is polarization both between and within parties. We assume that elites in both established parties belong to their respective party’s globalist faction, and, in the baseline model, that establishment candidates’ positions reflect their party elites’ preferred policies.

We introduce the threat of entry by an Outsider, who is distinguished from establishment candidates in two important respects. First, she has the resources, name recognition, or grassroots support to participate in either the primary or the general election without the support of party elites. Second, establishment candidates have valuable skills and experience that the Outsider lacks. Formally, this is captured by assuming that voters derive a value from an establishment candidate that is independent of her policy. These two features imply that voters

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1 For example, in the United States, the civil rights era created division within the parties that were distinct from the traditional cleavages that divided the parties (e.g., McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2008). The cleavage might also represent a religious or ethnic division.
will only turn to the Outsider if she offers policies that are left unrepresented by establishment candidates.\(^2\) The Outsider decides whether to enter the election, and if so, whether to do so by mounting a primary challenge inside an established party or, alternatively, to compete outside of the established parties as an independent, third-party candidate.

Because an establishment candidate represents the globalist faction in each party, the Outsider differentiates herself by running as an anti-globalist. When deciding whether to contest the election via a primary or a third party campaign, there are two important sources of uncertainty: the Outsider is unsure of the division of voters between the parties and between the factions within parties, and she is also unsure of the extent to which rank-and-file anti-globalist voters are relatively more intensely polarized on the globalization issue conflict versus the traditional partisan issue conflict.

If the Outsider chooses a primary campaign, she will be opposed by party elites and globalist voters, who prefer the establishment candidate on both policy and quality grounds. However, if there is significant polarization between the parties, the Outsider anticipates that—if she wins the primary contest—she will draw the support of both ideological factions within the party in the general. The reason is that even those who opposed the Outsider in the primary will nonetheless prefer her to the opposing party’s nominee. The gamble of early defeat may be worthwhile if it carries the promise that the party would subsequently rally around her, despite factional disagreement at the nomination stage. The Outsider therefore enters the election through a primary challenge if there is sufficiently intense inter-party polarization.

When inter-party polarization is instead relatively low, the Outsider anticipates that the globalist faction within the party would fail to rally behind her if she won the nomination on an anti-globalist platform. In a general election, she would therefore require a majority of anti-globalists to defeat the unified globalist vote in favor of the other party’s nominee. By staying out of the primary, in contrast, she ensures that both parties are represented by elite-endorsed candidates who champion globalist policies. This has the consequence that in the general election, the globalist vote is fractured across party lines, so that it is possible to win the election even if anti-globalists only constitute a plurality of the electorate. In this case the Outsider always prefers to enter as a third-party candidate.

Because an Outsider will only ever contest the primary in periods of intense inter-party polarization, our framework provides a rationale for Outsider candidates even if they are not perceived as more able or less corruptible. In an extension, we allow for the Outsider to be perceived as superior in quality to establishment candidates, and show that the incentive to offer non-establishment policies continues to exist.

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polarization, she always achieves its united support if she wins the nomination. A consequence of this is that, conditional on securing the party nomination, the Outsider has a better prospect than an establishment candidate of winning in the general election. This is because the Outsider secures not only the unified party vote, but may also steal the support of some anti-globalist voters in the opposing party. This latter feat could never be achieved by a globalist establishment nominee. So, even though an Outsider challenge may face long odds in the primary, her success need not necessarily reduce the party’s chances in the general—it may even increase those chances.

An Outsider campaign is disruptive to the established parties regardless of their ultimate success. Why, then, do party elites not take firmer steps to mitigate it? We address this question by consider two kinds of political party elites: strong and weak. Party elites are strong if they have the capacity—de jure or simply de facto—to block the Outsider from mounting a primary challenge; they are weak if the lack the capacity to stop the Outsider from entering. We show that strong party elites may not wish to use their power to block the Outsider; the reason is that doing so forces the Outsider to enter the election on a third-party challenge. These challenges divide the party’s factions in the general election, raising the prospect that the other party’s nominee wins on a plurality of votes. If elites are sufficiently polarized on the inter-party issue cleavage, they prefer to face the Outsider’s challenge head-on in the primary, rather than force her to compete as an independent in the general election. Thus, even strong party elites may opt not to block the Outsider from a primary challenge.

Weak parties, by contrast, cannot keep the Outsider out if she wishes to enter—this may be due to norms, explicit rules, or highly decentralized party organizations. In these contexts, elites must find another way. To give elites a chance, we suppose that they could find a high-quality candidate to run in the party’s primary on an anti-globalist platform against its most preferred (globalist) candidate. This gives all party factions a high-quality candidate in the primary, and effectively deters the Outsider from being able to mount a successful primary challenge. In contrast, by refusing to offer a genuine alternative to its most-preferred candidate, the elite creates an opportunity for the Outsider’s primary challenge to succeed.

We find that the elite will have the greatest incentive to restrict primary competition amongst establishment candidates when the intensity of globalist sentiment is high, when

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3 An example of strong party elites comes from Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a Chilean presidential candidate, in 2009. Enríquez-Ominami initially planned to contest the Concertacion coalition primary election, but opted instead to run as an independent after the leadership forced a rule-change that would guarantee the nomination of its preferred establishment candidate—the former president Eduardo Frei (Bunker and Navia, 2013). By contrast, party elites in the United States cannot stop a candidate from participating in the primary if she has sufficient grassroots support.
inter-party polarization is strong, and when elites are most confident that the Outsider would lose in the primary. In particular, since elites will always act to deter the Outsider whenever she has a high enough probability of success, Outsider challenges can only occur when they are unlikely to succeed; that is, an Outsider can only secure a party’s nomination when doing so is a surprise.

Our results can shed light on the contemporary US paradox of “strong partisanship, weak parties” (e.g., Azari, 2016). Our framework shows that it is precisely when polarization between parties is strongest that party establishments are most vulnerable to entry from Outsiders, and elites have the least control of their nominating process. The reason is that, despite initial opposition, Outsiders anticipate that so long as they win the nomination, they will be able to unite the party in its common desire to defeat the opposing party’s candidate. This makes a primary victory an especially valuable prize. As this prize only gets more valuable when the party is electorally advantaged, an Outsider primary challenge is more likely in the electorally advantaged than disadvantaged party. In light of the increase in polarization documented in recent decades (e.g., McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2008), our prediction that primary entry is relatively more attractive to Outsiders in periods of heightened partisanship is consistent with the fact that Ross Perot pursued a third-party candidacy in the 1990s, while Donald Trump instead pursued a primary challenge in 2016.

This paper is organized as follows. After reviewing related work, we present our model of Outsider challenges in Section 2. We then solve for general election outcomes (Section 3) depending on the Outsider’s entry inside the party or as a third-party candidate, and assess how this shapes the Outsider’s choice (Section 4). In Section 5, we extend the model to allow the elite to respond to the Outsider threat. Section 6 discusses several extensions of the baseline model. The proofs of all results are included in the Appendix.

**Related Work.** We view our results as relevant to a number of theoretical and empirical literatures on electoral competition and the internal organization of political parties. We describe the connection below.

**Primaries.** A large literature documents a shift in the internal organization of parties towards more open and democratic candidate selection procedures across a number of countries. Primaries can reveal information about candidates’ quality (Serra, 2011; Adams and Merrill, 2008; Snyder and Ting, 2011; Slough, York and Ting, 2017), and voters’ policy preferences (Meirowitz, 2005). They may also provide incentives for candidates to invest in high-quality platforms (Caillaud and Tirole, 2002; Crutzen, Castanheira and Sahuguet, 2010). At the same time, primaries may exacerbate policy conflict between parties (Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoff-
man, 2003; Serra, 2015; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2008; Agranov, 2016) and mitigate conflict within parties (Hortala-Vallve and Mueller, 2015).

We do not explore the party’s decision to use primaries: in our framework, all agents understand that a primary contest will take place. However, a formal commitment to internal party democracy belies the scope for elite control of the contest, as the party elite may be able use its privileged position to promote aligned candidates at the expense of others. Our focus is on the prospect that establishment candidates will adopt elite-preferred policies, as well as the question of when Outsider candidates choose to contest primary elections rather than bypass internal party democracy entirely by entering election as third-party candidates. Moreover, in contrast to previous work that has emphasized the role of primaries in selecting high quality candidates and platforms, our framework identifies circumstances under which holding a primary lowers the expected quality of the party’s nominee relative to elite selection.

Party nomination decisions. Our results address the types of candidates that are likely to be nominated when party leaders and rank-and-file members are misaligned. In an extremely influential book, Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller (2009) argue that the party establishment in the United States typically plays a decisive role in party nominations. Nonetheless, party elites are not always successful in imposing their preferred candidates on primary voters. This was demonstrated, for example, by the inability in recent elections of Republican party elites to forestall the nominations of Donald Trump and Roy Moore. Our analysis sheds light on how party elites can influence the process and derives predictions about when “the party decides” and when, instead, the party divides, with primary voters abandoning elite-preferred candidates.

