

PPHA 32740
Order & Violence
Spring 2020 Draft Syllabus

Chris Blattman
UChicago Harris Public Policy, Room 2009
blattman@uchicago.edu
<http://chrisblattman.com>
Office hours sign-up

Topics & readings subject to change

Part I

Course information

How detailed and anal retentive can a syllabus be? You're about to find out! Please read Part I thoroughly.

Lecture time and location

Mondays and Wednesdays 9:30–10:50 pm in TBA

Certificate eligibility

This class fulfills both the international development and the conflict certificates at Harris.

Prerequisites

The Harris core classes are recommended, especially the analytical politics sequence. Non-Harris students should have some familiarity with introductory economics and game theory. Mastery of these concepts will be assumed.

Who should take this class?

This class is designed for Master's students across Harris and the social sciences at UChicago. My Political Economy of Development class with James Robinson is for PhD and MACRM students only (no exceptions). Undergraduates interested in taking this class should contact me.

Pass/fail and auditor policies

I am happy for people to audit the class so long as there are extra seats. I am also happy for students to take the class pass/fail provided there is no excess demand for the class above the current class limit. If there is excess demand, then I will prioritize students taking the course for a letter grade. Note that the class will not qualify for the conflict or development certificates if you take the class pass/fail.

What this course is about

Over the past few decades, most low- and middle-income countries have enjoyed growing economies, more order, and greater freedom. Some countries, however, remain poor, violent, or unfree. What explains why some countries have moved along a path of “political development” while others have not?

Moreover, fifty years on, a lot of smart people are genuinely surprised that these countries’ leaders have not been able to make more progress in implementing good policies. With so many good examples to follow, why haven’t more countries adopted the policies of the high performers and achieved similar peace and prosperity?

Finally, decades of outside intervention have had mixed results. Did foreign aid, democracy promotion, peacekeeping, and maybe even military intervention have promote at least some order and growth? If not, why not, and what can you do about it as citizens or future policymakers?

This class is going to try to demystify what’s going on. There are good explanations for violence, weak states, and undemocratic regimes. There are some good reasons leaders don’t make headway, bureaucrats seem slothful, and programs get perverted. The idea is to talk about the political, economic, and other social scientific logics that lead to function and dysfunction.

To understand the politics of weak or unstable states, we are going to start with some theory and history. We need a theory of violence, and theories of how states, institutions, and societies develop to curb violence. And we also want to look at the impacts of Western nations and their own development on the world, over a wide sweep of history. So in part this class is a history of world development, especially political development.

We will also talk about policies, and how order and development can be fostered. This course will not tell you what specific programs or reforms to focus on, or how to implement them. What we can do is try to understand some of the big ideas about why some paths lead to success or failure, as well as why the best plans so often go awry—ideas that surprisingly few development practitioners ever acquire.

I designed this course to give students an appreciation for big ideas and theories in comparative politics, international relations, political economy, sociology, geography, and development economics. This class involves reading *a lot* of material, and building your conceptual and historical sense of development and politics. Reading = success, and more interesting class discussions.

This is a global class, but a slightly unbalanced one. A lot of the examples are going to draw on Africa and Latin America, with a good deal on historical European and U.S.

development, plus a little material on the Middle East and Asia. This balance is determined mostly by what I know well, and what I am ignorant of.

I won't have the concrete policy answers in many cases. Actually, no one does, and one of my big aims in this class is to help you learn enough and think critically enough to know why everyone with a clear solution is wrong, and why "peace-building" and "development" are the hardest things in the world. There is no single answer. But there are some principles to finding the right answer in the right situation, and history to learn from. That's what you're signing up for in this class.

Grading

Because this is a spring course and most of you are graduating, I need to submit your grades the final week of class! Therefore I cannot offer a real final exam. Instead I am going to try a set of weekly assignments and essays. This will spread the work across the full quarter, and you will need to keep up.

There is a simple way to get a good grade in this course:

- **Read the readings.** All of the grading is designed to incentivize you to read and understand the material. The reason I do this is that I think reading and writing are the main way we all change how we understand the world and influence others. Virtually every reading in this course is one that deeply influenced my own perspective.
- **Think critically about what you read.** Every paper is wrong in some way. Usually it has major flaws or oversights. Your job is to figure out what the problems are and the limits of the argument. For the rest of your career, approach every paper or book with the idea that your job is partly to figure out why it is wrong.
- **Make notes and think about your essay answers along the way.** You will have some of the essay questions quite early. When reading the readings and taking class notes, write down your ideas and thoughts in real time.

