

Tong Wang

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EDUCATION

PhD Candidate in Public Policy, University of Chicago, Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies (expected, June 2018)

Committee: Roger Myerson (Chair), Robert LaLonde, Brent Hickman, Seth Zimmerman

Master of Public Policy, University of Chicago, Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, 2012

Master of Public Policy, University of Sydney, 2009

Bachelor of Business Administration, Sichuan University, 2008

WORKING PAPERS

A Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms (with Congyi Zhou), [Job Market Paper](#)

In recent years, China has experienced a trend of changing from the Boston mechanism (BM) to the Chinese parallel mechanism for high school and college admissions. Using a unique data set from the high-school-assignment system in China that combines survey data eliciting students' school preferences with administrative data that cover students' school choices and assignment results under both mechanisms, this paper compares the welfare performance of BM, the Chinese parallel mechanism, and the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism. We find DA yields higher average welfare than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is higher than the average utility under BM. We also find a more manipulable mechanism hurts students from low socioeconomic districts. Less manipulable mechanisms are more likely to assign students with higher score percentiles to schools with higher education quality, especially for students from higher socioeconomic districts. However, students from lower socioeconomic districts would be able to produce higher levels of human capital if they are assigned to schools with higher education quality.

Cheap Talk with Sender's Action

This article analyzes the cheap talk game in which the Sender can take actions simultaneously with the Receiver. In this paper, I show that in this case, under certain conditions, there is no pure strategy babbling equilibrium. Also, when there is a lying equilibrium, there is not necessarily a truth-telling equilibrium.

[Bidding Seats for High School Admission in China \(with Congyi Zhou\)](#)

For more than 15 years, many Chinese cities have provided students the option to pay higher tuition to acquire seats in their desired schools in their centralized public school admission procedure. Real-life matching mechanisms with the option to purchase seats are not strategy proof, and may generate inefficient and unstable outcomes. This study combines administrative data on high school admissions with survey data from China to estimate the students' preferences over schools and tuition. The counterfactual analysis indicates that the change from the deferred acceptance mechanism to the existing matching mechanism with the option to purchase seats may benefit moderately performing students, but may reduce the welfare of top students. If the deferred acceptance mechanism is replaced by the Student Optimal Purchasing Seats mechanism (SOPS), then all student groups will experience slight welfare loss. By contrast, schools will collect significantly more tuition with minimal change in the quality of admitted students under SOPS.

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Matching Algorithms under Positive Sorting Conditions

Becker (1973) shows that when the traits of male and female are complements, positive sorting maximizes the total output, and derives the share of common good in equilibrium by marginal productivities. The other stream of matching literature discusses the mechanism through which a stable matching can be achieved, but in these literature, strong assumptions are imposed on the two sides of matching market, such as gross substitutability (Kelso and Crawford (1982)). This paper, under positive sorting condition, analyzes the outcome and properties such as efficiency and stability, of different matching algorithms based on which the division of the common good is determined.

WORKING IN PROGRESS

Strategic Moves on the School Side in School Choice (with Congyi Zhou)

Dynamic School Choice, Centralized Early Admission in China (with Congyi Zhou)

Stratified School Choice Mechanisms

Which is more obviously strategy-proof?

PRE-PHD PUBLICATIONS

Wang, T. (2007), “Viewing the Inspiration Mechanism from a Chinese Management Perspective”, Merchant Weekly, Volume 280, No. 27, 2007, pp. 56-57 (in Chinese)

Wang, T. (2009), “Analysis of Technology Development and policy Subsystem Deviancy”, Academic Journal of Shandong Administration Institute & Shandong Economic Management Personnel Institute, Volume 100, No. 5, 2009, pp. 39-41 (in Chinese)

Wang, T. (2009), “A Brief Analysis of the Educational function of Multinational Corporations: A Case Study of Shell Company”, Oriental Forum (Academic Journal of Qingdao University), Volume 99, No. 5, 2009, pp. 76-80 (in Chinese)

CONFERENCE AND WORK SHOP PRESENTATION

The 17th Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference on Current Trends in Economics

PhD Students in Public Studies Research and Practice Conference

Chicago Harris PhD Workshop

University of Tsukuba Research Seminar

University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Lunch Workshop

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RESEARCH ASSISTANT EXPERIENCE

National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, 2012
Breakthrough Organization, Hong Kong, 2008 – 2010
Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington, 2006 – 2007
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2009

TEACHING ASSISTANT EXPERIENCE

September 2011 – December 2011, *Mathematical Statistics for Public Policy*
September 2012 – December 2012, September 2013 – December 2013, September 2014 – December 2014,
September 2015 – December 2015, September 2016 – December 2016, *Statistics for Public Policy (1)*
January 2013 – March 2013, *Program Evaluation*
September 2013 – December 2013, September 2014 – December 2014, *Political Economy of Public Policy*
January 2014 – March 2014, *Statistics for Public Policy (2)*
January 2014 – March 2014, *Public Policy and Labor Market*
March 2016 – June 2016, *Social Experiments: Design and Generalization*
PhD Level Classes:
January 2016 – March 2016, *Advanced Microeconomics*
Undergraduate Level Classes:
January 2017 – March 2017, *Public Policy Analysis*

JOURNAL REFEREES

Journal of Human Resources, The American Economic Review

HONORS AND AWARDS

Sichuan University Scholarship Award, 2005 – 2006
Sichuan University Excellent Student, 2005
Pacific Lutheran University, Exchange Student Fellowship, 2006 – 2007
Pacific Lutheran University, Dean's List, 2006 – 2007
Harris School of Public Policy, PhD Fellowship, 2012 – 2017
Research Fellowship, Confucius Center, 2015

SKILLS/OTHER

- **Computer:** Highly Proficient: Microsoft Word, Excel, Power Point, STATA, MATLAB; Proficient: R; Capable: SAS
 - **Language:** Highly Proficient: Chinese Mandarin (Native), Chinese Cantonese and English; Proficient: Japanese
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REFERECES

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