Formal models of political parties. Our paper relates to existing work in which parties aggregate conflicting policy preferences. A seminal contribution is Levy (2004), who illustrates how parties may endogenously reduce the dimensionality of ideological conflicts to a single dimension in electoral competition. Our model also highlights when elections will be fought on one or more than one dimension of ideological conflict. In Roemer (1999), party factions assign different priorities to policy versus winning. Dewan and Squintani (2016) also consider parties made up of factions, but focus on information aggregation among the members. In Morelli (2004), parties serve as a mechanism to coordinate voters in elections in multi-district contests, in one dimension of policy conflict. Eguia (2011) shows how parties—defined as durable voting coalitions—endogenously form in a legislative assembly. Krasa and Polborn (2015) consider candidate selection and legislative elections in multiple districts, in a one-dimensional model. Krasa (2016) considers a dynamic model of two-party elections in which
parties nominate candidates, and in which party membership evolves over time, but in which there is no prospect of third-party entry.

*Outsiders, Populists, and Entry.* A large body of work considers established parties competing under threat of third-party entry, including Palfrey (1984), Weber (1992) and Callander (2005). In contrast with these papers, we consider more than one dimension of policy conflict, and also allow a potential entrant to decide whether to pursue her campaign as a third-party candidate or through established political parties. Finally, we contribute to a small but growing literature on populism. Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2013) develop a model of populism in which policymakers choose extreme and inefficient policies in order to signal they are not captured by elites. Rodrik (2017) empirically associates populism with new issues and distributive conflicts brought about by globalization. Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2017) consider when political candidates will pursue short-term populist policies, and find that such policies are more electorally attractive when there is greater distrust of elites. Karakas and Mitra (2017) develop a theoretical model in which Outsider candidates can commit to higher levels of redistribution, and find that Outsiders are more likely to win when there is greater income inequality. Unlike Guiso et al. (2017) and Karakas and Mitra (2017), who assume Outsiders have a comparative advantage in offering populist policies or rhetoric, we emphasize why voters may turn to Outsiders even if they are presumed to be risky, or less competent.

2. A Model of Outsider Challenges

**Environment.** There are two political parties, \( \mathcal{L} \) and \( \mathcal{R} \). Each party consists of an elite, a unit mass continuum of citizens, and a set of establishment candidates. The elite could represent the party leadership, such as the Republican National Committee, a group of senior legislative politicians, or major donors and party activists. Finally, there is an Outsider candidate, whose decisions will be the focus of our baseline model.

There are two dimensions of policy disagreement and in each dimension there are two possible policy positions, 0 or 1. Hence the policy space is \( \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \), depicted in Figure 1. The horizontal dimension of policy is most naturally interpreted as a traditional left-right cleavage, such as less \((x = 1)\) versus more redistribution \((x = 0)\). The vertical dimension of policy represents an emerging issue cleavage. We interpret it as reflecting competing views on globalization: voters located at \( y = 1 \) favor globalist policies, e.g., open immigration policies and free trade; by contrast, voters located at \( y = 0 \) favor more restrictive trade agreements and immigration controls. We refer to these latter voters as anti-globalists. We want to emphasize that we adopt this nomenclature purely for exposition; the interpretation of this second issue
dimension will vary with the particular context.\footnote{For example, it could reflect policies on a religious, economic, or social cleavage.}

Political parties are organized along the horizontal policy cleavage with all citizens a member of one of the two parties. Voters and party elites care about policy, and are identified by their most preferred policies. The $\mathcal{R}$ elite’s most preferred policy is $(1, 1)$, while the $\mathcal{L}$ elite’s ideal policy is $(0, 1)$: both party elites support the globalist position, but the $\mathcal{R}$ elite favors less redistribution and smaller government, while the $\mathcal{L}$ elite favors more redistribution and larger government.

The distribution of voters’ preferences is uncertain, from the perspective of all agents. We assume that fraction $R$ of the voters are in the $\mathcal{R}$ party and $1 - R$ are in the $\mathcal{L}$ party. Within each party, fraction $A$ are anti-globalists and $1 - A$ are globalists. This fraction is the same in each party and $R$ and $A$ are independent.\footnote{The assumption that the fraction of anti-globalists in each party is the same, and that anti-globalist and $\mathcal{R}$ support are independent, are made to simplify the exposition. In Subsection A.1 we show that our main results carry over if these assumptions are relaxed.} Hence the fraction of anti-globalists and globalists $\mathcal{R}$ voters is $RA$ and $R(1 - A)$ respectively. Similarly the fraction of $\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalists and globalists are $(1 - R)A$ and $R(1 - A)$ respectively.

We now define the particular probabilities that will be important for the analysis. We define

$$M_R \equiv \Pr(R > 1/2)$$

and

$$M_A \equiv \Pr(A > 1/2)$$

The set of policy alternatives.

Figure 1 – The set of policy alternatives.

$$(0,1)$$

$$(0,0)$$

$$(1,0)$$

$$(1,1)$$
is the probability of a majority of anti-globalists in the electorate. Finally we define

\[ P_A = \Pr(A > (1 - A) \max\{R, 1 - R\}) \]

to be the probability of an anti-globalist plurality: that is, the probability that there are enough anti-globalists that an candidate who wins the support of all anti-globalists would win if the globalist vote were divided between the L and R parties. Throughout the paper we maintain the following assumption.

**Assumption 1.** R and A are independent are independently drawn from some atomless distribution such that

1. \( \Pr((1 - R) \max\{A, 1 - A\} < R < 1 - R \min\{A, 1 - A\}) = 1, \)
2. \( M_R \in (0, 1), \)
3. \( 0 < M_A < P_A \leq 1. \)

The first part of Assumption 1 states that either faction in the R party (L party) is smaller than the combined factions in the L (respectively R) party. This condition will be satisfied if the division of voters between the parties is not expected to be very imbalanced. The second part states that it is uncertain whether voters in party R constitute a majority. The third part says that it is uncertain whether there is an anti-globalist majority, but the probability of an anti-globalist plurality is strictly higher than an anti-globalist majority, \( P_A > M_A. \) This means a candidate who has all anti-globalists united behind her has a strictly higher prospect of winning an election if the globalist vote is divided rather than united.

**Payoffs.** Citizens and party elites care about policy outcomes. If a policy \((x', y') \in \{0, 1\}^2\) is implemented, a citizen with ideal policy \((x, y) \in \{0, 1\}^2\) derives a spatial payoff

\[
 u(x', y'; x, y) = -p|x' - x| - \begin{cases} 
 g|y' - 1| & \text{if } y = 1 \\
 a|y' - 0| & \text{if } y = 0. 
\end{cases} \tag{1}
\]

The parameter \( p > 0 \) reflects the importance of the traditional cleavage, along which the parties are defined. Thus, \( p \) captures the extent of partisan issue polarization in the electorate.

The parameter \( g > 0 \) captures the relative concern that voters who favor globalist policies place on the globalization issue, and \( a \) captures the concern that voters who favor anti-globalist policies place on the globalization issue. Party elites are located at \( y = 1 \) and we assume that
the preferences of the party elite is common knowledge. Hence $g$ is commonly known to all players, including the Outsider.\(^6\) However, we assume that there is uncertainty about the intensity of anti-globalist sentiment, $a$, which is a random variable distributed according to an atomless cumulative distribution function $F(\cdot)$ with full support on $\mathbb{R}_+$.\(^7\) The asymmetry between what is known about $g$ and $a$ reflects that elite opinion is better understood than the opinions of the electorate as a whole.

Finally, we assume that voters care about the quality of politicians, interpreted loosely as governing skills and experience. Specifically, we assume that all voters believe that establishment candidates hold a quality advantage, $q > 0$, over the Outsider candidate. This could be because the Outsider has less experience or because she has not been vetted by the party as she rose through its ranks.\(^8\) Thus, when a policy $(x', y')$ is implemented by an establishment politician, a voter with ideal policy $(x, y)$ derives payoff

$$u(x', y'; x, y) + q,$$

and if the policy is implemented by the Outsider, a voter’s payoff is simply $u(x', y'; x, y)$. While our benchmark model assumes $q > 0$, in a later extension we also consider the possibility that $q < 0$, i.e., the Outsider is perceived to be of higher quality than an establishment candidate.

**Party nominations and the Outsider.** Our initial analysis focuses on the Outsider’s decision to enter the election. Thus, we assume that the $L$ party is certain to nominate a globalist establishment candidate, i.e., located at $(0, 1)$. This may reflect a context in which $L$ is the incumbent party and inherits its candidate from the previous electoral cycle.

Similarly, we initially assume that the $R$ party elite has thrown its support behind a globalist establishment candidate, i.e., located at $(1, 1)$, who will win the primary unless the Outsider enters the contest. Thus, the Outsider’s choice is whether to contest the primary on either the globalist or anti-globalist $R$ position—$(1, 1)$ or $(1, 0)$—or to run as a third-party candidate on one of those two positions, or not to run at all.

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\(^6\) That the Outsider has the same information as party elites could be because the Outsider moves in the same circles as the elites or because pundits, columnists, and party leaders are all elites and so elite opinion is well understood.

\(^7\) It is not important that $a$ could be arbitrarily close to 0 or unbounded above, but this reduces the number of cases to consider so we make this assumption for expositional simplicity.

