Overview of the Class
This class builds on some of the concepts you’ve learned as an undergraduate in Micro I and II to study at a
deeper level a variety of topics relevant to students of public policy. We will discuss familiar topics but at a
more advanced level and will discuss real-world policy applications. Topics covered include risk, uncertainty,
problems of asymmetric information, public goods, and externalities.

Text
However, your primary resource for studying/understanding the material should be my notes, which I will
post online.

Logistics
This class meets on Mondays and Wednesdays from 1:30-2:50PM in room Keller 0001. There will be a TA
section on Thursdays (5-6:20PM, in Keller 0023) and Fridays (1:30-2:50PM, in Keller 0010). Please stick
with the section you were enrolled in. I will hold office hours on Mondays from 9:30-10:30AM in person in
room 2045 (or via zoom, if you’d like). TA’s OH are TBA. A Canvas website for the class has been set up.
I will post readings and handouts there, make announcements, etc.

Formal Requirements
Formal requirements for this class are 5 problem sets, a midterm, a final exam, and class participation. The
problem sets will be given out at least a week in advance and will be due at 9PM, to be turned in on Canvas.
You can work together on problem sets (in groups of up to 4) but everyone has to turn in their own problem
set. Please write the names of anyone you worked with on your problem set. The date for the midterm is
Monday, 2/14 in class. The Final will be for both sections 1 and 2 on Wednesday March 16 3:00pm - 6:00pm.
Your final grade will be given by the following weights:

• 20% homeworks
• 35% midterm
• 40% final
• 5%: participation

Academic Integrity
Please read and understand the University of Chicago’s statement on Academic Honesty and Plagiarism:

It is contrary to justice, academic integrity, and to the spirit of intellectual inquiry to submit another’s
statements or ideas of work as one’s own. To do so is plagiarism or cheating, offenses punishable under
the University’s disciplinary system. Because these offenses undercut the distinctive moral and intellectual
character of the University, we take them very seriously.
Proper acknowledgment of another’s ideas, whether by direct quotation or paraphrase, is expected. In par-
ticular, if any written or electronic source is consulted and material is used from that source, directly or
indirectly, the source should be identified by author, title, and page number, or by website and date accessed.
Any doubts about what constitutes “use” should be addressed to the instructor.

All University of Chicago students are expected to uphold the highest standards of academic integrity and honesty. Among other things, this means that students shall not represent another’s work as their own, use un-allowed materials during exams, or otherwise gain unfair academic advantage. All students suspected of academic dishonesty will be reported to the Harris Dean of Students for investigation and adjudication. The disciplinary process can result in sanctions up to and including suspension or expulsion from the University. In addition to disciplinary sanctions, I reserve the right to give any students who have committed academic dishonesty a failing grade in the course, regardless of their performance on components of the course. The Harris policy and procedures related to academic integrity can be found at https://harris.uchicago.edu/gateways/current-students/policies. The University of Chicago Policy on Academic Honesty & Plagiarism can be found at https://studentmanual.uchicago.edu/academic-policies/academic-honesty-plagiarism/.
Tentative Outline

- Wednesday 1/5: Theory of the firm
  - Introduction to course/organizational material
  - What are the boundaries of the firm?
- Monday 1/9: Firm’s decisions
  - NS Chapter 10, Chapter 11.
  - Costs, profit, and monopolists
  - Dynamic vs. static views of efficiency
- Wednesday 1/11: Partial equilibrium and taxation in a competitive market
  - Discuss deadweight loss of taxation, incidence of taxation, price floors, etc.
  - NS pp. 431-439, 491-517
  - Homework 1 due
- Monday 1/16: Martin Luther King Day (no class)
- Wednesday 1/18: Externalities, Coase theorem, Pigouvian taxes
  - Define externalities, discuss market failure, when can taxation restore efficiency? Property rights and externalities.
  - NS pp. 683-695
- Monday 1/23: General Equilibrium
  - Define an Edgeworth box, discuss partial vs. general equilibrium (examples of when it matters—taxation), discuss welfare theorems.
  - NS Chapter 13
- Wednesday 1/25: Finish GE in theory and discuss in practice
  - Homework 2 due
- Monday 1/30: Public Goods
  - Define Lindhal equilibrium: how to define equilibrium when everyone is paying different prices but consuming the same good at the same time, but each might want different quantities of the good.
  - NS pp. 695-703
- Wednesday 2/1: Public Goods (cont)
  - Discuss the problem of true preference elicitation, mechanisms to support true preference elicitation
  - NS pp. 709-710
- Monday 2/6: Review and catch up
  - Homework 3 due
- Wednesday 2/8: Midterm
- Monday 2/13: Risk and uncertainty

• Wednesday 2/15: Risk and uncertainty (cont.)

– Discuss various equivalent definitions of risk aversion, certainty equivalents, risk premia, CARA, DRA, etc.

– What is the alternative to insurance and why does insurance/income smoothing increase welfare?

– **NS pp. 207-221**: notes closely follow **MWG ch. 6 (pp. 167-194)** which is posted on blackboard.

• Monday 2/20: An introduction to insurance

– Define insurance and show that a risk averse person chooses perfect insurance under “fair” prices. Formalize the notion of insurance: who can offer it, to whom, and at what price?

– **NS pp. 231-237**

• Wednesday 2/22: Adverse selection and moral hazard

– Why are insurance markets in real life so incomplete (deductibles, caps in coverage, tons of rules, denial of coverage)? Discuss practical barriers which arise when one agent’s behavior/characteristics aren’t perfectly observable to another: adverse selection and moral hazard. Define first-best vs. second-best equilibrium.

– **NS pp. 633-645, 665-671**

– Homework 4 due

• Monday 2/27: Adverse selection and moral hazard (cont.)

– **NS pp. 633-645, 665-671**

• Wednesday 3/1: Discrimination

– We will discuss taste-based discrimination and how discrimination can survive in competitive markets. We will discuss empirical evidence to support various models of discrimination.

– What do economists have to say about discrimination? We will define two theories of discrimination: statistical discrimination (in which individuals are assigned the average attributes of their group when being evaluated) and taste-based discrimination (in which employers/customers/coworkers dislike interactions with members of minority groups). How does statistical discrimination affect wages and employment of minority workers? How might statistical discrimination affect firm tenure, lifecycle wages, and promotion?

– ban the box and the unintended consequences of policy intervention


• Makeup Class 3/3: Discrimination (continued)

– Homework 5 due