Grading scheme

After the first week, there will be a weekly assignment nearly every week. Eight submissions will make up the majority of your grade along with participation. Assignments in this class are very important. Missing an assignment is similar to not answer 1/3 of an exam. I advise you not to miss them.

Your TAs will grade your assignments, in consultation with me. I ask my TAs to limit the number of perfect assignment grades to about 10%. All grading is relative.

Note that Harris asks its faculty and TAs to stick as closely as possible to a specific distribution of final grades. This means final grades reflect performance relative to your peers in class. As a result, your final letter grade may not be the sum of your assignment grades over the semester. We will try to maintain a similar distribution throughout the quarter, to be as transparent and fair as possible, but please understand this is difficult to do with any precision. This is a major reason why I limit the number of high grades that the TA grant on an essay.

Lecture attendance (10%) Attending lecture is not required, but it is rewarded since it is such an important part of the class. Your TAs will circulate an attendance sheet during class. You are responsible for ensuring you sign it. You will not be penalized for missing one or two lectures, since everyone falls sick, has family circumstances, or religious observances. Please consult your TA if you have more frequent absences. Note that we have this policy because we expect everyone to fall sick or have religious or personal obligations.

Do not sign on behalf of others.

Game theoretic assignments (20%) Twice during the semester you will have a very short assignment that requires you to work out the logic of a simple game theoretic model of the material we are discussing in class. Each one is worth 11% of your grade. These are designed to be challenging but feasible for Harris MPP students who have done the analytical politics core classes. Non-Harris students who do not have this background: do not freak out or drop the class. The goal is not to give non-mathematical class-takers a zero. It's to walk you through the ideas step by step, so you get a sense of what it is all about. Your classmates and your TAs will be a resource for you.

Essays (70%) Six times during the semester I will ask you to submit a short essay in response to a question. We will grade you on the best five, dropping your lowest grade. You can hand in all six if you want. If you hand in just five, that is fine. But note that, in the past, it is difficult to earn an A in the class if you don't hand in one of the six assignments and drop your lowest grade.

- I will provide the questions at least 1–2 weeks in advance.
- The questions draw on the required readings and the lecture material. You should feel free to bring in other material you know, but be sure to cite as well as you can. (e.g. “According to so-and-so in their book Great Thoughts, the reason for the war is...”). Cite well. It is rewarded.
- When grading, we will reward original insights, citing relevant work, critical thinking, and knowledge of the class material.
- You should prepare your answers mostly independently. You may discuss answers to the questions with classmates, and discuss the readings, but you should not prepare answers jointly, and you should not ask others to share their notes or detailed ideas. If you are asked to share your notes or detailed ideas, you should decline. In the past, sharing detailed answers has led to students have nearly identical exam answers, which at a minimum has meant a zero grade for both the giver and the recipient of answers.

Other considerations

Grading is relative in this class. Therefore, to be fair to all students, I have a clear policy that I apply consistently, one that rewards people who hand in assignments on time, but makes reasonable allowances for students with legitimate and documented excuses that they raise at the time of the lateness or missed assignment.

Late policy

The late penalty is one grade level per day. I can waive the penalty if you have a timely, legitimate, and documented excuse.

- If you are missing classes or have a late assignment because of sickness or religious observance (e.g. Ramadan), we can accommodate you. Please alert the TA by email in advance or shortly afterwards. Please make specific arrangements for extensions of any assignments.
- In general, please do not wait until weeks after a missed assignment to talk to us. I especially advise against waiting to contact us until the last week of classes or after final grades have been submitted. It is easier to accommodate timely requests.
- I am very accommodating to mental and physical illness. Please feel free to come speak with me personally. Per Harris policy, however, late or missed assignments/exams due to mental health and physical health issues require a doctor's note. Typically this is a doctor's note with specific dates of illness mentioned. One reason for this policy is to ensure students are getting professional help, and to ensure that their student advisor is aware. It is also to be fair to other students and avoid dishonesty. You can submit this to me and your TA by email, and cc your Harris student advisor so they are aware and can help you coordinate with your other classes. We do not need to know personal details of your illness, if you do not want to share. You can also decide to share details with your Harris advisor only. But we do need at least a note from your Harris advisor that relate to the dates of an assignment.