\(^8\) One micro-foundation of this quality wedge is to assume that the elite privately observes the competence of establishment candidates, but not of the Outsider, and that high-quality establishment candidates are always available to the elite. It would then be a weakly dominant strategy for the elite to only endorse those who are high quality and we can interpret $q$ as the expected quality difference between a known high quality candidate and a candidate of uncertain quality.
Many of these simplifying assumptions will be relaxed later: we give the Outsider the ability to choose different policies and consider the possibility of primaries in both parties in Section 6, and study the elite’s response to Outsider threats in Section 5.

We assume that the Outsider is purely office-motivated, and will enter the contest if and only if she wins with positive probability. This simplifies the analysis, since it implies that the Outsider will choose the strategy that maximizes her probability of winning office without concern for how she will impact the relative election probabilities of the other candidates.

**Timing.** The game proceeds as follows.

1. The distribution of voters, $R$ and $A$, and the preference parameter $a$ are independently realized. Neither realization is observed by the elite or the Outsider.

2. The Outsider decides whether to contest the primary within the $R$ party at either location $(1, 1)$ or $(1, 0)$, or instead to stay out.

3. A primary is held within the $R$ party if there are two contestants for the nomination and the candidate who receives the larger share of the vote in the primary proceeds to the general election as the $R$-party nominee.

4. A general election is held in which the $R$-party nominee competes against a $L$-party establishment candidate located at $(0, 1)$. In addition, if the Outsider previously chose to stay out, she decides whether to compete in the general election at either location $(1, 1)$ or $(1, 0)$ or stay out. The election takes place by plurality rule.

We assume that at all stages voters cast their ballots sincerely. In particular, this means that a primary voter who chooses between two candidates does so on the basis of her *immediate* comparison between the candidates.\(^9\)

**Equilibrium.** Our solution concept is sequential equilibrium. We use sequential equilibrium to account for nature’s moves, but since no player has any private information, players’ beliefs are determined only by their prior beliefs and (possibly) the outcome of the primary. We

\(^9\)As previously discussed, this means that even if the Outsider runs as a third-party candidate she is constrained to choose the $R$ position on the traditional issue in the general election. This makes the comparison between a primary and third-party run as simple as possible. However we consider the case in which a third-party candidate is free to pursue any policy she wishes in Section 6.

\(^{10}\)Assuming instead that voters take into account the probabilities of winning in the general election when casting their ballot in the primary would not fundamentally change the results; for a range of parameters the equilibrium behavior would be the same under this assumption.
will show that the equilibrium is generically unique.\footnote{A potential multiplicity arises because for a measure zero set of parameters, voters may be indifferent between two or more candidates, and for a measure zero set of parameters an Outsider may be indifferent between contesting the primary or general. We specify the following tie-breaking rule: if a voter is indifferent over a set of candidates, she always votes for a candidate with strictly higher expected quality than a candidate with strictly lower expected quality; amongst the set of candidates with the weakly highest expected quality, she always votes for a candidate that locates at a platform that includes her ideal policy on the traditional (x) dimension. We further assume that if the Outsider is indifferent between contesting the primary of general she will run as a third party. This specification is sufficient for our benchmark presentation.}

**Discussion.** Our model includes uncertainty both about the distribution of voter ideal points, and about the intensity of anti-globalist sentiment. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty about which party will be a majority as well as uncertainty about anti-globalists constitute a majority, or perhaps not even a plurality. The probability of a R majority, $M_R$, and the probabilities of an anti-globalist majority and plurality, $M_A$ and $P_A$ respectively, will be the important probabilities. The uncertainty about $a$ captures that it is uncertain whether anti-globalists are polarized enough on this dimension to potentially turn to an Outsider candidate.

Elite influence is reflected in our baseline assumption that establishment candidates take the elite-preferred position inside their respective parties. While we endogenize the positions of establishment candidates in Section 5, in the baseline model the anti-globalist position can only be taken by the Outsider. This generates a possible rationale for voters to embrace Outsiders despite perceived weaknesses in experience or competence.

We assume that the Outsider can run in the primary or as a third party candidate but she cannot do both. One could instead allow the Outsider to mount a third-party challenge, even if she is defeated in a primary contest, but assume she incurs cost to run in the primary, and an additional cost to contest the general election as an independent candidate. If this cost is neither too large or too small the Outsider would run in the primary or as a third party candidate, but not both, and our results are unchanged.\footnote{The details are available upon request.}

Finally, we assume that the Outsider chooses her entry strategy solely to maximize her prospect of winning—her first-order concern is not to influence the prospect that any other candidate wins, or promoting a policy agenda.\footnote{This means, for example, that ours is not a model of policy-motivated third-party runs, such as those by Ralph Nader in 2000 and 2004.} The prospect of winning need not be large: in fact, as in many real-world examples, it is possible that the Outsider will contest the primary even if her absolute probability of winning is small. What is important for the Outsider’s decision is her relative prospects from a primary versus third-party entry.
3. Preliminary Results

We begin by deriving the Outsider’s prospects from entering the electoral contest via the \( R \) primary, or alternatively pursuing a third-party campaign.

We first observe that the Outsider never prefers to locate at the same policy as an establishment candidate, either in the primary or general election. The reason is that she would be sure to lose: voters would be indifferent between the Outsider and an establishment candidate on policy grounds, but anticipate a quality wedge \( q > 0 \) in favor of the establishment candidate. They would therefore unanimously prefer the latter.

Since a primary campaign would pit her against an establishment \( R \) globalist, and a third-party campaign would have her compete against establishment globalists from both parties, the only way the Outsider can win is by campaigning either in the primary or in the general election on an anti-globalist platform. The Outsider’s decision is therefore whether to enter in either venue on an anti-globalist platform, or instead stay out of the election altogether.

**Outsider Entry in a Primary Campaign**

We first consider the conditions under which the Outsider can win the \( R \) primary, and subsequently the general election, on an anti-globalist platform. In the primary she receives no support from the party’s globalist faction; thus, two conditions must be satisfied in order for her to win.

*First*, a primary victory requires anti-globalists to be a majority of the \( R \) primary voters—something that occurs with probability \( M_A \). *Second*, rank-and-file \( R \) party voters that favor anti-globalist policies must care enough about the globalization cleavage to overlook the Outsider’s quality disadvantage. The Outsider generates a payoff of zero to a voter with ideal policy \((1, 0)\). By contrast, the party’s establishment globalist generates a policy cost \(-a\), but also a quality \( q \). Rank-and-file anti-globalists will therefore support the Outsider in the \( R \) primary if and only if:

\[
0 > -a + q \iff a > q.
\]

(2)

When condition (2) holds, we say that there is **moderate anti-globalism**.

When both these conditions are satisfied, the Outsider wins the \( R \) primary and advances to the general election as the party’s nominee. Who votes for the Outsider in the general election? Anti-globalist voters located at \((0, 1)\) preferred the Outsider to their own party’s globalist establishment candidate, and so will also prefer her to the opposing party’s globalist nominee. Conversely, globalists in party \( L \)—located at \((1, 1)\)— are represented by an
establishment candidate who champions their most preferred policy, and so they will never support the Outsider.

The $\mathcal{R}$ globalists and $\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalists, on the other hand, face a non-trivial decision of whether to rally around their respective party’s nominee, or instead to cross party lines and support the opposing party’s candidate in the general election. To see why, consider each faction’s preferences, in turn.

$\mathcal{R}$ globalists. The preferred candidate of the $\mathcal{R}$ globalists was defeated in the primary, so these voters now face a choice between party $\mathcal{L}$’s establishment candidate, located at $(0,1)$, and their Outsider nominee located at $(1,0)$. These voters must therefore decide whether to rally around their party’s candidate—despite her anti-globalist platform and inferior governing skills—or instead abandon their own nominee in favor of the $\mathcal{L}$ globalist establishment candidate.

Recalling that the polarization of globalist voters on the globalism versus anti-globalism (vertical) issue cleavage is $g > 0$, and their polarization on the partisan (horizontal) issue cleavage is $p > 0$, we observe that the $\mathcal{R}$ globalists vote for their nominee if and only if

$$-g > -p + q \iff p > g + q.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

When condition (3) holds, globalist voters are sufficiently polarized in the partisan dimension that they will rally behind the Outsider in the general election, despite opposing her in the primary. When (3) holds we say that the election is *highly partisan*. In that event, an Outsider who wins the primary enters the general election with the unified support of her party.

$\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalists. Members of the anti-globalist rank-and-file in party $\mathcal{L}$ must decide whether to rally around their party’s candidate, located at $(0,1)$—despite her globalist platform—or instead abandon their own nominee in favor of the $\mathcal{R}$ anti-globalist nominee, accepting her lower governing skills and misalignment on the partisan issue as the price of better alignment on the globalization issue cleavage. $\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalist voters abandon their party’s establishment nominee if:

$$-p > -a + q \iff a > p + q.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Condition (4) is more stringent than condition (2): an $\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalist must care enough about the globalization cleavage to outweigh both the Outsider’s quality disadvantage and ideological misalignment on the partisan issue cleavage. When condition (4) holds we say that there is *extreme anti-globalism*.

