

Harris School of Public Policy
University of Chicago
Course number

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Spring 2024: Order and Violence PPHA 32740

Time and Location: Mondays and Wednesdays 1:30 pm -2:50 pm, Keller 0023

Office Hours: Mondays 4:30pm – 6:00pm

Course materials: canvas.uchicago.edu

Teaching Assistant:

Email:

Office Hours:

1. Course information

This course studies why some states provide *order* while others descend into *violence*. First, we'll cover the most recent theoretical and empirical evidence on the formation and consequences of fragile states across world. Second, we'll focus on understanding how competing violent orders by non-state actors, such as criminal or rebel organizations, often emerge and challenge these states. In the process, we'll reassess the ideas that dominate contemporary policy debates about fighting organized crime, counterinsurgency, and state-building.

Goals: In this course students will learn the social science literature on state formation and rebel governance, gain exposure to various theoretical and empirical methodologies, develop technical and soft skills commonly used in public policy (i.e: oral and written communication, etc.), and think critically about why some states fail and what policies can help.

Prerequisites: This course is aimed at Masters students. I have designed it to be a complement to other courses in the international development and conflict sequences at Harris. There are no formal prerequisites, but non-Harris students would benefit from having some background in economics and econometrics.

Certificate: This course is recommended for the certificate on Global Conflict Studies at Harris.

ADA student accommodations: “Any student who believes they may need assistance should inform the Office of Student Disability Services by the end of the first week of class. Once you have received an accommodation letter, it should be presented to the course instructor immediately.” <https://disabilities.uchicago.edu/>.

2. Course organization

Classes will be on Mondays and Wednesdays from 13:00pm to 2:50pm in Keller 0023. The class material will cover in detail readings indicated by ** in the syllabus. Other readings will also be discussed but not in much depth. All readings will be available at Canvas and it is essential to read them in advance according to the course outline. Some classes will have guest speakers.

Readings: They will be made up of studies in academic journals or book chapters and not a typical book text.

Dates: Tasks submitted after the dates established in the program will not be accepted. At the beginning of the quarter, students will choose the day they will debate. Later they will also choose when they want to present the progress in their proposal. research within the dates established in the middle and at the end of the semester. 30% of the grade It will be delivered on October 14 and the last day to withdraw the material will be December 16.

3. Grading and assignments

The course will have four types of activities: policy memos and debates, paper comments, class participation and a final exam. Activities are primarily designed to develop technical and soft skills that policy makers use regularly. The grading distribution is the following:

Assignment	Grade distribution
Policy memos and debates	40%
Paper comments	20%
Class participation	15%
Final exam	25%

Policy memos and debates: These assignments will focus on analyzing and answering a policy question. Groups of 5-6 students will have write a memo and use it to debate with other groups in front of the class. While memos and debates should draw on content internal to the course, outside research about the institutional context or question in hand is welcome (although not required). The assignment will usually be posted 10-15 days prior to the due date. Memos should be typed and should not exceed 2 pages in length (double-spaced, using 12 point font, 1-inch margins all around) and uploaded to Canvas 3-5 days prior to the due date so that other groups can read it in advance. Groups will then use all the information available to prepare arguments for a debate. Grades on memos and debates will be based on both the quality of your writing as well as the clarity and content of arguments. The evaluation will reward arguments that are theoretically and empirically based, clear, and novel. Each memo and debate will count 10% of the grade and attendance is mandatory.

Paper comments: Students will be asked to submit 3 short comments (2-3 paragraphs) on how a pre-selected reading relates to a contemporary news article or op-ed. You can comment on any reading listed in the paper for comment/discussion part of the syllabus. In the first 20 minutes of each class some students will be randomly selected to publicly discuss their comments.

Class participation: Class participation is also an essential part of the course. I expect active discussion and comments, and encourage questions.

Final exam: This “take-home” exam will be open book and take place during finals week.