Re-grading policies

Feel free to discuss your grades with your TAs to get clarification. If, following such a conversation, you feel that an error was made, *please submit a re-grade request in writing to both TAs, by email, within two weeks of the assignment being handed back*. Please include an explanation or justification for the re-grade request. A really bad way to ask for a re-grade is to lobby for a better grade, or to explain there is some reason you need to maintain a certain grade level. A good way to ask for a regrading is to substantively discuss why you thought you answered the question well, ask for clarification, and if a mistake was made we can correct it. Or, if you have a legitimate medical or related excuse, please follow the instructions above.

Developing reading & writing skills

Harris has some resources for students who feel they need help developing their academic reading and writing skills.

- For a reading assessment (and academic skills assessment in general), the best option at the University would be the [Academic Skills Assessment Program \(ASAP\)](#).

- We also have the [Harris Writing Program](#), which does not particularly focus on reading, but might indirectly help students get a better grasp of the written word and academic text comprehension.
- [The English Language Institute](#) also offers workshops and courses to help ESL students. Some are free, some are not.

If you have personal problems

I understand that tragedy can unexpectedly befall people, and that personal lives and sickness intervene with normal life. I will do my best to accommodate you. I like to keep your program adviser in the loop. So any emails about missed exams, sickness, and related issues, please discuss this with your advisor and cc your advisor on any correspondence with me (or the TA you are talking to). Please alert us as immediately as possible.

Plagiarism

From the [University of Chicago student manual](#):

It is contrary to justice, academic integrity, and to the spirit of intellectual inquiry to submit another's statements or ideas as one's own work. To do so is plagiarism or cheating, offenses punishable under the University's disciplinary system. Because these offenses undercut the distinctive moral and intellectual character of the University, we take them very seriously.

Proper acknowledgment of another's ideas, whether by direct quotation or paraphrase, is expected. In particular, if any written or electronic source is consulted and material is used from that source, directly or indirectly, the source should be identified by author, title, and page number, or by website and date accessed. Any doubts about what constitutes "use" should be addressed to the instructor.

The Office for International Students has some [excellent additional discussion of academic honesty](#).

In the context of this course, this means that you should prepare your exam answers mainly on your own. You should not prepare your answers directly from another person's notes. If someone asks you to share your notes, you should not do so, since this too carries consequences. Finally, in any exam answers, you should credit any ideas to their sources, even if this is relatively informal. For example, "As Acemoglu and Robinson argue..."

Part II

Weekly schedule and readings

This is a reading-intensive course. Each week I assign about 3–4 required book chapters or papers. There is no good textbook for the subject of political development. A selection of social science articles is the way that most Master’s classes are taught in this subject. Most of these are “classic” articles or otherwise very influential social science pieces. Some readings relate more closely to the lectures, assignments, and essays than others. But all come from some of the most influential thinkers and contributions to the political economy of development, and I’ve selected them for this broader importance.

Some additional notes:

- You should read all required readings before coming to class. If people are not reading in advance, I will tend to lecture more and have less discussion over the quarter.
- Required readings are marked with *’s, where more *’s imply more importance. I list other papers because I may discuss them in the lecture, or in case you are interested in reading deeper on the topic.
- All readings are downloadable online through UChicago’s network or from home on UChicago’s [VPN](#). The book chapters that are not on the Internet have Dropbox links. Please let me know if any links are broken and I will fix them.

1 [1 class] What is political development? Why is it important?

- **[Pages 23-65](#) of Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. “Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy.” Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- **Sen, Amartya 1988. “[The Concept of Development](#),” Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 1, Edited by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, Elsevier Science Publishers.
- *[Introduction and conclusion](#) to Autesserre, Severine. 2014. “Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention.” Cambridge University Press
- [Chapter 3](#) of Ake, Claude. 2000. “The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa.” Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
- Martin, Courtney. 2016. “[The Reductive Seduction of Other People’s Problems](#),” The Development Set, Medium.com, January 11.
- Chapter 1 of Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. [Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action](#). Oxford University Press, 2017.

- **New York Times** excerpt from Singer, Peter. “The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty.” Random House Incorporated, 2010.
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- James Ferguson with L. Lohmann. 1994. “**The anti-politics machine: ‘development’ and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.**” *The Ecologist* 24(5).

2 [3 classes] War and peace

- **Fearon, James 1995. “**Rationalist Explanations for War,**” *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- **Amos Sawyer. 2004. “**Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River basin area.**” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(03).
- *Pearlman, Wendy. “**Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings.**” *Perspectives on Politics* 11.2 (2013): 387-409.
- *Introduction to Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra Hartman, and Robert Blair. 2014. “**How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education.**” *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 100–120.
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- Olson, Mancur. 1993. “**Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.**” *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. “**Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.**” *The American Political Science Review* 90: 715–35.
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- Walter, Barbara. 2014. “**Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War.**” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 58(2).
- **Chapter 1** of Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. “**Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador.**” New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. “**War as a commitment problem.**” *International organization* 60.1 (2006): 169-203.