When the environment is highly partisan, i.e., (3) holds, the Outsider wins the general
election after a successful primary challenge whenever $R$ voters constitute a majority of the voting population—something that happens with probability $M_R$. Even if the $R$ voters are a minority, the Outsider still wins under a highly partisan environment if she enjoys the support of the anti-globalist factions in both parties (i.e., (4) holds)—regardless of their size; it is enough simply to convince $L$ anti-globalists not to support their party’s nominee.

There are contexts in which, conditional on a primary victory, the Outsider is better positioned than an establishment candidate to win the general election on behalf of the $R$ party.

**Remark 1.** In a highly partisan environment, the prospect that the $R$ nominee wins the general election is strictly higher if the Outsider wins the primary than if the establishment candidate wins the primary.

To see why, recall that $M_R$ is the probability that $R$ voters are a majority, and notice that in a highly partisan environment, when the Outsider wins the primary, her prospect of winning the general election is:

$$M_R + (1 - M_R) \Pr(a > p + q|a > q),$$

while the corresponding prospect that the elite’s preferred candidate would have won the general election after winning the primary is $M_R$. The reason is that the Outsider is uniquely positioned to win over the opposing party’s anti-globalist rank-and-file voters, while still commanding the support of both factions of her own party.

If, instead, the environment is not highly partisan $p < g + q$, the Outsider anticipates that in the event of winning the primary, globalists in the $R$ party will abandon her. In that event, she wins the general election if and only if she can unite both parties’ anti-globalist factions, and these factions collectively constitute a majority that can defeat the unified globalist vote in favor of the $L$ nominee.

*To summarize:* if the Outsider contests the primary when the environment is not highly partisan, she wins the election if anti-globalists are both a majority of the $R$ party and a majority of the electorate, and there is extreme anti-globalism. If, instead, the Outsider contests the primary when the environment is highly partisan, she wins the election if there is at least moderate anti-globalism and anti-globalists are a majority of the $R$ party and either party $R$ voters are a majority or if there is extreme anti-globalism. Recall that $M_A$ is the probability that anti-globalists are a majority of the electorate. We obtain the following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** If the Outsider contests the primary, her prospect of winning is:

$$M_A \Pr(a > p + q) + \mathbb{I}[p \geq g + q]M_A M_R \Pr(q < a < q + p).$$  

(5)
Notice that the most favorable post-primary environment for an Outsider who has successfully contested the primary is one in which (i) her party is advantaged in the general election (ii) globalists and party elites are highly partisan and thus predominantly concerned with defeating the other party’s nominee, and (iii) anti-globalists are likely relatively more concerned with the emerging issue and so willing to vote across party lines. The Outsider therefore fares best when the issue priorities of the different factions within the established parties at least partially diverge.

**Outsider Entry in a Third-Party Campaign**

If the Outsider were to run a third-party globalist campaign, she would lose to the $R$ globalist nominee; voters would be indifferent between the Outsider and establishment candidate on policy grounds, but anticipate a quality wedge $q > 0$ from the latter. Instead, her best chance to mount a successful third-party challenge is to run on an anti-globalist platform, $(1, 0)$ in the hopes of uniting both parties’ anti-globalist factions.

The Outsider receives the support of $R$ anti-globalists if there is moderate anti-globalism (i.e., (2) holds). Likewise, she receives the support of $L$ anti-globalists if there is extreme anti-globalism (i.e., (4) holds). In fact, absent extreme anti-globalism, the $L$ establishment nominee wins the support of the unified $L$ party; Assumption 1, which guarantees that the unified $L$ electorate defeats either $R$ faction, implies that the Outsider loses. Hence:

**Remark 2.** Extreme anti-globalism is necessary for the Outsider to win the election as a third-party candidate.

Extreme anti-globalism is not sufficient, however, to guarantee the Outsider’s victory as a third-party candidate. Since voters favoring globalist policies are divided between the parties, the Outsider wins if the remaining voters, who oppose these policies, constitute a plurality. Recalling that the probability of an anti-globalist plurality is $P_A$ we get the following lemma.

**Lemma 2.** If the Outsider did not run in the primary, she contests the election as a third party candidate on an anti-globalist platform. She wins the election if and only if there is extreme anti-globalism and there is an anti-globalist plurality. Thus, her prospect of winning the election is

$$P_A \Pr(a > q + p).$$

(6)
4. A Primary or Third-Party Challenge?

We now consider the Outsider’s decision to compete in the election and her preferred path when she does so. We show that a critical consideration for the Outsider is whether the environment is highly partisan.

Globalists not highly partisan (i.e., (3) fails): Suppose, first, that the environment is not highly partisan, in which case the Outsider expects that she will not receive the support of globalists within the \( R \) party, even if she were to win the nomination. Lemma 1 reveals that, in this case, the Outsider’s prospect of winning the election via a primary challenge is:

\[
M_A \Pr(a > q + p). 
\]

(7)

In words, the Outsider wins a primary challenge only if anti-globalist voters are a majority and there is at least moderate anti-globalism \((a > q)\), but in the general she also needs the combined support of anti-globalists across both parties, which requires extreme anti-globalism \((a > q + p)\), and an anti-globalist majority across parties.

If, instead, the Outsider circumvents party elites entirely by competing as a third-party candidate, by Lemma 2 her probability of winning the election is given by (6),

\[
P_A \Pr(a > q + p). 
\]

In words, while extreme anti-globalism is still necessary for the Outsider to win, by running as a third-party candidate she can win office even if anti-globalists are only a plurality. Comparing this with (7) reveals an unambiguous advantage from steering clear of the \( R \) primary when the environment is not highly partisan. We summarize our result.

**Proposition 1.** If the environment is not highly partisan (i.e., (3) fails) the Outsider never contests the primary. Instead, she enters the contest in the general election as a third party candidate on an anti-globalist platform.

This result highlights the critical role of inter-party polarization in creating the incentives for an Outsider challenge to take the form of a primary challenge in an established party.

Globalists highly partisan (i.e., (3) holds): If, instead, globalist voters are highly partisan, the Outsider anticipates that she can rally both party factions in the event that she wins the \( R \) primary. Lemma 1 reveals that her prospect of victory from a primary challenge is

\[
M_A(M_R \Pr(a > q) + (1 - M_R) \Pr(a > q + p)). 
\]

(8)
To win the primary, the Outsider relies on an anti-globalist majority and at least moderate anti-globalism \( (a > q) \). In the general, the Outsider then wins if there is either extreme anti-globalism—regardless of the total number of anti-globalists— or if the unified \( R \) factions constitute a majority of the voting population. Comparison with the Outsider’s probability of winning via a third-party challenge reveals a non-trivial trade-off.

**Primary Campaign.** Entering the electoral contest through the party allows the Outsider to sometimes win the election even if there is only moderate, rather than extreme, anti-globalism: when \( q < a < q + p \). The reason is that, after a primary victory, all \( R \) voters will rally around the Outsider, who wins whenever the party’s support is a majority. And, extreme globalism is sufficient for the Outsider to win. The combined anti-globalist vote need not be a majority or even a plurality: it is enough merely to convince party \( L \)’s rank-and-file anti-globalists not to support their party’s candidate.

**Third-Party Campaign.** Bypassing the party and pursuing a third-party challenge allows the Outsider to sometimes win the general election when anti-globalists are only a plurality of the electorate, allowing the Outsider to divide the globalist vote along party lines.

By comparing the Outsider’s prospect of winning if she competes in the primary, given by (8), to her prospect of winning as a third-party candidate, given by (6), we can identify the conditions under which the Outsider prefers one mode of entry into the election over another.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose the environment is highly partisan (i.e. (3) holds). If the prospect of an anti-globalist majority in the \( R \) party exceeds the prospect of anti-globalist plurality in the electorate, the Outsider runs in the primary. Otherwise, there exists a threshold \( \pi \in (0, 1) \) such that the Outsider runs in the primary if \( \frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} < \pi \), but contests the election as a third party candidate if \( \frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} > \pi \).

The ratio:

\[
\frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} \in (0, 1),
\]

represents the prospect of extreme anti-globalism given at least moderate anti-globalism. When (9) is **small**, the Outsider anticipates that the intensity of anti-globalist sentiment is unlikely to be sufficient to induce voters to cross party lines. This encourages the Outsider to focus her efforts on \( R \) partisans, gambling on an anti-globalist majority inside the party in order to win the primary. When (9) is **large**, the Outsider anticipates a high likelihood that anti-globalist sentiment will be of sufficient intensity to induce voters to cross party lines. This encourages her to circumvent the primary in order to have a chance at winning with only a plurality of support.
Notice that (9) decreases in partisan polarization, \( p \), and vanishes as \( p \) becomes very large. As increasing \( p \) also increases the likelihood that the environment is highly partisan, i.e., (3) is satisfied, a greater degree of inter-party polarization always makes a primary challenge relatively more appealing for the Outsider. Proposition 2 can therefore be re-stated in terms of partisan polarization: if and only if inter-party \( p \) is sufficiently high, the Outsider will run in the primary.

**Corollary 1.** Fixing all other primitives, there exists a threshold \( p^* \geq g + q \) such that the Outsider contests the primary if \( p > p^* \).

Corollary 1 then establishes that high polarization is not only necessary, but also sufficient, to guarantee that an Outsider challenge to a globalist establishment candidate will come through the primary. This is because increased polarization makes it easier to unite both factions in the party after winning the nomination and more difficult to unite the different anti-globalist factions— both forces make a primary challenge relatively more appealing.