4. Course outline

Week	Topic	Dates
1	Introduction & state order	March 18-20
2	Causes of state fragility	March 25-27
3	Consequences of state fragility	April 1-3
4	Criminal order	April 8-10
5	Policy Debate 1	April 15-17
6	Rebel order	April 22-24
7	Counterinsurgency and posconflict	April 31-May 1
8	State-building	May 1-8
9	Policy Debate 2	May 13-15

Week 1: Introduction & state order

- ** Heldring, L., Robert C.A., & Bertazzini, C., (2023). “The Economic Origins of Government,” forthcoming in American Economic Review.
 - ** Sanchez de la Sierra, R., (2020). “On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo”, Journal of Political Economy, 128(1), 32-74.
 - ** Olson, M. (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-576.
- Mayshar, J., Moav, O., and Pascali, L., (2022). “The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability?”, Journal of Political Economy, 130(4), 1091-1144.

Week 2: Causes of state fragility

- ** Besley, T., & Persson, T., (2009). “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics”, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1218-44.
- ** Michalopoulos, S. & Pappaioannou, E., (2016). “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa,” American Economic Review, 106 (7), 1802–1848.
- ** Scott, J. C., (2009). The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. Yale University Press. Chapters 1, 5 y 6.
- Tilly, C., (1990). Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990, Blackwell, Cambridge MA. Chapters 1 and 8.
- Migdal, J. S., (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 and 8.

Week 3: Consequences of state fragility

- ** Dell, M., Lane, N., & Querubin, P., (2018). “The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam”, *Econometrica*, 86(6), 2083-2121.
- ** Heldring, L., (2021). “The Origins of Violence in Rwanda”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 88(2), 730-763.7
- ** Evans, P. (1995). *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 3.
- Acemoglu, D., Garcia-Jimeno, C., & Robinson, J. A., (2015). “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach”, *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2364-2409.

Week 4: Criminal order (guest lecturer: Chris Blattman)

- ** Blattman, C., Duncan, G., Lessing, B., & Tobon, S., (2021). "Gang Rule: Understanding And Countering Criminal Governance", NBER Working Paper 28458.
- ** Sviatschi, M. (2022). Making a Narco: Childhood Exposure to Illegal Labor Markets and Criminal Life Paths. *Econometrica*, 90 (4), 1835–1878.
- ** Gambetta, D. (1996). *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Harvard University Press.
- Dell, M. (2015). “Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War”, *American Economic Review*, 105, 6, 1738-1779.
- Brown, Z., Montero, E., Schmidt-Padilla and Sviatschi, M. M., (2024). “Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments”, Forthcoming in *Review of Economic Studies*

Week 6: Rebel order

- ** Bandiera, A., Dinarte, L., Jimenez, J. M., Rozo, S., & Sviatschi, M. M. (2023). “Rebel Governance and Development: The Persistent Effects of Guerillas in El Salvador”, Working Paper.
- ** Bautista, M. A., Galan, J. S., Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R., (2024). “Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Social Sources of Leader Strategy”, Working Paper.
- Arjona, A. (2017). *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, S. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weinstein, J. M. (2006). *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 7: Counterinsurgency and posconflict

- ** Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq. *Journal of Political Economy*, 119 (4), 766–819.
- ** Dell, M., & Querubin, P., (2018). “Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2), 701-764.
- ** Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilova, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., & Mitts, T., (2016). “Can War Foster Cooperation?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30(3): 249–274.
- Acemoglu, D., Fergusson, L., Robinson, J. A., Romero, D., & Vargas, J. F., (2020), “The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia’s False Positives”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 12(3), 1-43.
- Dube O., Cilliers, J., & Siddiqi, B., (2016). “Reconciling After Conflict Increases Social Capital But Decreases Well-being”, *Science*, 352(6287), 787-794.

Week 8: State-building

- ** Weigel, J., (2020). “The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(4), 1849-1903.
- ** Acemoglu, D., Cheema, A., Khwaja, A., & Robinson, J. A., (2020). “Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(8), 3090-3147.
- Henn, S., Mastaki Mugaruka, C., Ortiz, M., (Qihang) W., M., (2023). “Monopoly of Taxation Without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State’s Trade-Offs from Taxation”, forthcoming in *Review of Economic Studies*.
- Henn, S., and Tanutama, V., (2024). “State Expansion and Social Responses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Working Paper.