3 [2.5 classes] Weak and strong states

- **Diamond, Jared. 1998. “The Evolution of Guns and Germs.” In *Evolution: Society, Science, and the Universe*, edited by A. C. Fabian, Cambridge University Press.
- **Pages 1-22 of Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. “Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy.” Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- *Chapter 1 (please read up to at least *The challenges of the de facto state*): Dipali Mukhopadhyay. 2014. “Warlords, strongman governors, and the state in Afghanistan.” Cambridge University Press.
 - A Kindle version of Chapter 1 is available [on Amazon for free](#) by clicking on “Send a free sample”
- *Bräutigam, Deborah. “Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance.” *IDS Bulletin* 33, no. 3 (2002): 1–17.
- *p. 91-93 of Ekeh, Peter P. 1975. “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement.”* *Comparative studies in society and history* 17(1): 91-112. (We will read remainder of article later in the class).
- Herbst, Jeffrey. “War and the State in Africa.” *International Security* (1990): 117-139.
- Subrick, J. Robert. 2017 “The Political Economy of Black Panther’s Wakanda”
- North, Douglass C. 1992. “Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance.” San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.

4 [2 classes] Free and unfree societies

- Tilly, Charles. “Coercion, Capital, and European States [1990].” 2012. In *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, edited by Craig Calhoun et al., 251–67. John Wiley & Sons.
- Monty Python and the Holy Grail, “The Annoying Peasant”
- **Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth.” *Handbook of Economic Growth* 1: 385-472. (Focus on Sections 5 to 10)
- **Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis & Barry R. Weingast. 2009. “Violence and the rise of open-access orders.” *Journal of Democracy*, 20(1): 55-68.
- **Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. “Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world.” *Journal of Economic perspectives* 14.3 (2000): 217-232.

- *Read **introduction** to Dell, Melissa. 2010. “**The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.**” *Econometrica*, 78(6): 1863-1903.
- Mahoney, James. 2001. “**Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective.**” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1): 111–41.
- Selectorate model in **Chapter 11** of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. “Political Economy for Public Policy.” Princeton University Press.
- North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2006. “**A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history,**” National Bureau of Economic Research. 12795.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. “**Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty.**” Basic Books.

5 [2.5 classes] Society and the state

- **Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2013. “**Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game.**” Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan and Pennsylvania State University.
- **Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2016. “**Paths to inclusive political institutions.**”
- ****Chapter 1** of James Scott. 2009. “The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia.” Yale University Press.
- *Blog post by Tabarrok, Alex. 2015. “**The Ferguson Kleptocracy,**” *Marginal Revolution* (blog post, March 5).
- Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern. 2003. "The struggle to govern the commons." *Science* 302.5652: 1907-1912.
 - **Elinor Ostrom interviewed on NPR Planet Money**
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. “**Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.**” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 137-158.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2017. “**The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States.**”
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. “**What makes democracy work?**” *National Civic Review* 82(2): 101-107.
- **Preface (p. ix-xxvi)** in James C. Scott. 2012. “Two Cheers for Anarchism.”
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. “**Social capital, civil society and development.**” *Third world quarterly* 22(1): 7-20.

6 [2.5 classes] A short history of world development and Western intervention

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- **[Chapters 2 and 8](#) of Migdal, Joel S. 1988. “Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World.” Princeton University Press.
- **[Bates, Robert H., John H. Coatsworth, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. “Lost Decades: Post-independence Performance in Latin America and Africa.”](#) The Journal of Economic History.
- **[Ekeh, Peter P. 1975. “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement.”](#) Comparative studies in society and history 17(1): 91-112.
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- *[Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2004. “Economic Reform: Patterns and Constraints.”](#) Democratic Reform in Africa. The Quality of Progress: 29-63.
- [Chapter 2](#) of Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism,” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- [Chapter 2](#) of Samuels, David J. 2012. “Comparative Politics.” Pearson Higher Education. (especially second half of chapter on late state development)
- [Robinson, James A. “Colombia: Another 100 years of solitude.”](#) Current history 112.751 (2013): 43-48.
- [Heldring, Leander, and James A. Robinson. 2012. “Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa.”](#) Working paper.
- [Huillery, Elise. “History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa.”](#) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 2 (2009): 176–215.
- [Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. “How Is Power Shared in Africa?”](#) Econometrica 83, no. 2 (2015): 465–503.