We can also ask how changes in the Outsider’s beliefs about voter preferences affect her relative value from pursuing a primary challenge, rather than a third-party challenge.

**Corollary 2.** Holding all else equal, \( p^* \) decreases in \( M_R \) and \( M_A \) and increases in \( P_A \).

While a change in the distribution of preferences could affect all three probabilities at once, Corollary 2 implies that a more electorally favored \( R \) party becomes more attractive for the Outsider to mount a primary challenge, as opposed to a third-party challenge. Thus, Outsider challenges are most likely to wrest control from elite-backed candidates in the majority party and in a highly polarized environment.\(^{14}\)

## 5. Elite Response to Outsider Threat

Our analysis raises a natural question: under what conditions can party elites head off the prospect of a primary or third-party challenge? Even if they could, would party elites be prepared to do so? To address these and other questions, we extend the game to allow the elite to be able to respond to the potential Outsider challenge.

We consider two contexts, reflecting real-world variation in the extent to which party leaders can influence and control nomination processes.

\(^{14}\) For example, our model would predict that Roy Moore in Alabama in 2017, or David Brat in Virginia’s 7th district in 2014, had a greater incentive to mount a primary challenge than run as third party challenge because the Republican party was strongly advantaged.
**Strong Party Elites.** First, we suppose that party elites have the power to keep the Outsider out of the primary contest. This corresponds to a context in which elite control of candidate nominations is near-complete, for example where top-down intra-party hierarchies allow party leaders to forestall the rise of mis-aligned candidates. For example,

Formally, we extend our benchmark setting to allow the $\mathcal{R}$ elite to bar the Outsider’s entry in to the $\mathcal{R}$ primary. This choice is triggered if and only if the Outsider attempts to run a primary challenge; if the elite bars her entry, the Outsider may run as a third-party candidate.\(^{15}\)

**Proposition 2** identifies conditions under which the Outsider would prefer to mount a primary challenge, if her entry were not barred by the $\mathcal{R}$ elite. Suppose, therefore, that these conditions hold. What are the trade-offs faced by the party elite?

Allowing the Outsider into the $\mathcal{R}$ primary raises the total prospect that she is elected on anti-globalist platform. This harms the $\mathcal{R}$ elite both because it dislikes anti-globalist policies (via preference parameter $g$) and because it prefers establishment candidates over inexperienced candidates (via quality parameter $q$).

However, barring the Outsider from the party also raises the specter of a third-party challenge that will divide $\mathcal{R}$ voters into their globalist and anti-globalist factions, against a united $\mathcal{L}$ party. A third-party challenge by the Outsider is especially damaging to the $\mathcal{R}$ elite: even if unsuccessful, the Outsider’s presence in the general election raises the prospect that the $\mathcal{L}$ nominee wins the election. This harms the elite in proportion to $p$. In particular:

**Proposition 3.** *If there is sufficiently large inter-party ideological polarization, $p$, then the $\mathcal{R}$ elite would not stop the Outsider from challenging its preferred establishment candidate in the primary, even if it had the ability to do so.*

As the $\mathcal{R}$ elite becomes more concerned with keeping the $\mathcal{L}$ nominee from power, its conflict of interest with the Outsider declines: the elite prefers to face the general election with a united $\mathcal{R}$ party—even at the cost of an anti-globalist candidate of dubious quality—to give its nominee the best possible chance of winning.

**Weak Party Elites.** In many contexts, party elites may not have the power to prevent the Outsider from participating in the party’s nomination process. However, her appeal in a primary contest hinges on her ability to offer policies that would otherwise go unrepresented by establishment candidates favored by the party’s elite.

\(^{15}\) An example of strong party elites comes from Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a Chilean presidential candidate, in 2009. Enríquez-Ominami initially planned to contest the Concertación coalition primary election, but opted instead to run as an independent after the leadership forced a rule-change that would guarantee the nomination of its preferred establishment candidate—the former president Eduardo Frei (Bunker and Navia, 2013).
Even though the elite cannot restrict the Outsider from entering the primary, it may be able to find indirect ways to deter her entry. Suppose, in particular, that the elite can find a high-quality candidate to represent the party’s anti-globalist faction in the primary, and who can compete against it’s most preferred globalist candidate. This corresponds to an inclusive primary contest in which both the party’s globalist and anti-globalist factions are represented by high quality candidates. We again focus on the case in which an Outsider challenge would come through the primary.

We extend the game so that, before the Outsider makes her entry decision, the \( R \) elite decides whether to hold an inclusive primary, in which both globalist and anti-globalist factions within the party are represented by an elite-endorsed establishment candidate, or instead to endorse only a globalist establishment candidate. The Outsider observes the elite’s choice before deciding whether to enter the primary. We continue to assume that the conditions of Proposition 2 are met, so that the Outsider would enter the \( R \) primary if the anti-globalist position were left unrepresented.

Notice that if the elite holds an inclusive primary the Outsider can never mount a successful primary challenge—both factions would be represented a higher quality establishment candidate available and so never support the Outsider. The difference with the case of strong party elites is that the party leadership must now face the prospect that its preferred candidate is defeated in the primary by a globalist—or, indeed, that the Outsider will simply enter the general election as a third-party anti-globalist if the elite’s preferred candidate wins the primary. More generally, the decision to hold an inclusive primary always raises the prospect that an anti-globalist will win the election. This harms the elite in proportion to \( g \), generating our next result.

Proposition 4. There exists a threshold \( g^* \) such that, whenever the Outsider prefers to enter the primary after the elite endorses only a globalist, the party elite prefers to endorse only a globalist, if and only if \( g > g^* \).

Recall that the condition \( p > g + q \)—i.e., a highly partisan environment—is necessary for the Outsider to favor primary entry. This condition is equivalent to \( g < p − q \): the Outsider will only contest the primary when \( g \) is not too large relative to \( p \). On the other hand, Proposition 4 states that the elite prefers to endorse only a globalist—therefore creating the prospect for primary entry by the Outsider—only when \( g \) is not too small. A natural question, therefore, is whether there are primitives that ensure both conditions can hold.

Recall that \( M_R \) is the prospect of an \( R \) majority, and \( A \) is the prospect of an anti-globalist
majority. The following proposition provides necessary conditions as well as sufficient conditions for the elite not to hold an inclusive primary.

**Proposition 5.** \( g^* < p - q \) if \( M_R \) is sufficiently large, and

1. \( M_A \) is sufficiently small, or
2. \( p \) is sufficiently large.

Conversely, \( g^* \geq p - q \) if \( M_A \) is sufficiently large and

1. \( M_R \) is sufficiently small, or
2. \( p \), is sufficiently small.

The sufficient conditions in the first part of Proposition 5 show that there are, indeed, parameters for which, even if weak party elites are capable of blocking an Outsider primary challenge, they will fail to do so. The necessary conditions in the second part, in contrast, provide predictions as to when we cannot observe a primary challenge. Given Corollary 1, Propositions 4 and 5 elucidate the contexts in which primary challenges are likely to be observed in parties where elites do have the ability to simply deny Outsider participation by fiat.

First, polarization must be sufficiently high that the Outsider will contest the primary if the elite endorses only a globalist. Second, elites cannot believe that the Outsider is too likely to win the primary. If the prospect of an anti-globalist majority, \( M_A \), is large, and either inter-party ideological polarization is low, or the party is unlikely to be a majority of the electorate, elites would choose to hold an inclusive primary. In particular, Outsider primary challenges can only arise when ex-ante their victory would be a surprise to the elite: a primary victory is only possible when a primary challenge is likely to fail. Nonetheless, Remark 1 notes that conditional on winning the primary, the Outsider’s prospect of winning the general election may be strictly higher than for a globalist establishment candidate.

### 6. Extensions and Robustness

We now consider some extensions of the baseline model.

**Optimal Third Party Platform** Our benchmark setting restricts the policy space to \( \{0, 1\}^2 \), and further restricts the Outsider to locate at one of the two policies associated with party \( \mathcal{R} \), either \((1, 0)\) or \((1, 1)\). An alternative interpretation is that parties have developed reputations that constrain the set of policies they can credibly offer to this set—by contrast, a new party or candidate who enters the election as an independent may not be similarly constrained.
We continue to suppose that although an Outsider who contests the $\mathcal{R}$ primary is forced to adopt the $x = 1$ policy.\footnote{See Krasa and Polborn (2014) for a model of electoral competition in which the policies of candidates are fixed in one dimension.} However we capture the idea that a third-party candidate may not be constrained by the policies associated with established parties by allow her to choose any policy in $[0, 1]^2$. Given this additional flexibility, what policy will she choose?

If the Outsider enters the general election she cannot win the support of globalists in either party: both factions are already represented by an establishment candidate that perfectly reflects their policy preferences. Further, Assumption 1 implies that unless the Outsider wins the support of both parties’ anti-globalist factions, she loses the election. It is immediate that she must adopt an anti-globalist platform, i.e., $y = 0$, in order to maximize her appeal to the set of potential supporters. That is, she opts to differentiate herself maximally from the established parties on the issue where they are in consensus.

With respect to the traditional cleavage, however, anti-globalists are divided. If the Outsider adopts a policy $x \in [0, 1]$, her prospect of winning the support of both anti-globalist factions is:

$$\Pr(a > q + \max\{x, 1-x\}),$$

which is maximized by adopting the compromise policy $x = 1/2$, the centrist economic policy. That is, the Outsider opts to pursue a compromise position with respect to the issue that polarizes the established parties.

The Outsider’s ability to locate at any platform as a third-party candidate gives her a greater chance to win the general election as a third-party candidate; this raises her relative value from a third-party run versus a primary. Nonetheless, if inter-party issue polarization $p$ is sufficiently large, the Outsider anticipates a sufficiently low prospect of uniting the anti-globalist factions across party lines, and she continues to enter the election through a primary contest.

**Proposition 6.** If the Outsider enters the election as a third-party candidate she chooses policy $(1/2, 0)$. If $p \leq p^\ast$, the Outsider runs as a third-party candidate; conversely, if $p$ is sufficiently large, the Outsider prefers to run in the $\mathcal{R}$ primary.

Proposition 6 shows that, on the issue that polarizes the main parties, a third party candidate adopts a centrist position, but on the issue highlighting consensus between the established parties she chooses a policy that differentiates herself as much as possible. Hence she adopts a platform that is economically centrist, and wholly anti-globalist.
offer a broader range of policies running as a third party reduces, but does not eliminate, the
incentive to contest the primary.

**Primaries in Both Parties.** Our benchmark analysis presumes that the \( L \) party is certain to
nominate an establishment globalist candidate, and focuses on the prospect of Outsider en-
try in the \( R \) party. This raises a number of questions: if an anti-globalist challenge in the \( R \)
primary is attractive, would such a challenge also be attractive to an Outsider in the \( L \) party?
And, how would the relative value of a primary challenge in one party be affected by the
possibility of a similar anti-globalist primary challenge in the other?

To address these questions, we extend our benchmark model by allowing for the possibil-
ity that each party faces a threat of entry from an Outsider candidate, and that each Outsider
simultaneously decides whether to enter the primary of a party, or instead run as a third-
party candidate. As in our benchmark setting, one Outsider is can only credibly offer one of
the \( R \) policies (i.e., either \((1, 0)\) or \((1, 1)\)) and one Outsider can only credibly offer one of the \( L \)
policies (i.e., \((0, 0)\) or \((0, 1)\)). Further, we specialize the distribution of voter ideal policies by
assuming \( M_R = 1/2 \) and so either party is equally likely to be the majority. Finally, we assume
that the environment is highly partisan, i.e., \( p > g + q \).

The prospect of Outsider entry at a platform associated with one of the major parties
changes the remaining Outsider’s relative value from entry in the other party. To see why, no-
tice that if an Outsider secures the \( L \) party nomination as an anti-globalist—or offers this plat-
form as a third-party—the remaining Outsider can never win the support of \( L \) anti-globalists
in the general election. If the Outsider had entered and won the \( R \) primary, she therefore
relies entirely on the support of unified \( R \) party voters—both anti-globalists and globalists.
If, instead, she runs as a third-party candidate, she secures more votes than the \( R \) globalist
establishment nominee only if there is at least moderate anti-globalism and anti-globalists are
a majority of the \( R \) party. These are precisely the conditions under which she would have
won a primary challenge.

We show that there is a level \( \hat{p} \) such that if and only if inter-party ideological polariza-
tion \( p \) is above this threshold, both Outsiders strictly prefer to enter via primary challenges.
Recalling that \( p^* \) was the necessary and sufficient level of inter-party ideological polarizat-
tion to sustain a primary challenge in our benchmark setting, the above discussion implies that
\( \hat{p} < p^* \). If inter-party polarization is below \( \hat{p} \), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in
which Outsiders randomize over each possible mode of entry.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\) There are also asymmetric equilibria in which one candidate enters via one party’s primary, and the other
runs a third-party campaign—in all cases, however, candidates offer anti-globalist platforms.
Proposition 7. Suppose $M_R = 1/2$. Then there exists a threshold amount of inter-party issue polarization, $\hat{p}$, with $g + q \leq \hat{p} \leq p^*$—and $\hat{p} < p^*$ unless $p^* = g + q$—such that,

1. if $p \geq \hat{p}$, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which both Outsiders contest a primary election as anti-globalists.

2. if $p \in [q + g, \hat{p})$, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which both Outsiders randomize over a primary versus third-party challenge; in either case, they always adopt anti-globalist platforms.

We again get the conclusion that primary challenges are more likely when inter-party polarization is higher. In addition, this result highlights that when there is the threat of a primary in the other party, this (at least weakly) increases the likelihood of an Outsider contesting the primary. Note that, although we focus on a highly partisan environment, in the baseline model an Outsider never contests the primary if the environment is not highlight partisan, the possibility of Outsider challenges from both ends of the spectrum can only increase the likelihood of a primary challenge as well.

**Outsider With a Quality Advantage.** Our benchmark setting endows establishment candidates with a perceived quality advantage vis-a-vis Outsider candidates, $q > 0$. This advantage may derive from prior governing experience, or the perception of a more stable temperament. In some contexts, however, voters may assign a higher perceived quality to the Outsider vis-a-vis establishment candidates from major parties. This may derive from characteristics of the Outsider—such as a record of success in private enterprise—or negative valence on the part of the established parties.\(^{18}\)

To capture these contexts, we allow for the possibility that $q < 0$. This implies that if voters are indifferent between the Outsider and an establishment candidate on policy grounds, voters nonetheless strictly prefer to vote for the Outsider. This means that, for a range of parameters, the Outsider’s position will depend on the perception of her ability: the Outsider would take the traditional position already occupied by an establishment candidate if advantaged but differentiate herself if she has a quality disadvantage.\(^{19}\) However for other parameters

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\(^{18}\) A plausible context in which the Outsider held a perceived quality advantage is Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election of 2017.

\(^{19}\) Our analysis highlights the sources of different strategies pursued by Outsider candidates: those perceived as intrinsically better may campaign on traditional policies whereas those perceived to be less able must exploit latent issue cleavages. Our logic is similar to Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985), Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) who find that those with a quality advantage will locate closer to the expected median, whereas disadvantaged candidates must differentiate themselves with policies further from the expected median.
the Outsider will still run as an anti-globalist, just as in the baseline model, because it gives her an opportunity to appeal to voters in the other party.

**Proposition 8.** If \( q + g < 0 \), the Outsider prefers to compete as an anti-globalist rather than a globalist, either in the primary election or as a third-party candidate.

To see why, notice that the Outsider always strictly increases her prospects of winning the support of anti-globalist voters in either party when she adopts an anti-globalist platform. The only reason to locate at a globalist platform is to avoid alienating these voters within the \( R \) party. But if the Outsider’s quality advantage is large enough (i.e., \( q \) is very negative), or if globalists are not too polarized on the globalization cleavage (i.e., \( g \) is small), the Outsider can still win their support even when she positions herself as an anti-globalist. In this context, the advantage of appealing to anti-globalists across parties outweighs the advantage of locating at the same position as an establishment candidate.

7. Conclusion

Our paper analyzes electoral competition in a setting with ideological polarization both between and within parties, and a threat of Outsider entry either via a primary challenge or a third-party campaign. We asked: When do voters prefer to support Outsider candidates instead of candidates who have the endorsement and support of the party establishment? What forces shape an Outsider’s decision to enter an election through an established political party, rather than campaigning as a third-party candidate? And, why might party elites fail to take the necessary steps to mitigate the Outsider threat?

The appeal of Outsiders turns on their ability to adopt policies that are misaligned with party elites but may have substantial appeal amongst rank-and-file voters. In turn, established parties become an increasingly attractive target for Outsider candidates as these parties become more electorally advantaged and as inter-party polarization increases. The reason is that it is in precisely these circumstances that Outsiders are willing to risk early defeats for the prize of a general election campaign with unified support across all party factions. Paradoxically, this implies that elite control over party nominations diminishes under the same circumstances, and sheds light on the contemporary US paradox of “strong partisanship, weak parties” (Azari, 2016). Even if party elites have the authority and resources to block the Outsider’s entry into the party nomination process, they may not use this power in order to head off a third-party challenge that would split its base. This incentive, too, increases as party elites become more polarized on the inter-party issue cleavage. And, when party elites lack this power, Outsider challenges arise only when elites do not take these candidates too seriously.
Our results offer a novel framework for understanding how electoral competition is impacted by emerging cleavages within political parties, as well the rise of non-traditional candidates. We also believe there are a number of promising directions for future research, using this framework. It would be particularly interesting to study dynamic elections, and consider when parties are able to adjust to disagreements along emerging cleavages, and when instead, emergent issues trigger a partisan realignment dividing the parties along the emergent issue. It would also be interesting to further explore the internal organization of political parties and how they are affected when an Outsider manages to win control after a successful primary challenge. Under what conditions can the Outsider’s faction become the new party elite, and how might this possibility affects urgency with which party elites attempt to head off the Outsider threat? We leave these, and other questions, to future research.

References


Azari, Julia. 2016. “Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship are a Bad Combination.” Vox November 3.


Appendix: Proofs of Propositions

Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 are proven in the main text.