7 [2 classes] Ending violence and establishing order

- **[Introduction](#) to Stewart, Rory, and Gerald Knaus. 2011. “Can Intervention Work?” W.W. Norton & Company. ([The whole book](#) is highly recommended)
- **[Chapter 1 and 7](#) of Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. “Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War.” Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- **Weinstein, Jeremy M.** 2005. “**Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective.**” Center for Global Development Working Paper 57.
- “**The World Must Act Now on Syria: An Open Letter**” The New York Review of Books, February 27, 2018.
- This debate on intervention in Sudan:
 - Mamdani, Mahmood. “**Can the African Union Save South Sudan from Genocide?**” New York Times, January 8, 2017.
 - Gettleman, Jeffrey. “**Quandary in South Sudan: Should It Lose Its Hard-Won Independence?**” New York Times, January 23, 2017.
 - Mamdani, Mahmood. “**Responsibility to protect or right to punish?.**” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4.1 (2010): 53-67
- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 2004. “**Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States.**” International Security 28 (4): 5–43.
- **Chapter 1** and **Chapter 6** of Driscoll, Jesse. 2015. “Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States.” Cambridge University Press.
- Easterly, William. 2008. “**Foreign Aid Goes Military!**” New York Review of Books.
- Shringarpure, Bhakti. 2013. “**In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani.**” Warscapes, July 15.

8 [2 classes] State building from inside and outside

- **Grindle, Merilee S.** 2007. “**Good Enough Governance Revisited.**” Development Policy Review 25(5): 533–74.
- **Chapters 2-5** of Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. **Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action.** Oxford University Press, 2017.
- **Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle.** 2006. “**An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa.**” Center for Global Development Working Paper 74.
- Pritchett, Lant. 2018. “**Can Rich Countries be Reliable Partners for National Development?**” Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD).
- Blum, Jurgen, Fotini Christia, and Daniel Rogger. 2016. “**Public Service Reform in Post-Conflict Societies.**” Working paper.
- **Chapters 5.2** and **11.3** of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. “Political Economy for Public Policy.” Princeton University Press.

- Englebort, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. "Postconflict reconstruction in Africa: Flawed ideas about failed states." *International security* 32.4 (2008): 106-139.
- Grindle, Merilee S. 2004. "Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries." *Governance* 17(4): 525-48.
- Mwenda, Andrew. *Africa and the Curse of Foreign Aid* (Video)
- Qian, Nancy. 2014. "Making Progress on Foreign Aid." *Annual Review of Economics* 3.

9 [1.5 classes] Fostering freedom

- **Easterly, William. 2011. "Benevolent Autocrats." Working paper.
- *Chapter 3 of Ake, Claude. 2000. "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa." Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
- *Introduction to Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship." Cambridge University Press New York.
- Sen, Amartya. "Democracy as a universal value." *Journal of Democracy* 10.3 (1999): 3-17.
- Fujiwara, Thomas. "Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica* 83(2) (2015): 423-464.
- Naidu, Suresh. "Suffrage, schooling, and sorting in the post-bellum US South. No. w18129. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The backlash against democracy promotion." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (2006): 55.
- Chapter 1 of Bush, Sarah Sunn. "The taming of democracy assistance." Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Hyde, Susan D. "Catch us if you can: Election monitoring and international norm diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.2 (2011): 356-369.
- Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication." Unpublished paper (2018).
- Brancati, Dawn. "Democratic authoritarianism: origins and effects." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 313-326.
- Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." Working paper.

10 [0.5 classes] Conclusions

- **James Ferguson with L. Lohmann. 1994. “[The anti-politics machine: 'development' and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.](#)” *The Ecologist* 24(5).
 - If interested, see [this interview with Ferguson](#)
- **[Introduction and Chapter 10](#) in Scott, James C. 1998. “Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.” New Haven: Yale University Press.
- *Chang-Tai Hsieh “[Crony capitalism with Chinese characteristics](#)” YouTube video of a BFI & IMF talk (52:15). Paper version is [here](#).
- Susan Cotts Watkins, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan. 2012. “[Outsourcing Social Transformation: Development NGOs as Organizations,](#)” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38: 285-315.
- Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. [Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action.](#) Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Paul Seabright. 1999. “[The Aestheticising Vice,](#)” *London Review of Books* 21(11), p.26-27
- Easterly, William. 2006. “[The white man’s burden: why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good.](#)” Penguin Group USA.