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose \( p - g > q \). The probability with which the Outsider wins the election as a third-party candidate by locating at \((1, 0)\) is

\[
P_A(1 - F(p + q)).
\]

If, instead, the Outsider locates at \((1, 0)\) in the \( \mathcal{R} \) primary, by (8) her prospect of winning is:

\[
M_A(M_R(1 - F(q)) + (1 - M_R)(1 - F(p + q))).
\]

and thus a primary challenge is preferred if and only if

\[
\frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} \leq \frac{M_A M_R}{P_A - M_A(1 - M_R)} \equiv \overline{x}.
\] (10)

Since \( M_A < P_A \), it follows that \( \overline{x} \in (0, 1) \). □

Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 are immediate from inspection of (22). □

Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that Outsider prefers to contest the election by entering the \( \mathcal{R} \) primary on an anti-globalist platform, and party elites are strong. If the elite does not stop the Outsider from doing so, its expected payoff is:

\[
M_A M_R \left[ \frac{(1 - F(q))(-g)}{F(q)q} + M_A(1 - M_R) \left[ \frac{(1 - F(p + q))(-g)}{F(p + q)(q - p)} \right] \right] + (1 - M_A) M_R q + (1 - M_A)(1 - M_R)(q - p) \equiv \lambda_1(p).
\] (11)

If the elite blocks the Outsider’s entry, the Outsider instead mounts a third-party campaign on an anti-globalist platform, generating the following expected payoff to the \( \mathcal{R} \) elite:

\[
(1 - F(p + q)) \left[ \frac{P_A(-g) + (1 - P_A) M_R q}{(1 - P_A)(1 - M_R)(q - p)} \right] + (F(p + q) - F(q))(q - p) + F(q) \left[ M_R q + (1 - M_R)(q - p) \right] \equiv \lambda_2(p).
\] (12)
We observe:

\[
\lim_{p \to \infty} \left[ \lambda_1(p)/p - \lambda_2(p)/p \right] = -(1 - M_R) - \left[ -\left(1 - F(q)\right) - F(q)(1 - M_R) \right] \\
= (1 - F(q))(1 - (1 - M_R)),
\]

which is strictly positive. □

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Suppose that party elites are weak, and the Outsider prefers to contest the election by entering the \( R \) primary on an anti-globalist platform, in the event that there is no establishment candidate at this location. If the elite endorses only a globalist, its expected payoff is given by (11). If, instead, the elite endorses both a globalist and an anti-globalist, its expected payoff is:

\[
M_A M_R(q - g) + M_A(1 - M_R) \left[ (1 - F(p))(q - g) + F(p)(q - p) \right] \\
+ \Pr(1/2 \geq A \geq R(1 - A), R > 1/2) \left[ (1 - F(p + q))(-g) + (F(p + q) - F(q))(q - p) + F(q)q \right] \\
+ \Pr(1/2 \geq A \geq (1 - R)(1 - A), R < 1/2) \left[ (1 - F(p + q))(-g) + F(p + q)(q - p) \right] \\
+ \Pr(1 - R \geq \max\{1/2, A/(1 - A)\}) (q - p) \\
+ \Pr(R \geq \max\{1/2, A/(1 - A)\}) (q - (F(p + q) - F(q))p).
\]

Letting \( \phi(g) \) denote the difference of (11) and (14), we find that \( \phi'(g) > 0 \). We set

\[
g^* = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \phi(0) \geq 0 \\
\phi^{-1}(0) & \text{if } \phi^{-1}(0) \in (0, p - q) \\
p - q & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Setting \( g = p - q \), (11) simplifies to:

\[
q - M_A M_R(1 - F(q))p - (1 - M_R)p,
\]

while (14) simplifies to

\[
q + M_A M_R(q - p) + M_A(1 - M_R) \left[ (1 - F(p))(q - p) + F(p)(-p) \right] \\
- \Pr(A < 1/2, R < \max\{1/2, A/(1 - A)\})p \\
- \Pr(A < 1/2, R \geq \max\{1/2, A/(1 - A)\})(F(p + q) - F(q))p.
\]
Suppose $M_R = 1$; then, the first expression is $q - M_A(1 - F(q))p$, while the second is strictly less than $q - M_A(q - p)$. Therefore, a sufficient—but not necessary—condition for the first expression to be larger than the second is $pF(q) > q$. Similarly, if $M_R = 1$ and $M_A$ is sufficiently close to 0, the first expression is larger than the second.

Conversely, suppose $M_A = 1$. Then, the first expression simplifies to $q - p(M_R(1 - F(q)) + (1 - M_R))$, while the second simplifies to $q + (M_R(q - p) + (1 - M_R)((1 - F(p))(q - p) - F(p)p))$. Thus, the net value of endorsing both a globalist and an anti-globalist establishment candidate is positive to the $R$ elite if and only if $M_R F(q)p < q(1 - F(p)(1 - M_R))$. This could be true either because $p$ is small, $F(q)$ is small, or $M_R$ is small. □

Proof of Proposition 6. The first claim is proven in the text, so we focus on the second claim. If the Outsider contests the primary, then her probability of winning is

$$M_A(M_R \Pr(a > q) + (1 - M_R) \Pr(a > q + p)).$$

Conversely, if she runs as a third-party candidate on platform $(1/2, 0)$, her probability of winning is

$$P_A(1 - F(p + q) + F(p + q) - F(p/2 + q)).$$

It follows that she prefers to run as a third-party candidate if and only if

$$(1 - F(p + q))(P_A - M_A(1 - M_R)) + [F(p + q) - F(p/2 + q)]P_A \geq (1 - F(q))M_A M_R. \quad (18)$$

Recalling that, in our benchmark setting, the corresponding condition is:

$$(1 - F(p + q))(P_A - M_A(1 - M_R)) \geq (1 - F(q))M_A M_R, \quad (19)$$

we observe that whenever (19) holds, (18) also holds. This implies that whenever the Outsider prefers a third-party challenge in which she locates at $(1, 0)$, she strictly prefers a third-party challenge in which she locates at $(1/2, 0)$. Finally, notice that as $p \to \infty$, the the LHS of (18) tends to zero, while the RHS is strictly positive and constant in $p$. Thus, for $p$ large enough, the inequality fails, implying that the Outsider prefers a primary challenge at the platform $(1, 0)$ instead of a third-party challenge at the platform $(1/2, 0)$. □

Proof of Proposition 7. As the environment is highly partisan by assumption, i.e., $p > g + q$, the globalists in each party will always support their nominee in the general. We proceed by considering the best response of a $R$-Outsider to each entry decision of the $L$-Outsider. As in the baseline model, each Outsider can only win with positive probability by adopting an
anti-globalist platform.

Suppose, first, that the $\mathcal{L}$ candidate runs a third-party campaign. If the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider also runs in the primary, she wins the primary if and only if $A > .5$, and $a > q$. Then, in the general, since there is moderate anti-globalism, the $\mathcal{L}$ voters are divided between the establishment candidate and the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider. As the $\mathcal{R}$ party is united behind her, the Outsider wins in the general election for sure. Hence the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider’s probability of winning the election by contesting the primary is

$$M_{A}(1 - F(q)).$$

If, instead, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider runs as a third-party candidate she must win more votes than the $\mathcal{R}$ establishment candidate, as well as the $\mathcal{L}$ establishment candidate and the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider. In addition, however, she must receive more votes than the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider in the general as well, which requires $\mathcal{R}$ voters to be a majority. Hence the probability of winning the election is

$$M_{A}(1 - F(q))M_{R} = \frac{M_{A}(1 - F(q))}{2}.$$

It is then immediate that, if the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider runs as a third-party candidate, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider is more likely to win the election by running in the $\mathcal{R}$ primary.

Suppose, second, that the $\mathcal{L}$ candidate runs in the primary. If the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider also contests the primary she wins if and only if the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider also wins, and so she wins in the general election with probability $M_{R} = 1/2$. Hence her probability of winning is

$$M_{A}(1 - F(q))M_{R} = \frac{M_{A}(1 - F(q))}{2}.$$

If, instead, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider runs as a third-party candidate she can only win if the $\mathcal{L}$ party nominates a globalist: otherwise $\mathcal{L}$ party would unite between their nominee and the $\mathcal{R}$ voters would divide between the establishment candidate and the Outsider. If the $\mathcal{L}$ establishment candidate wins the primary then, in the general, the Outsider would need to unite both anti-globalist factions and have the anti-globalists constitute a plurality. Hence, her probability of winning the election is

$$(P_{A} - M_{A})(1 - F(p + q))$$

It then follows that the Outsider will contest the primary if and only if

$$\frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} < \frac{M_{A}}{2(P_{A} - M_{A})}.$$
Note that the LHS is decreasing in $p$ and tends to zero as $p \to \infty$ whereas the RHS is constant and strictly positive for all $p$. It then follows that, if the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider contests the primary, there exists a $\hat{p} \geq g + q$ such that the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider’s best response is to run in the primary if $p > \hat{p}$ and to run as a third-party candidate if $p < \hat{p}$. It then follows that, for $p > \hat{p}$, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider’s payoff is strictly higher from running in the primary regardless of the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider’s strategy. Hence, in equilibrium, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider runs in the primary and, by symmetry, the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider must also run in the primary. If $\hat{p} = g + q$, we are done.

Suppose, instead, $[g+q, \hat{p})$ is a non-empty interval and $p \in [g+q, \hat{p})$. Then, the $\mathcal{R}$-Outsider’s ($\mathcal{L}$-Outsider’s) prospect of winning is strictly higher from running in the primary if the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider ($\mathcal{R}$-Outsider) runs a third-party campaign, and is strictly higher from running a third-party campaign if the $\mathcal{L}$-Outsider ($\mathcal{R}$-Outsider) runs in the primary. Hence, by symmetry, there exists a unique $\sigma^* \in (0, 1)$ such that it is an equilibrium for each Outsider to run in the primary with probability $\sigma^*$ and run as a third-party candidate otherwise.

Finally, recall that, in our benchmark setting with only one Outsider, the threshold $p^*$ solves:

$$\frac{1 - F(p^* + q)}{1 - F(q)} = \frac{M_AM_R}{P_A - MA(1 - M_R)} \equiv \pi. \quad (20)$$

As $M_R = 1/2$ this is equivalent to:

$$\frac{1 - F(p^* + q)}{1 - F(q)} = \frac{M_A}{2P_A - MA} < \frac{M_A}{2(P_A - MA)} = \frac{1 - F(\hat{p} + q)}{1 - F(q)}. \quad (21)$$

We conclude that $\hat{p} < p^*$. □

**Proof of Proposition 8.** Suppose $q < -p - g$. If the Outsider locates at $(1, 0)$ in the $\mathcal{R}$ primary, $q < -p - g$ implies $q < -g$, which implies that the Outsider wins the $\mathcal{R}$ primary, and in the general election she wins with probability one. If, instead, the Outsider locates at $(1, 1)$ in the $\mathcal{R}$ primary, she wins the nomination; in the general election, she wins with probability one since she wins the support of $\mathcal{R}$ anti-globalists (since $q < 0$ implies $-a - p + q < -a$), $\mathcal{R}$ globalists (since $0 > -p + q$) and $\mathcal{L}$ globalists (since $q < -p$). Suppose, instead, the Outsider enters the contest in the general election. If she locates at $(1, 0)$, she wins the support of globalists in both parties and $\mathcal{L}$ anti-globalists, therefore she wins the election. If, instead, she locates
at \((1, 1)\) as a third-party candidate, she again wins the support of these three groups of voters: Assumption 1 again implies that she wins the election with probability one. Thus, when \(q < -p - g\), the Outsider is indifferent over either \(\mathcal{R}\) policy and either entry strategy (primary or third-party challenge).

Suppose, next, \(-p - g \leq q \leq \min\{-g, -p\}\). This implies \(g + q < 0\), and thus \(p > g + q\). If the Outsider runs in the \(\mathcal{R}\) primary as an anti-globalist, she wins the primary; in the general election, she rallies both factions of the \(\mathcal{R}\) party, and if \(-a + q < -p\), i.e., \(a > p + q\), she wins the votes of all \(\mathcal{L}\) anti-globalists. Under \(q \leq -p\), we have \(p + q \leq 0\), implying \(a > p + q\) with probability one. The Outsider therefore wins with probability one.

Suppose, next, \(-p < q \leq -g\). If the Outsider runs in the \(\mathcal{R}\) primary as an anti-globalist, she wins the primary; in the general election, she rallies both factions of the \(\mathcal{R}\) party, and if \(-a + q < -p\), i.e., \(a > p + q\), she wins the votes of all \(\mathcal{L}\) anti-globalists. Thus, her prospect of winning is:

\[
M_R + (1 - M_R)(1 - F(p + q)).
\]

Suppose, instead, she runs in the \(\mathcal{R}\) primary as a globalist; she wins the primary, and in the general she rallies the support only of \(\mathcal{R}\) factions: her prospect of winning is therefore \(M_R\). Thus, conditional on running in the primary, she strictly prefers to run an anti-globalist platform.

Next, suppose that the Outsider runs as a third-party candidate in the general election. If she runs an anti-globalist platform, her prospect of winning is the same as if she were to run in the \(\mathcal{R}\) primary on an anti-globalist platform. If she runs as a globalist, her prospect of winning is the same as if she were to run in the \(\mathcal{R}\) primary on a globalist platform. We conclude that she strictly prefers an anti-globalist platform either via a third-party or primary challenge. \(\square\)
A. Supplementary Appendix to “Crashing the Party?”

A.1. More General Distributions of Voter Preferences

In the baseline model we assumed that: (1) the fraction of anti-globalists in each party is the same (2) the fraction of anti-globalists and \( R \) voters is independent. Neither of these assumptions is critical as we demonstrate in this section.

We let \( R_G \) denote the mass of voters located at \((1, 1)\), i.e., that favor low redistribution and globalist policies, and \( R_A \) denote the mass of voters located at \((1, 0)\), i.e., that favor low redistribution and anti-globalist policies. Likewise, \( L_G \) denotes the mass of voters located at \((0, 1)\) and \( L_A \) denotes the mass of voters located at \((0, 0)\). The total mass of voters in party \( L \) is therefore \( L \equiv L_A + L_G \), and the total mass of voters in party \( R \) is \( R \equiv R_A + R_G \), and the total mass of anti-globalists is \( A = R_A + L_A \). Letting:

\[
\Delta = \{(R_G, R_A, L_G, L_A) \in [0, 1]^4 : R_G + R_A + L_G + L_A = 1\},
\]

we can adapt the Assumption 1 to this environment.

Assumption 2. The distribution of voters’ ideal policies satisfies the following properties:

1. \( \Pr(L > \max\{R_G, R_A\}) = \Pr(R > \max\{L_G, L_A\}) = 1\),

2. \( \Pr(R > .5) \in (0, 1) \)

3. \( \Pr(R_A > R_G) \in (0, 1) \).

Assumption 2 is similar to Assumption 1 except that instead of assuming it is uncertain whether there is an anti-globalist majority in the population (which, in the baseline model was equivalent to an anti-globalist majority in \( R \)) our assumption applies only the proportion of \( R \) anti-globalists.

We now show that our main result about Outsider-challenges coming through the party also holds when we relax our distributional assumptions.

Proposition A.1. Fixing all other primitives, there exists a threshold \( p^* \geq g + q \) such that the Outsider contests the primary if \( p > p^* \) and runs as a third-party candidate if \( p < p^* \). Furthermore, for any change in beliefs about the distribution of preferences such that \( \Pr(R_A > R_G, R > L) \) weakly increases, and \( \Pr(A > \max\{R_G, L_G\}) \) weakly decreases, with at least one equality strict, then \( p^* \) decreases.
Proof. We first note that, if \( p < g + q \) the Outsider is always worse off running in the primary, since dividing the globalist vote always increases the Outsiders chances. Suppose \( p - g > q \). The probability with which the Outsider wins the election as a third-party candidate by locating at \((1, 0)\) is
\[
\Pr(A > \max\{R_G, L_G\})(1 - F(p + q)).
\]
If, instead, the Outsider locates at \((1, 0)\) in the \(R\) primary, her prospect of winning is:
\[
(1 - F(p + q))\Pr(R_A > R_G) + \Pr(R_A > R_G \text{ and } R > .5)(F(p + q) - F(q)).
\]
If \( \Pr(R_A > R_G) \geq \Pr(A > \max\{R_G, L_G\}) \), the Outsider strictly prefers to run in the primary. Suppose, instead, the reverse inequality holds. The value of a primary challenge can be re-written:
\[
(1 - F(q))\Pr(R_A > R_G \text{ and } R > .5) + \Pr(R_A > R_G \text{ and } R < .5)(1 - F(p + q)),
\]
and thus a primary challenge is preferred if and only if
\[
\frac{1 - F(p + q)}{1 - F(q)} \leq \frac{\Pr(R_A > R_G \text{ and } R > .5)}{\Pr(A > \max\{R_G, L_G\}) - \Pr(R_A > R_G \text{ and } R < .5)} \equiv \bar{x}. \tag{22}
\]
If \( \Pr(R_A > R_G) < \Pr(A > \max\{R_G, L_G\}) \), \( \bar{x} \in (0, 1) \). The result then follows from inspection of (22). \( \square \)

Proposition A.1 demonstrates that the conclusion that the Outsider contests the primary if and only if parties are sufficiently polarized. This means that an Outsider who wins the \(R\) primary will have the party united behind her and, unless the Outsider winning the primary reveal negative information about the number of \(R\) voters in the electorate, she will have a higher probability of winning the general election than an establishment candidate.

Another implication of Proposition A.1 is that making the \(L\) party more globalist, will increase the incentive to contest the \(R\) party. Put another way, suppose that, over time, the modal \(L\) supporter has become increasingly favorable to international cooperation, trade and open borders, but the distribution of voters across parties has remained stable. This corresponds to a transfer of mass from \(L_A\) to \(L_G\). This change in the \(L\) party raises the Outsider’s value from entering the election through the \(R\) party, rather than as a third-party candidate. This is in spite of the fact that there is no anticipated change in the share of globalists within the \(R\) party, nor is there any anticipated change in the prospect of a \(R\) majority.